

*AMC Suppl 1 to AR 50-5 and AR 50-5-1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
5001 EISENHOWER AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22333-0001

AMC Supplement 1
to AR 50-5 and AR 50-5-1

20 July 1992

Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel

NUCLEAR SURETY

This supplement and basic regulatory requirements are applicable to HQ AMC, AMCCOM, DESCOM, MICOM, TECOM, CECOM, U.S. Army TMDE Activity, their subordinate organizations, and all separate reporting activities that have nuclear or nuclear-related mission responsibilities.

All supplemental paragraphs in section I pertain to AR 50-5, Nuclear Surety. Nuclear surety program requirements in this section are applicable to nuclear reactor facilities. Paragraphs in section II pertain to AR 50-5-1, Nuclear Surety. Nuclear reactor security requirements are contained in AR 190-54, Nuclear Reactor Security Program.

Further supplementation by AMC subordinate commands and installations is not permitted.

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*This supplement supersedes AMC Supplement 1 to AR 50-5 and AR 50-5-1, 22 Jan 88.

SECTION 1

AR 50-5, 7 August 1989, is supplemented as follows:

Page 3, paragraph 1-4, Responsibilities. Add subparagraphs o through u.

o. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Ammunition (AMCAM) directs and manages the USAMC Nuclear Surety Program.

p. Each deputy chief of staff and separate staff office chief, Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command (HQ AMC), will --

(1) Consider nuclear surety requirements in their areas of responsibility and coordinate all significant actions related to nuclear surety with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Ammunition.

(2) Furnish information copies of all letters and messages containing policy, significant procedures, and technical information relative to nuclear surety to the Director, USAMC Surety Field Activity, (AMXSA), Dover, NJ 07801-5299.

q. Director, USAMC Surety Field Activity, will conduct surety assistance visits and management reviews as required by HQ AMC.

r. Director, U.S. Army TMDE Activity, will furnish information copies of nuclear weapon and reactor-related calibration inspections to HQ AMC (AMCAM-CN) and the Director, USAMC Surety Field Activity.

s. Commanders of each major subordinate command (MSC), installation, or activity that have nuclear or nuclear-related mission responsibilities will --

(1) Establish a Nuclear Surety Program per the policies, procedures, and concepts set forth in the basic regulation and this supplement. Program requirements will include as a minimum --

(a) Command emphasis for program visibility at all levels.

(b) Comprehensive surety plans and directives for each mission activity.

(c) Establishment of surety objectives, goals, and milestones to promote program management.

(d) Assignment of specific responsibilities for compliance with surety requirements and the attainment of surety objectives.

(2) Appoint a Nuclear Surety Board and a nuclear surety officer for independent monitorship of the organization's surety activities. The surety officer will have direct access to the commander, will be

supported by an adequate staff, and will have primary authority to develop and implement the command surety program. The surety officer and surety board will --

(a) Assist the command in properly discharging surety responsibilities identified in the basic regulation and this supplement.

(b) Meet quarterly at the MSC and reactors level, and monthly at depot and activity levels to identify surety problem areas requiring command attention or emphasis and to recommend actions necessary for problem resolution. Minutes, to include a record of actions taken in regard to surety recommendations, will be presented to the commander for review and approval. These documents will be retained for a minimum of 18 months.

(c) Review and analyze the results of test exercises, inspections, audits, and surveys which address surety areas and assess the adequacy of corrective actions.

(d) Ensure consistent application of Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) requirements by all elements of the organization.

(3) Furnish current copies of command directives and documents which implement the command Nuclear Surety Program to HQ AMC (AMCAM-CN) and to the Director, USAMC Surety Field Activity.

t. Director, USAMC Security Support Activity, will review plans, conduct security assessments and surveys, and provide assistance as necessary to ensure an effective security environment.

u. Director, U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School, will establish and maintain a training program to support the requirements of the U.S. Army's Nuclear Surety Program.

Page 5, paragraph 3-3e(4), PRP policy. Add the following at the end.

The USAMC installation commander is authorized to act as the MACOM designee for this function.

Page 5, paragraph 3-3h. Add the following at the end.

PRP qualification cannot be identified as a critical element in a civilian employee's General Performance Appraisal System (GPAS) requirements.

Page 6, paragraph 3-5a(3), Nuclear duty positions. Add subparagraph (e).

(e) Surety personnel at nuclear weapon sites who monitor operations will be in the PRP.

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Page 6, paragraph 3-5c(2). Add the following at the end.

This also applies to USAMC Surety Management Review Team members.

Page 8, paragraph 3-7, Training requirements. Add subparagraphs d and e.

d. Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition Surveillance) interns must be qualified upon completion of their training for assignment to any designated career position to include nuclear duty positions. Interns who fail to meet PRP or academic standards will be immediately removed from the career program.

e. Training requirements for AMCCOM and MICOM personnel who might be placed on temporary duty requiring access to nuclear weapons (engineering, design, or other weapons systems development positions) may be satisfied by on-the-job experience in the weapons system development process.

Page 10, paragraph 3-16, Certifying official's evaluation and briefing. Add subparagraph f.

f. The DCS for Ammunition will determine reliability and conduct the necessary PRP briefing for the Director, USAMC Surety Field Activity.

Page 12, paragraph 3-24j, Permanent disqualification. Add the following at the end.

The names of permanently disqualified military personnel will be telephonically reported to HQ AMC Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (officer personnel data is provided to AMCPE, DSN 284-9325, and enlisted personnel data is provided to AMCPE, DSN 284-9325). The telephonic report is to be followed by the appropriate request for reclassification or reassignment.

Page 13, paragraph 3-28, Information requirements. Add the following at the end.

Reporting activities will forward the Annual PRP Status Report to arrive at HQ AMC (AMCAM-CN) not later than (NLT) 20 January each year.

Page 13, paragraph 4-3b, Logistical movement considerations. Add the following at the end.

The Commander, AMCCOM, will provide necessary information and instructions for nuclear weapons movements to HQ AMC, DESCOM, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and DA Staff agencies as appropriate. This data will also be provided to both consignor and consignee. When possible, advance shipment information will be provided 30 days prior to scheduled shipment date.

Page 13, paragraph 4-3e. Add the following at the end.

There is no AMC requirement to have emergency destruction plans, procedures, or materiel in support of nuclear weapons shipments to, from, or within CONUS.

Page 14, Paragraph 4-3h. Add subparagraph (6).

(6) AMC installations have the authority to ship trainers per AR 55-203, Movement of Nuclear Weapons, and AR 55-355, Military Traffic Management Regulation. Appropriate commercial carriers may be used for any administrative movement/shipments. Military couriers will only be required to escort shipments of trainers that have a classification of Secret Restricted Data (SRD) as prescribed in AR 55-203.

Page 14, paragraph 4-3q. Add the following at the end.

Following air movement from AMC depots, security forces will remain at the airfield for at least 20 minutes after the aircraft is airborne. The function of these forces is to assist in equipment security should the air mission be aborted. Weapons custody is not a consideration in this instance.

Page 14, paragraph 4-3. Add subparagraph u.

u. On-depot transportation of nuclear weapons is not considered a logistical movement. SOPs to cover all on-depot movement procedures will be developed and published. All positions and functions associated with the movement will be identified and personnel filling these positions will be fully trained in their respective movement duties.

(1) Nuclear weapons that are moved by motor vehicle will be loaded and braced per AMC Drawing 19-48-6267-SW11M49. The 463L Palletizing System can also be used. All load-carrying vehicles will have at least one fire extinguisher. All vehicles and handling equipment will be inspected prior to use per **AMC-R 385-100**, Safety Manual, and all safety requirements prescribed in this regulation will be met.

(2) In movement operations outside the limited area, two-way radio communication capability will be provided for all convoy vehicles.

(3) All movements outside the limited area will be under the direct supervision of a movement commander and escorted by a security force of not less than five properly cleared armed guards who are supported by a response force (RF) of not less than 15 persons.

(a) Escort personnel will be positioned so that one guard rides with the driver of each load-carrying vehicle and two guards (one may be a driver) ride in each of the vehicles immediately preceding and

following the load-carrying vehicle(s). These guards will be used by the movement commander to provide security for the load-carrying vehicle(s) and to provide an initial firefighting capability, if required.

(b) A nonload-carrying vehicle will carry the additional firefighting equipment (minimum of two 10-BC rated carbon dioxide or dry chemical extinguishers).

(c) Convoys will expedite movement between storage locations and air strips. Vehicles will be examined prior to convoy assembly and need not be inspected further until the movement mission is complete, as long as the vehicles remain under security surveillance. Badge exchange procedures at the limited area perimeter may be deferred to expedite convoy movement through barrier gates.

(d) The reserve force which accompanies the convoy will be positioned to maximize effective response to any emergency situation within 5 minutes.

(4) The prescribed route will be followed. Prior to actual movement, route reconnaissance will be conducted to ensure that the route is safe and secure. All on-depot bridges and culverts will be inspected at least semiannually for structural soundness along route movements.

Page 14, paragraph 4-5, Command and control (C2). Add subparagraph d.

d. AMC courier officers will be provided with both a Letter of Identification and a Letter of Instruction by their immediate commander. Formats are at appendixes H and I of this supplement.

Page 15, paragraph 4-9a, Movement training. Add the following at the end.

AMC courier officers must successfully complete the Nuclear Weapons Courier Course conducted by the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition School prior to being assigned courier duty responsibilities.

Page 15, paragraph 4-9. Add subparagraphs c and d:

c. Proficiency certification will be written in locally developed format and retained as a matter of record. Certification will be based upon completion of required training and the certifier's assessment of the individual's proficiency in the subject areas identified in paragraph 4-9b.

d. Certification is a one-time requirement except in those cases where an individual has not participated in a logistics movement mission or training exercise for a period of 6 months. In such cases, the individual must be recertified prior to participation in the movement of a war reserve weapon.

Page 6, paragraph 4-16a, General. Add the following at the end.

Within this command, **AMC-R 385-100** will be used in place of TM 9-1300-206, Ammo and Explosive standards.

Page 16, paragraph 4-16b. Add the following at the end.

This requirement does not apply to vehicles carrying nuclear weapons on AMC installations.

Page 16, paragraph 14-7b, Vehicle inspection and maintenance. Add subparagraphs (1) and (2).

(1) Servicability of Department of Energy (DOE) vehicles is a DOE responsibility. DOE vehicles (empty or loaded) will be allowed into the limited area without search when the convoy commander verifies that the convoy has been sanitized. If not, the vehicles will be fully searched.

(2) DOE convoy vehicles, personnel, and hand-carried items remain subject to inspection or search at the discretion of the installation commander. This discretion should only be opted when justified by probable cause based on valid information.

Page 17, paragraph 4-24b, Aircraft parking requirements. Add the following at the end.

For operations at AMC, use AMC-R 385-100 in lieu of TM 9-1300-206.

Page 21, paragraph 5-4e, Responsibilities. Add subparagraphs (9) and (10).

(9) Specific responsibilities within AMC are as follows:

(a) The Deputy Chief of Staff or Ammunition (AMCAM) will--

1. Provide overall staff supervision of Nuclear Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (NAIRA) activities within the headquarters and, in coordination with proponent staff elements, promulgate command policy and guidance on this subject.

2. Identify general officer on-scene-commander (OSC) designee(s).

3. Act as principal advisor to the Commanding General on NAIRA matters. This function includes assessment of the seriousness of a nuclear weapon or reactor accident/incident and the need to alert and/or dispatch an OSC and the Army Service Response Force.

4. Assume the position as Director of AMC Operations Center (AMCOC), as required, and identify appropriate staffing during the emergency situation.

(b) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Readiness (AMCRE) will--

1. Coordinate, publish, and maintain the Command NAIRA plan as part of the headquarters Disaster Control Plan (DCP).

2. Maintain the current availability status of general officer OSC designee(s).

3. Activate the AMC Operations Center (AMCOC) and coordinate its activities during actual and exercise NAIRA operations.

4. Obtain military aircraft and other available support as requested by the OSC and staff through JNACC.

(c) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering, Housing, and Installation Logistics (AMCEN) will maintain current data on the availability and location of materiel and equipment required to support NAIRA operations.

(d) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (AMCRM) will -- plan, program, budget, provide, and disburse funds for the planning execution of annual Army Service Response Force exercises.

(e) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (AMCPE) through the Provost Marshal (AMCPE-S) will --

1. Provide law enforcement and security review and inputs, as required, to the command contingency plans and directives addressing NAIRA operations.

2. Review and evaluate subordinate command NAIRA plans for adequacy and completeness in terms of security and law enforcement, to include rules of engagement and the use of force by security forces.

3. Provide advice and assistance to the Commanding General and subordinate commanders on law enforcement and security aspects for all phases of NAIRA operations.

(f) The Chief, Safety Office (AMCSF), will --

1. Provide the single HQ AMC point of contact (POC) for duty hour Notification of nuclear accident or incident and initiate command notification alert procedures, as required.

2. Inform the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), of changes in AMC membership on the Nuclear Weapons Accident Investigation Board (AR 15-22, Nuclear Weapons Accident Investigation Board).

3. Forward technical investigation and analysis reports to HQDA (AR 385-40, Accident Reporting and Records).

4. Review nuclear reactor investigation reports (AR 385-40).

(g) the Chief, Public Affairs Office (AMCPA), will --

1. Act as the principal adviser to the Commander and the AMC staff on internal and external public affairs issues in all phases of NAIRA operations.

2. Review and secure HQDA approval of AMC and subordinate command contingency news releases which address nuclear accident or incident situations.

3. Provide public affairs support to the Joint Information Center (JIC) established by the OSC at an accident/incident scene.

4. Identify and organize an augmentation team of public affairs specialists from AMC MSCs who will deploy, upon notification, to an accident/incident site to support the OSC Public Affairs Officer.

(h) The Command Counsel (AMCCC) will review command NAIRA plans and provide legal advice and assistance to the Commanding General and subordinate commanders regarding the proper implementation of these directives.

(i) Other DCS and separate staff office chiefs will provide functional area support, as required in the event of NAIRA operations.

(j) The Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) will --

1. Dispatch Army nuclear weapons technicians to the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or incident and provide technical advice when requested by HQ AMC.

2. Establish a single POC for coordination of all AMCCOM NAIRA activities with HQ AMC.

3. Prepare and forward nuclear weapon technical investigation and analysis reports (AR 385-40) to HQ AMC (AMCSF).

4. Execute OSC duties, as assigned.

(k) The Commander, U.S. Army Depot System Command (DESCOM), will--

1. Establish a single POC for coordination of all DESCOM NAIRA activities with HQ AMC.

2. Execute OSC duties as assigned.

(l) The Commander, U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM), will--

1. Dispatch Army nuclear weapons delivery system technicians to the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or incident and provide technical advice when requested by HQ AMC.

2. Establish a single POC for coordination of all MICOM NAIRA activities with HQ AMC.

(m) The Commander, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), will --

1. Develop a plan for recovery of special nuclear materiel.

2. Establish a single POC for coordination of all TECOM NAIRA activities with HQ USAMC.

3. Execute OSC duties, as assigned.

(n) The Commander, Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) will --

1. Organize, equip, and train a Radiological Control (RADCON) team(s). Teams will be capable of departing for the scene of a nuclear accident within 4 hours of notification.

2. Prepare and maintain an SOP which addresses procedures required for prompt response to a nuclear accident. Procedures will include team alert and transportation functions.

(o) Director, USAMC Surety Field Activity will --

1. Conduct SMR, as directed by AMC.

2. Plan for, conduct, and evaluate AMC biennial Nuclear Army Service Response Force exercises in coordination with the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School.

(p) The Director, U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School will --

1. Plan for, conduct, and evaluate AMC biennial Nuclear Army Service Response Force exercises in coordination with Surety Field Activity.

2. Establish and conduct a special course of instruction to support NAIRA operations.

(q) The Director, AMC Surety Field Activity, will provide health physicist staff support to AMC designated OSCs, as required.

(r) AMC Commanders with nuclear missions will --

1. Ensure that local NAIRA plans fully identify all initial response force (IRF) functions and designate the organizational activities that are responsible for these operations. NAIRA plans must be thoroughly coordinated, to include integration of appropriate medical department activity (MEDDAC), EOD, augmentation force, and other supporting organizations.

2. Designate themselves or, appoint another field grade officer as the installation Response and Assistance Control Officer. In either case, a deputy (field grade officer or civilian, minimum GS-12 or equivalent) will be designated to assist this officer at the scene of a nuclear weapon or reactor accident/incident. One of these individuals will be available or on call whenever operations involving nuclear weapons or reactor operations are in progress. Incumbents filling these positions will be qualified by experience or by successful completion of a NAIRA course at the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School or its equivalent.

3. Organize, equip, train, and maintain organic radiation response teams. Reaction time objective is a deployment capability within 1 hour of notification when operations are in progress and within 4 hours at other times.

4. Brief new OSC designees on all aspects of the Recovery Plan.

5. Provide appropriate monitoring teams to the CECOM RADCON team, as required.

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(10) Copies of organization NAIRA plans and implementing SOPs, to include revisions, will be provided to HQ AMC (AMCAM-CN), the Director, USAMC Surety Field Activity, Dover, NJ 07801-5299, and exchanged among supporting and supported activities.

Page 26, paragraph 7-2a, Responsibilities. Add the following at the end.

Nuclear-capable depots will comply with subparagraphs (1) through (6) below. Direct communication with USANCA and USAISEC is authorized.

Page 32, paragraph 8-12, Reclamas. Add the following at the end.

All reclamas will be forwarded through command channels to DCS for Ammunition for resolution.

SECTION II

AR 50-5-1, 30 Aug 1991, is supplemented as follows:

Page 7, paragraph 1-23a, The two-person concept. Add the following at the end.

The standards for applying the two-person concept in AMC are contained in appendix J of this supplement.

Page 9, paragraph 1-36, Site security profile report. Add the following at the end.

Reporting organizations will submit three copies of the site security profile report to arrive at the USAMC Security Support Activity, Ft. Gillem, Forest Park, GA 30050-5000, NLT the 15th day of December. The Security Support Activity will forward this report to the ultimate addressees.

Page 11, paragraph 2-12d, Physical security plan. Add the following at the end.

Physical Security Plans (PSP) will be maintained current. A copy that includes MSC-approved changes will be provided to the USAMC Security Support Activity, the office of record for these documents. Additionally, one copy of the current PSP will be furnished to HQ AMC (AMCPE-S).

Page 11, paragraph 2-12, Physical security plan. Add subparagraph e.

e. Building contents. Security plans will include procedures for informing emergency response forces of the contents of the storage or maintenance structure to which they are responding; e.g., nuclear weapons or components, explosives, or inert materiel. The plan will also address procedures for passing this information promptly, and in detail, to the installation command group.

Page 16, paragraph 3-13f, Lighting system (Perimeter Lighting Controls). Add the following at the end.

Activation means both an "on and off" capability. Additional switches for perimeter security light shall be secured so that they cannot be operated by unauthorized persons. To ensure reliability and operability of auxiliary generators supporting surety operations, it is imperative that they be inspected and tested. Appendix C, AR 420-43, Electrical Services, outlines specific exercise schedules for auxiliary generators. Director of Engineering and Housing (DEH) should be contacted to determine how the requirements of AR 420-43 are being implemented. Test results should be available from either the DEH or using activity

personnel. It is important to note the auxiliary generators of interest are those specifically designated to support surety security operations; e.g., intrusion detection system (IDS), lighting, and communications.

Page 17, paragraph 3-20, Detection. Add subparagraphs c. and d.

c. Design. Responsibilities and procedures for design, installation, and use of IDSs and other electronic security enhancement systems (closed circuit television (CCTV) and access control devices) are contained in CEGJ-166-25, and **AMC Supplement 1 to AR 190-13**, chapter 4.

d. Testing. IDS testing will be accomplished on a daily and monthly basis. Semiannual maintenance inspections, conducted by qualified maintenance personnel, satisfy the system tests for that month.

(1) The daily test consists of a remote system circuit continuity check performed by the IDS panel monitor.

(2) The monthly tests include activation of all perimeter sector sensors, all sensors installed on entrances to and within protected structures, and system operation under IDS back-up (battery) power. All these tests need not be accomplished on the same day. Selective perimeter sector and structure sensor activation tests may be conducted daily, providing that selection ensures a 100-percent monthly check of all components.

(a) Tamper and grid circuit operation is tested by opening the Bunker Entry Box (BEB) and IDS console to activate the circuit switches.

(b) Sensors, control units, and junction boxes will not be routinely opened or removed from structure surfaces for testing purposes.

(3) Maintenance requirements are addressed in Chapter 5 Electronic Security Systems Requirements, and Appendix G (U) (Alarm Types and Specifications), basic regulation.

Page 20, paragraph 4-18, Storage structure entry hinderance. Add the following at the end.

For AMC depots, concrete King Tut blocks will be emplaced to inhibit unauthorized opening of storage igloos containing nuclear weapons at all times except when an operation is being performed. Adjacent igloos may be opened for operational efficiency. However, appropriate security forces must be in place at each igloo. Security personnel will conduct a survey of the storage area at the end of each operational period to ensure blocks have been replaced and lifting equipment secured.

Page 23, paragraph 5-10b, Test and record requirements (Purpose). Add subparagraph (6).

(6) Scheduling. All testing should be programmed in such a fashion that the entire system is not subject to a 1 or 2 day crash program. Systematic scheduling will be developed to ensure all systems are completed within the timeframe articulated.

Page 23, paragraph 5-10c. (1) Test and record requirements (Record of Alarms). Add the following at the end.

The intentional activation of previously identified sensors, not related to IDS testing; i.e., the known/deliberate opening of igloo doors for movement, tech ops, etc., need not be recorded.

Page 26, paragraph 8-4a, Identification badges (Badge system). Add the following at the end.

Badge exchange systems will use two badges per individual. One badge permits entry into the outer area and the second is required for entry into a more sensitive security area. The individual exchanges his/her initial badge for a second badge at the entrance to the more sensitive area. Exchange of badges for an exclusion area will be accomplished only by security personnel at points of ingress and egress.

Page 26, paragraph 8-4, Identification badges. Add subparagraph h.

h. Other Markings

(1) Installation badges used for security identification at AMC nuclear weapons storage depots will be conspicuously marked to identify the restricted areas to which the bearer is authorized access (controlled, limited, or exclusion areas).

(2) Exchange badges used within the limited area perimeter will be color-coded to clearly differentiate between exclusion area access authorization (PRP personnel) and limited area access authorization (non-PRP personnel with requisite security clearance). Exclusion area exchange badges for individuals who require escort will identify the specific escort requirement ("1 unarmed escort/"2 armed escorts") in bold face type.

Page 28, paragraph 8-6e, Searches and inspections (Sealed Packages). Add the following at the end.

Current DD Form 577 (Signature Card) for personnel authorized to sign DA Form 1818 (Individual Property Pass) will be maintained at the entry control facility. The number of persons authorized to sign passes will be held to a minimum.

Page 28, paragraph 8-7b, Vehicle/MHE control (After Duty Hours). Add at the end.

Security personnel will conduct a survey at the completion of each operational period to ensure that King Tut blocks are replaced and that lifting equipment is properly secured.

Page 28, paragraph 8-10, Perimeter patrols. Add subparagraphs a through d.

a. Exclusion area entrances and the perimeter fenceline will be continually patrolled. Motorized patrol intervals are not to exceed 45 minutes. Each section of the fenceline will be patrolled at 5-minute intervals when perimeter IDS is inoperative.

b. Locks on auxiliary perimeter gates and exclusion area structures will be visually checked at the start of each shift.

c. Motorized patrols will be comprised of a minimum of two persons during periods of darkness or reduced visibility.

d. Security functions which support technical operations (opening structures, escorting personnel, maintenance building security sweeps, etc.) will not be performed by RF personnel or those personnel assigned to established posts and patrols.

Page 30, paragraph 8-16, Duress system. Add subparagraphs c. and d.

c. Guard Force. Code words or authentication signals will be exchanged between security guards controlling exclusion area access and the IDS monitor prior to opening a structure or igloo where nuclear weapons or components are located. Response forces (RF) will be dispatched upon receipt of an improper code word, signal, or the duress code.

d. Tests. Unannounced tests of duress response procedures will be conducted monthly. Actual code words or signals will not be used in training or test exercises.

Page 30, paragraph 18-8, Structure and building security. Add subparagraph d.

d. Building Sweeps

(1) Responsibility for the interior security of maintenance buildings which contain nuclear weapons will pass from the security force to operations personnel at the start of each operational period and continue until control is returned to security forces at the close of the period.

(2) When nuclear weapons or nuclear components remain overnight in the maintenance building, internal security control is passed to security forces following a joint (operating and security personnel) inspection of the buildings interior.

(3) Technical operations on weapons or components that expose Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information (CNWDI) will be screened to preclude passage of this information to personnel who do not have a verified need to know.

Page 35, paragraph 11-2, Categories of deviations. Add subparagraph c.

c. Requests for exceptions, waivers, variances, or renewal will be forwarded through command channels to HQ AMC/AMCPE-S, Alexandria, VA 22333-0001 per AR 190-13, the Army Physical Security Program, and AMC supplement thereto. AMC installations will request waivers and exceptions per AMC Suppl 1 to AR 190-13.

Page 38, paragraph 13-1, Key and lock control (Access Control). Add subparagraph v.

v. When doors on maintenance buildings or storage areas must be equipped with panic hardware to meet safety requirements, the following procedures will apply:

(1) During operating hours, doors will be equipped with IDS or serial numbered frangible seals. IDS or seals are not required if doors are under continual surveillance.

(2) During nonoperating hours, doors not equipped with IDS will be secured with padlock or serial numbered protective seals. This additional requirement need not be met if positive measures are taken to detect stay behinds.

(3) Panic hardware will be inaccessible and inoperable from outside the door.

(4) Use and control of protective seals will be per appendix B, AR 190-51, Security of Army Property at Unit and Installation level.

Page 38, paragraph 13-3a, Key control officer. Add the following at the end.

This individual will be personally responsible for supervision of the security key and lock system, to include control, issue and rotation of security (including intrusion detection system) locks, cores, and keys.

Page 39, paragraph 13-3, Key control officer. Add subparagraphs f. through 1.

f. The security key control officer's records will accurately document the acquisition, status, and location of all security locks, cores, and keys and stand as an audit trail of positive key control. As a minimum, the following data will be recorded:

(1) The total number of locks, cores, and keys in the system, to include the date of their acquisition.

(2) Identification of the locks and cores in use, the date they were put in service, and their location.

(3) The number of keys issued and the identification of the person who has possession of each key.

(4) Security keys will not be removed from the limited area.

(5) Key custodian(s) or designated alternate will inventory all assigned keys daily. This daily inventory does not include keys signed out for extended periods. Missing keys will be promptly reported to the provost marshal/security officer (PM/SO).

(6) Security key control officer(s) will maintain records of all systems for security areas, to include the following information:

(a) Total number of locks/keys in system.

(b) Number of keys issued and to whom.

(c) Number of keys and key blanks on-hand.

(7) If combination locks are used in the key and lock system, the recorded combination will be safeguarded by the responsible custodian in a manner that will prevent compromise.

(8) Combinations to locks in the security key/lock control system will be changed whenever the security/container/structure/ padlock has been discovered unlocked and unattended.

g. Locks and cores that are not in use will be kept in a secure container. Structure locks will be secured to the locking staple or chained to the door facing when the structure or igloo is open.

h. High security shrouded hasps will be used with high security padlocks.

i. Containers will be located so that they are either under continual surveillance or protected by IDS. Keys to structure control units (CU) may be retained in the CU keyway when this unit is located within the protected structure.

j. Issue of new, duplicate, or replacement keys will not be effected without specific approval by the security key control officer.

k. The fact that a key is missing will be reported immediately to the security key control officer. Formal investigation of a missing key will be conducted by a disinterested party.

l. Installation physical security plans will include the security lock and key control procedures specified in this supplement.

Page 39, paragraph 15-1, Recovery operations, (General). Add the following at the end.

TECOM will develop a plan to recover special nuclear materials (SNM). This plan will be exercised at least annually at the reactor sites.

Page 51, Appendix G, paragraph G-5. Add the following at the end.

Security personnel (minimum two) will monitor the IDS console and the closed circuit TV monitor panel.

Page 52. Add appendixes H, I, J.

The proponent of this supplement is the United States Army Materiel Command. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to the Commander, HQ AMC, ATTN: AMCAM-CN, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333-0001.

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Chief of Staff

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SAMPLE

APPENDIX H

LETTER OF IDENTIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS

(symbol)

(date)

SUBJECT: Letter of Identification

1. This letter effective only for the period of _____
to _____.
2. The bearer, _____ is member of the U.S. Army and is performing a courier or guard function to military property that is vital to the defense of the United States. In the event of an accident or incident, the courier is qualified to give instructions for the safety of persons who may be involved and for security of property. It is imperative that the courier be furnished assistance and cooperation as required.
3. _____ has a military security clearance of _____.
4. The identity of the bearer should be verified using military identification card (DA Form 2A- series (Armed Forces Identification Card) by comparison of SSAN, signature, and picture.
5. Due to security requirements, the bearer may be able to provide only a limited amount of information regarding the circumstances for which assistance is requested.
6. In the event that _____ and all other members of the courier's party are disabled, immediately call _____, collect, for further instructions.

/S/ John Q. Jones

JOHN Q. JONES
Colonel, OD
Commanding

H-1

SAMPLE

SAMPLE
APPENDIX I

HEADQUARTERS _____

(symbol)

(date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: (insert courier's name, grade, and SSN)

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction to Courier Officer

1. (U) Your authority for this trip is Letter Order _____.
Headquarters _____, dated _____.

2. (Insert classification, if appropriate). The following specific instructions apply to this shipment.

a. You will proceed by _____ to _____ reporting upon arrival, NLT _____ date/time, to _____ who will coordinate the transfer of material to you.

b. If possible, you will observe and check the cargo as it is loaded on the _____ assigned for the movement, or as a minimum, the cargo must be checked prior to movement of the carrier.

c. This shipment contains class _____ explosives. In the event the shipment is threatened by fire, the class of explosives must be provided to personnel engaged in firefighting.

d. In the event of an accident or incident and if an eventual explosion is feared, the minimum personnel hazard distance is 2,000 feet. If required, establish a perimeter of that distance in radius all around the accident/incident site.

e. The cargo will consist of _____ pieces, _____ pounds of materiel, requiring, _____ placards on the vehicles.

f. Estimated time of departure from _____ will be approximately _____ date/time via the following route:

_____.

SAMPLE

g. The control number assigned to this shipment is _____. Use this control number whenever reporting information pertaining to this shipment.

h. Periodic telephonic progress reports will be made to the designated Army movement monitor at intervals of approximately _____ hours, but not more than _____ minutes + from the prescribed time. Call telephone number _____ during duty hours, or telephone number _____ or telephone number after duty hours, and state--

"This is the courier officer for controlled shipment _____. I submit the following information. (Give shipment progress or accident/incident information with appropriate location). My next telephonic report is due at _____ hours, + _____ minutest tolerance."

i. Upon arrival at _____, contact _____.

3. Upon completion of your mission, a report in triplicate, classified if necessary, will be forwarded to this office. Your report will include a chronological accounting of your mission to include name, grade, and social security number of persons receipting for your cargo, comments on adequacy of selected routes, cooperation by state or local law enforcement agencies, recommendations, and any items of special interest, especially unusual incidents or circumstances encountered.

/S/John Q. Jones

JOHN Q. JONES
Colonel, OD
Commanding

APPENDIX J

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TWO-PERSON CONCEPT

WITHIN AMC

J-1. The following standards will be applied within AMC to implement the two-person concept. These standards amplify the safety rules for each nuclear weapons system.

J-2. It is important that all personnel implementing the two-person concept be instructed in exactly what the purpose is and how to implement it. They must know what types of unauthorized acts to watch for and what to do if such acts are observed. To ensure against unauthorized or unsafe acts, each task to be performed must be authorized and clearly specified by supervisory personnel.

J-3. In enforcing the concept insofar as access to the weapon to commit an act of sabotage is concerned, supervisors must ensure that each of the two persons are capable of detecting an unauthorized act on the part of the other. It is not necessary for the two persons involved to possess technical knowledge. For example, if two persons are moving weapons in shipping containers from one location to another, a wide variance in technical knowledge and skill is acceptable. Any sabotage of the weapon must be preceded by opening or penetrating the container, which in this case would be an incorrect procedure with respect to the task to be performed. It does not take technical knowledge or skill to detect such an act. A highly knowledgeable person in a critical position and an ordinary workman in a controlled position could perform this job together and be in compliance with the concept. This same rationale can be applied where only first and second echelon maintenance is being performed; however, exceptions may exist in situations involving nuclear components or other unique operations that provide an unusual degree of access. The Commander, AMC, ATTN: AMCAM-CN, should be requested to provide specific guidance where any doubt exists.

J-4. The opportunity to cause a nuclear detonation is remotely possible in an area or building where third through fifth echelon maintenance, retrofit, or assembly operations are underway. To ensure that personnel engaged in these operations are capable of detecting incorrect and unauthorized procedures concerning the task being performed, personnel implementing the two-person concept must possess technical knowledge commensurate with the operation. Only personnel occupying critical positions will be allowed to implement the two-person concept where third echelon maintenance, retrofit, or assembly operations are in process. When other personnel must be present during such operations, there must be at least two persons occupying critical positions present and in a position to observe them and each other. Supervisors must give special attention to ensure that personnel in critical positions are not used to implement the concept on systems with which they are not entirely familiar.

In depots with capabilities covering a large number of systems, it must be recognized that not all personnel occupying critical positions have the requisite technical knowledge on all systems.

J-5. Instructions promulgated for the application of the two-person concept will include the following provisions:

a. Operating bays that contain nuclear warheads, nuclear components, nuclear projectiles, or warhead sections will be closed off from the rest of the building by metal accordion gates, ropes, chains, or other carriers that will permit visual observation. A sign will be posted at the entrance to the bay indicating that entry is prohibited without supervisory authorization. This requirement will not apply to those operating buildings where the physical layout will permit continued observation by supervisory personnel.

b. Signs will be posted in operating bays in which operations are being conducted indicating that the two-person concept is in effect.

c. Positive measures will be taken to assure compliance with the two-person concept. Signs, warnings, and honor systems alone will not suffice. To preclude violation of the two-person concept, one of the following conditions must be met:

(1) At least two persons must be present in the operating bays who will keep the weapons and each other under continual visual surveillance to assure that they are not approached by unauthorized personnel; or

(2) The weapons must be locked behind secure barriers that are sufficiently impenetrable to ensure that any attempt at forcible entry would not go unnoticed by at least two qualified persons; or

(3) The weapons must be in a secured building in a secured area within a building or in an igloo, from which all personnel are barred. Guard forces must follow the two-person concept unless intrusion detection equipment allows the use of single guards.

d. An identification and control system must be provided that will at any time indicate to supervisors the number, position, and designations of personnel in the operating bays collectively. Such a system is not required in each individual operating bay.

J-6. During training operations, the two person concept will apply to trainers, just as it does to war reserve weapons, at all times when trainers are out of their containers in a nuclear weapon storage or maintenance building in an exclusion area. This not only includes times when they are being used in training, but also when they are being repaired or maintained, if the maintenance is done in a nuclear weapon exclusion area.

The two-person concept will not apply to packaged trainers stored in the exclusion area while not in use. Nor does the concept apply to trainers while in other areas, such as schools, where war reserve weapons are not permitted. The school may, of course, place the concept in effect for training purposes.

J-7. When a weapon has separable nuclear components, the two-person concept applies as follows:

- a. When the nuclear components are assembled to the weapons, i.e., a complete round exists.
- b. When working on the nuclear components.
- c. During assembly of the nuclear components to the remainder of the weapon.

J-8. Administrative regulations will be published at installations where nuclear weapons are stored or processed, stating that violation of the two-person concept will be considered disobedience of the established regulations that could result in severe disciplinary penalty.

J-9. Visitors will not be allowed unescorted access to nuclear weapons or be used to implement the two-person concept. As an exception, in those cases where an individual or team from another installation is serving on temporary duty at a depot for the purpose of providing technical assistance that involves access to weapons, the depot commander will request that the security clearance for those individuals include a statement that he/she is in the personnel reliability program. If the visitor will be used in a critical position, the message must contain a statement that he possesses technical knowledge required to perform the task assigned.

J-10. Visitors need not be escorted within nuclear weapons limited areas when all of the following conditions are met:

- a. The visitor has a SECRET clearance.
- b. The visitor has an established need-to-know which requires entrance to the limited area.
- c. The visitor's name appears on the access list and the visitor is issued a pictured badge for the limited area.
- d. The visitor is not permitted unescorted entry into igloos or other structures where nuclear warheads, nuclear components, nuclear projectiles, or warhead sections are located.