DATE: JANUARY 17, 1997 REPLY TO ATTN OF: OFFICE OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT, HR-6 SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF DRAFT DOE O 452.4, SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO: DIRECTIVES POINTS OF CONTACT The subject Draft Order, developed by the Office of Defense Programs, is attached for your review and comment. Draft DOE O 452.4, SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, was developed to clarify and formalize requirements for the Department's Nuclear Explosives and Weapons Use Control Program. The Directives Management Document for this Order was coordinated on June 20, 1996. Numerous comments were received from Headquarters, Operations Offices, and contractors concerning the draft order. The Office of Defense Programs has resolved all major issues and addressed and incorporated suggested comments, where appropriate. A set of definitions have been provided to assist in your review of the draft Order. Upon final issuance of DOE O 452.4, the definitions will be included in the DOE Directives System Glossary to be published in Spring 1997. Comments on the Draft Order are due by March 10, 1997. MAJOR ISSUES and SUGGESTED COMMENTS should be designated as such when submitted. MAJOR ISSUES shall be limited to instances where a directive in its entirety, or its requirements, would have an adverse effect on Departmental policy objectives, mission accomplishment, economy, efficiency, or other management concerns that would preclude its publication. The following procedures shall be followed for the submission of comments: Headquarters, Field Elements, and Power Marketing Administrations: Submit comments to Mr. Jon Todd, DP-21, A-368, GERMANTOWN, send facsimile to (301) 903-8628 or INTERNET address: jon.todd@dp.doe.gov; or forward via other electronic mail. Submit a second set of comments to Ms. Susan C. Smith, Corporate Management Practices Group, HR-62, Room 4B-222, FORRESTAL; send facsimile to (202) 586-9585, INTERNET addresses: susan.c.smith@hq.doe.gov. Field Elements: The package submitted by Field Elements shall include as an attachment, the comments provided by contractors. Operations Offices will send an additional copy of their comments to the Associate Deputy Secretary for Field Management. Contractors: Submit comments directly to their appropriate Field Element. You may also obtain these directives by accessing Explorer, DOE Directives On-line using the following address: http:\\www.explorer.doe.gov/. If there are any questions concerning the Draft Order, please contact one of the following individuals for assistance. For issues pertaining to the content of the Draft Order, please contact Mr. Todd at (301) 903-3545. Contact Ms. Smith at (202) 586-3296 for questions pertaining to the Directives System or the processing of these directives. Attachment December 6, 1996 DP-21 (J. Todd, 3-3545) SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS M. L. Morris, Director, Office of Organization and Management, HR-6 I am requesting that the attached subject draft order be issued for formal Departmental coordination. The Directives Management Document (DMD) for this order was issued June 20, 1996. Numerous comments were received from Headquarters, operations offices, and national laboratories concerning the DMD and draft order. All comments have been addressed and incorporated, where appropriate. As a result, the subject order is ready for formal coordination. If you have any questions, please call me or have your staff contact Jon Todd of my staff at 301-903- 3545. Thomas P. Seitz Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Management Defense Programs Attachment cc: S. Smith, HR-62 DP-21:JTODD:ws:3-3463:11/27/96:Q:\DP-21\coordmem.o Distribution: 3bcc: Std DASMA 1bcc: DP-21 Rdr 1bcc: DP-21 Corres. Book 1bcc: Team Leader DP-21 Correspondence Review________________12/ /96 DP-20.3 Correspondence Review_______________12/ /96 DP-20 Executive Correspondence Review________12/ /96 DP-21 DP-21 DP-21 DP-22 DP-23 Todd Rich McConagha Hahn Gordon-Hagerty 12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96 DP-16 NN-51 DP-20.1 DP-20 DeWitt McCallum Brown Seitz 12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96 U.S. Department of Energy ORDER Washington, D.C. DOE O 452.4 Draft: 1-17-97 SUBJECT: SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. OBJECTIVES. a. Establish Department of Energy (DOE) requirements and responsibilities to prevent the deliberate unauthorized use (DUU) of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives. b. Support the maintenance of a research and development program on a broad range of security and control methods and devices for nuclear weapons. c. Develop positive measures to maintain control of all nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives during all phases of their life cycles. d. Protect public health and safety in conjunction with the Department of Defense (DoD) through dual agency judgment and responsibility for the surety of nuclear weapons. e. Require the development, implementation, and maintenance of an integrated system of positive measures to protect all nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives in the custody of the DOE against DUU. 2. CANCELLATION. None. 3. APPLICABILITY. a. DOE Elements. This Order applies to DOE Headquarters and field elements involved in the DOE Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program. b. Contractors. As set forth in the Contractor Requirements Document (CRD, Attachment 1), this Order applies to all laboratories, contractors, and subcontractors that manage, oversee, or conduct the DOE NEWS Program as provided by law and/or contract and implemented by the appropriate contracting officer. 4. REQUIREMENTS. a. The Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Security and Control Program (hereafter known as the Program) comprises an integrated system of positive measures to maintain control of nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons at all times. These measures allow use when authorized and directed by proper authority and protect against deliberate unauthorized use. Major elements of the Program include the following. (1) Interim Personnel Assurance Program (PAP) Procedures and Standards, dated October 2, 1996, to ensure the reliability of DOE and contractor employees requiring access to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives. (2) Measures for the use control of nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons, including design features for nuclear weapons that are incorporated and employed at the earliest practical point during assembly and removed at the latest practical point during disassembly or dismantlement. (3) Measures to assist the timely recapture or recovery of lost or stolen nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives. b. The DOE shall conduct research and development for positive measures that can prevent the DUU of nuclear weapons. c. All DOE nuclear explosive operations shall meet the following qualitative DOE Surety Standards to prevent deliberate unauthorized nuclear detonation, fissile material dispersal from the pit, or loss of control. There shall be positive measures to: (1) minimize the possibility of or delay deliberate unauthorized nuclear detonation, and (2) minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts that could lead to high explosive deflagration or high explosive detonation. d. DUU evaluations shall be performed and may be specific to a DOE nuclear explosive, nuclear explosive operation, class of operations, or a facility or site. The evaluation shall address DOE nuclear explosive operations to help ensure that positive measures are adequate to meet the surety standards given in paragraph 4c. These positive measures shall be continually evaluated at the direction of the Operations Office Manager against all existing and emerging threats as well as technological advancements. e. To the maximum extent practical, control criteria and methods shall be integrated into the process design for nuclear explosive operations. f. The responsible Operations Office shall conduct annual program reviews. These reviews will fulfill the requirements of the appraisal process as defined in the DOE NEWS Program and shall cover: (1) relevant ongoing activities; (2) future plans/projects; (3) resource requirements, including the necessary resources to implement and administer this Order; and (4) major concerns and issues. g. DOE shall cooperate with the DoD and other Federal agencies as required to provide protection against DUU and to assess the effectiveness of surety features for all U.S. nuclear weapon systems throughout their life cycles. h. Nuclear weapon design features shall support secure critical command and control communications whenever practical. i. DOE shall assist DoD in designating nuclear command and control critical equipment and components to ensure that these items are developed and maintained to meet the criteria designated in National Security Decision Directive-281. 5. RESPONSIBILITIES. a. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1). (1) Recommends and implements DOE policy concerning the DUU of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives in DOE custody. 2) With DoD, ensures dual agency oversight of the surety of nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons. b. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Development (DASRD/DP-10). Allocates research and development (R&D) resources and directs R&D of positive measures to prevent the DUU of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives. c. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Management (DASMASM/DP-20). (1) Establishes and oversees all aspects of the Program. (2) Establishes programs for coordinating and assisting DoD and other Federal agencies in the recapture and recovery of nuclear explosives or nuclear weapons for which physical control has been lost. (3) Represents DOE regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems control to the DoD and other Federal agencies. (4) Assists the DoD and other Federal agencies in designating nuclear command and control critical equipment and ensuring that they are developed to meet criteria specified in National Security Decision Directive-281. (5) Directs the assessment of the effectiveness of control features of nuclear weapons in DOE and DoD custody. (6) Establishes programs to incorporate improved use control measures in the enduring stockpile and promotes those programs found to be cost effective and feasible within the Military Services. (7) Creates and sustains advisory committees as needed to consider and assess control issues and to make programmatic recommendations to the DASMASM. (8) In coordination with the Director, Office of Security Affairs, ensures proper integration of safety and use control with security. d. The Director, Office of Security Affairs (NN-50). (1) Develops and establishes DOE policies for the safeguards and security of nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons and their components. (2) Directs evaluation of physical protection technology and equipment to meet present and future safeguards and security requirements for nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons. (3) Advises the DASMASM on DOE Safeguards and Security requirements to implement the security element of the surety standards as defined in the DOE NEWS Program. (4) Represents DOE security policy to the DoD and other Federal agencies. (5) Establishes the security programs and policies for coordinating with DoD and other Federal agencies in the recapture and recovery of nuclear explosives or nuclear weapons. e. Managers of Operations Offices. (1) Ensure implementation of the Program. (2) Conduct an annual Program review for the DASMASM and other DOE senior-level managers. (3) Assess the effectiveness of the integrated system of positive measures to protect nuclear explosives under their cognizance against DUU. (4) Certify to the DASMASM that all nuclear explosive operations under their cognizance meet the Surety Standards in paragraph 4c, and specify the basis for making this certification. Specification may be by reference to other documents that do not need to be included in the certification memorandum. 6. IMPLEMENTATION. Contractors shall refer to the attached CRD for implementation requirements. 7. REFERENCES. a. Interim Personnel Assurance Program Procedures and Standards (U), October 2, 1996 (Unclassified), the rule that defines a voluntary human reliability program and provides requirements and guidance for personnel performing nuclear explosive operations. b. "Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety (U)," June 27, 1991 (Unclassified), signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. c. Memorandum of Understanding, "Department of Defense and the Department of Energy on Objectives and Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities (U)," January 17, 1983 (Unclassified). d. National Security Decision Directive-309, "Nuclear Weapons Safety, Security, and Control (U)," June 27, 1988 (Confidential), which defines the joint, dual- agency surety responsibilities to protect the public health and safety between the DoD and DOE. e. National Security Decision Directive-281, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control (U)," August 21, 1987 (Top Secret), which provides the basis for the attainment and maintenance of a nuclear command and control system under the authority and direction of the Commander-in-Chief. f. DOE O 452.1, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM (U), 4-29-96 (Unclassified), which establishes DOE objectives, standards, criteria, authorities, and responsibilities for the nuclear explosive and weapon surety program. g. DOE O 452.2, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS (U), 4-29-96 (Unclassified), which establishes DOE objectives, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for nuclear explosive and weapon safety. h. DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM (U), 9- 26-95 (Unclassified), which establishes basic requirements and responsibilities for the DOE Safeguards and Security Program. i. DOE 5530.1A, ACCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP (U), 9-20-91 (Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy for response to accidents and significant incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components. j. DOE 5530.2, NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM (U), 9-20-91 (Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy for Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) operations in response to malevolent radiological incidents. k. DOE 5610.13, JOINT DOE/DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM SAFETY, SECURITY, AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES (U), 10-10-90 (Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control activities. l. DOE 5610.14, TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM OPERATIONS (U), 5-12-93 (Unclassified), which establishes the DOE policies for and implementation of the management and operation of the Transportation Safeguards System Program. m. DOE 5632.1C, PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS (U), 7-15-94 (Unclassified), which establishes policy, authorities, and responsibilities for the protection and control of safeguards and security interests. n. DOE M 5632.1C-1, MANUAL FOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS (U), 7-15-94 (Unclassified), which provides supplementary requirements for the protection and control of safeguards and security interests applicable to the design, modification, and/or operation of DOE facilities. o. DOE 5632.7A, PROTECTIVE FORCE PROGRAM (U), 2-13-95 (Unclassified), which establishes the Protective Force responsibilities to conduct on-site protection of DOE nuclear weapons using deadly force and to conduct recapture/recovery operations, including fresh pursuit off DOE facilities in the effort to recover stolen weapons. p. DOE 5633.3B, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (U), 9-7-94 (Unclassified), which prescribes minimum requirements and procedures for control and accountability of nuclear materials at DOE-owned and -leased facilities and DOE-owned nuclear materials at other facilities exempt from licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 8. CONTACT. DASMASM, Office of Weapons Surety, (301)903-3463. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY: ARCHER L. DURHAM Assistant Secretary for Human Resources and Administration Contractor Requirements Document for Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons 1. A system for protecting nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives against deliberate, unauthorized use (DUU) shall be established and shall include the following. (a) An integrated system of positive measures to maintain security and control of nuclear explosives and weapons at all times. These measures shall allow use when authorized and directed by proper authority and prevent or delay unauthorized use. (b) Personnel assurance programs to ensure the reliability of employees requiring access to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives. (c) Use control measures that deter or delay unauthorized acts by anyone who gains access to nuclear weapons. Measures for the control of nuclear explosives and weapons shall include design features that are incorporated and employed at the earliest practicable point during assembly and removed at the latest practical point during disassembly. (d) Methods to ensure timely recapture or recovery of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives in the event physical control is lost. 2. Positive measures for safety, security, and use control shall be effectively balanced to achieve the surety standards as follows to prevent unintended nuclear detonations, fissile material dispersal from the pit, or loss of control. (a) Positive measures shall be established to minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts that could lead to high explosive deflagration or high explosive detonation. (b) Positive measures shall be established to minimize the possibility of or delay unauthorized nuclear detonation. 3. The Design Laboratories shall: (a) Conduct R&D on a broad range of security and control methods and devices for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives. (b) Provide support to the Program. 4. The Production Agencies shall provide support to the Program as required by the responsible Operations Office. DEFINITIONS 1. Control. The application of systems, devices or procedures that allow timely authorized use while precluding or delaying unauthorized use. 2. Deliberate Unauthorized Use (DUU). A nuclear detonation, high explosive detonation or deflagration, launch, release, or transfer for use of nuclear explosives or weapons, or termination of nuclear operations, not authorized by the President, resulting from a deliberate attempt by one or more individuals to circumvent critical elements of the Nuclear Command and Control System. 3. High Explosive Deflagration. A rapid chemical reaction in which the output of heat is sufficient for the reaction to proceed and accelerate without input of heat from another source. Deflagration is a surface phenomenon, with the reaction products flowing away from the unreacted material along the surface at subsonic velocity. 4. High Explosive Detonation. A violent chemical reaction within a chemical compound or mechanical mixture evolving heat and pressure. A detonation is a reaction that proceeds through the reacted material toward the unreacted material at a supersonic velocity. 5. Launch. Propulsion of a missile with a nuclear warhead into controlled flight or uncontrolled flight beyond the immediate area of the launch site. 6. Nuclear Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by the President, as Commander in Chief, through established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations of military forces; as Chief Executive over all government activities that support those operations; and as Head of State over required multinational actions that support those operations. 7. Nuclear Command and Control Critical Equipment. Specifically designated equipment including software used to build, encode, decode, transmit, or receive emergency action messages; that identify nuclear targets, select nuclear weapons to be used against specific targets, and route nuclear-weapons-carrying platforms to appropriate launch points; support or inhibit the delivery, arming, fuzing, and firing of nuclear weapons themselves; positive control material and devices; and nuclear weapons hardware. 8. Nuclear Command and Control System. The designated combination of flexible and enduring elements including facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, personnel, and the structure in which these elements are integrated, all of which are essential for planning, directing, and controlling nuclear weapon operations of military forces and the activities that support those operations. 9. Nuclear Detonation. An energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of one microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating four or more pounds of trinitrotoluene. 10. Nuclear Explosive. Any assembly containing fissionable and/or fusionable materials and main charge high explosive parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation (e.g., a nuclear weapon or test device). 11. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety. The safety, security, and use control of nuclear explosives and weapons. 12. Nuclear Explosive Operation. Any activity involving a nuclear explosive, including activities in which main charge high explosive parts and pit are collocated. 13. Nuclear Weapon. A nuclear explosive configured for the Department of Defense use. 14. Nuclear Weapon System. A nuclear weapon and its intended means for delivering it to the target. This includes associated support equipment, noncombat delivery vehicles, facilities, procedures, and personnel. 15. Pit. A fissile component or set of fissile components designed to fit in a cavity of an implosion system and which if placed therein will create a nuclear explosive. 16. Positive Measures. Design features, rules, procedures, or other controls used individually or collectively to provide nuclear explosive surety. 17. Recapture. Locating and/or regaining control of a nuclear weapon and/or special nuclear material (SNM), which is under unauthorized possession, while still within the confines of a DOE site/facility. 18. Recovery. Locating and/or regaining control of a nuclear weapon and/or SNM, which is under unauthorized possession, that has been removed from within the confines of a DOE site/facility or DOE possession. 19. Release. The separation of a missile or gravity bomb with a nuclear warhead from a delivery aircraft. 20. Unauthorized Act. Any intentional action taken by one or more individuals who have not been authorized and approved by proper authority. 21. Use Control. The application of systems, devices, or procedures that allow timely authorized use of a nuclear explosive while precluding or delaying deliberate unauthorized nuclear detonation.