Let me take a couple
of steps back and hit on broad themes, and also on some extraordinary
participation.
We'll be accompanied
on the flight over by Senator Lugar and by Senator Lieberman, who is
also playing a role in the Nunn/Lugar project. Senators Lugar
and Lieberman will be with the Secretary for most of Thursday's activities
to include meetings in the Ministry of Defense, to include accompanying
him to the Duma -- where I do not believe they will be at the podium
with him initially, but they will join him after he finishes his opening
remarks. Then they'll be out with us at the Military Academy of the
General Staff.
Late Thursday afternoon,
Senator Nunn will arrive in Moscow. So when we go up to Sevrodvinsk,
Nunn, Lugar, and Lieberman will be there, so they will be part of the
ceremony. As you know, this is Senator Nunn's last year in office, and
they will get to see some of what the program has accomplished. Indeed,
they then stay on over the weekend for a series of meetings arranged
by the Aspen Institute. Then, on Monday and Tuesday of the following
week, they will go off and tour additional Nunn/Lugar sites in
the former Soviet Union.
Basically, if you're
looking for themes, there are really two themes. The first is the degree
to which the United States' and Russian Defense Departments are working
together and need to expand that cooperation. This is an area which
Rodionov is interested in pursuing. In his writings -- and in his interactions
with U.S. counterparts, while he was at the Military Academy of the
General Staff -- he consistently indicated an interest in working with
the United States. He has been here several times, unlike some other
new members of the Russian power structure. He has traveled outside
the former Soviet Union. He's done so more than once. He's really quite
knowledgeable about our military educational system, at least for the
higher ranks. So we're going to be stressing the theme of enhanced and
improved military-to-military cooperation. Not for show or for spectacle,
but rather for practical, common mutual benefit.
For example, we
all acknowledge -- Americans and Russians alike acknowledge that the
peacekeeping exercises we engaged in at Tutskoye and Fort Riley themselves
helped provide indications where interoperability was lacking. That
later worked to our mutual advantage because we saw the areas where
we had problems and we fixed them for IFOR. So what we learned in the
field, we actually can put into practice.
The other theme,
of course, will be the importance of ratifying START II and proceeding
to get the Duma to ratify START II.
As you know, it's
almost in a way reminiscent of SALT I in the United States. This is
an issue in the Duma now which has transcended the facts and specifics
of the treaty. It's a very politicized treaty over there. Many of the
Russian deputies who have expressed opinions against it know very little
about it. One of the things we're going to seek to do is to set the
record straight, and to demonstrate to the deputies that this treaty
is every bit as much in Russia's interest as it is in our own interest.
So the Secretary will be meeting with members of the, as we understand
it, three key committees -- the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Defense
Committee, and the Security Committee. There will be others who will
be invited as well. We don't know, probably about 100 members of the
Duma.
I think with that,
we should just go to any questions you might have about the trip.
Q: Can you be a
little more specific about the kinds of logic that the Secretary will
use in making his pitch to the Duma, because, obviously, there could
be some ways in which the U.S. Defense Secretary up there could do things
that might be counter-productive to passage.
A: Sure. One of
the things that we're going to indicate is that this treaty enhances
strategic stability. There has always been a tendency to associate START
II with just a reduction in numbers, but what START II really was about
was eliminating the heavy MIRV'd ICBMs on both sides. I should be more
specific. Heavily MIRV'd ICBMs, because the SS-18 is the heavy MIRV
to the arms control aficionados in the crowd. Eliminating the land-based
MIRV'd missiles on both sides. Those, of course, have traditionally
been the source of instability in the U.S./Soviet, now U.S./Russian
nuclear equation. If you've got a series of heavily armed missiles in
silos, obviously, the advantage is to the person who can get in a preemptive
strike, because one missile kills ten, or one warhead kills ten. One
missile could kill ten missiles. So the payoff to a preemptive strike
is very high. What theorists and strategists have always worried about
-- since the advent of the MIRV'd missile -- is that in a crisis with
uncertainty going on, with perhaps false reports coming in about what
the other side is doing, that there will be a temptation to launch preemptively
-- thinking the other side is getting ready to launch and saying, If
I launch first, I can fire ten and destroy 100 of his missiles. The
whole point of START II is to get out of that business and to move towards
much more survivable forces, to emphasize survivable forces.
For us the key,
obviously, was to emphasize the submarine and bomber forces, because
in an alert situation the bombers can launch for survivability, but
don't have to move towards their targets.
For the Russians
it's a mix of systems because they had already begun to invest heavily
in the road mobile SS-25s. They do have a bomber component, although
smaller than ours, and a submarine force. So that's one thing, strategic
stability.
A second thing
is we all know that the Russian military is under extreme financial
pressure. Rodionov himself wants to reduce the size of the military
establishment and to convert the savings into a better trained, better
equipped, indeed, better manned military capacity. He would like to
take strategic nuclear dollars and turn them into conventional dollars.
In the absence of START II, we're certainly going to stay at START I
levels.
There is some debate
among all the analysts as to whether Russia can afford to stay at START
I levels and, even if they do for a couple of years, how long they can
do so.
If you look at
START I levels, those of you who have covered the treaty in the past
will remember there are a series of counting rules that heavily favor
bomber weapons. START I's contribution to stability was that it penalized
missile weapons in favor of slower flying systems on the idea that you
didn't have to react quickly to the other side's bomber forces, and
that the missiles were the short-time-of-flight, compressed- decisionmaking
threat.
So under START
I, the U.S. has an advantage because with the bomber force, you'll recall
that the ALCMs were heavily discounted. A B-52 that was capable of carrying
20 ALCMs only counted as carrying 10. And gravity bombers counted as
one weapon, regardless of how many weapons were actually on the aircraft.
So, while the B-1 was in a nuclear role, no matter how many gravity
bombs it carries, it only counted as one weapon under START I, and the
same goes for the B-2. So, there was an inherent advantage to the United
States in terms of levels for START I alone.
If we stay roughly
at START I levels, that is, not counting, of course, the B-1, which
has been re-rolled ... but if we stay roughly at START I levels and
economic pressures force the Russians down lower, clearly it's to their
advantage -- as well as ours -- to come down to START II, where every
weapon counts as a weapon and the levels are much lower. So, there's
a stability point and there's a maintaining-a-balance point and there's
a point where Rodionov wants to take money for strategic nuclear forces
-- that both sides believe do not reflect the new nature of the U.S./Russian
relationship -- and to turn them into rubles that he can use, enhancing
his conventional forces.
Q: What's the history
between Rodionov and Lebed, and how would you characterize their relationship?
What's the prognosis for how their relationship may unfold?
A: I think the
bottom line is that the relationship is evolving. Whatever it was in
the past, Rodionov is older. Lebed, I believe, had some fair degree
of contact with him in his career. Indeed, it was then said that Lebed
was a major promoter of Rodionov to become Defense Minister. Since then,
you know -- as well as I -- that there have surfaced from time to time
reports of tensions. It's back to the old adage about where you stand
depends on where you sit. So there may be some tension between the men,
as is normal given their different bureaucratic entities.
I think on balance,
one can certainly talk about broad common goals which revolve around
military reform. Both believe in restoring some measure of effectiveness
to the Russian military forces. Both recognize that they're too large;
that the training level is quite low; that the manning is quite low
in quality; and that the equipment levels are coming down. So there's
a very sure commonality of interest there.
Q: Using as descriptive
adjectives as you can, how would you describe the state of the Russian
military today?
A: I think the
best thing is to say that it's mixed. It's spotty. They've just recently
had a strategic nuclear exercise. They've had a strategic nuclear exercise
every year for the past four years, and the nuclear forces are generally
in very, very good shape. While we always worry about custody of nuclear
weapons over there -- and indeed the Nunn/Lugar program is designed
to help enhance their own measures for maintaining control of their
own nuclear weapons -- those forces seem to be in very good shape. On
the other hand, you can look at what happened to some of the forces
in Chechnya and see that the forces were badly manned; that they were
young conscripts without a great deal of training; that they were not
particularly well led; and that they were not particularly well equipped
and were not able to adapt to the military circumstance that they found
themselves in.
I think we'd also
have to talk about the Russian forces in IFOR which have performed very,
very well. You guys have seen them, I have not. But the Secretary is
full of praise about the Russian forces. The way they carry out their
patrols, the military manner in which they carry themselves, in which
they cooperate with the U.S. forces in IFOR. So it's really a very mixed
and spotty record.
Q: I apologize
if this was touched on before I came in, but will Perry at all be meeting
with Lebed?
A: We're working
other parts of the schedule. If we know more, Ken will certainly tell
you. I've given you what is the schedule right now, and that is: meetings
with Rodionov on Wednesday; meetings at the Ministry of Defense again
on Thursday; speech to the Duma Thursday; speech to the Military Academy
of the General Staff on Thursday. Right now, I have no scheduled meetings
outside the defense establishment, but that might change.
Q: He's visiting
at a time, obviously, when Yeltsin's health is a question mark. How
does that affect the trip? And I don't suppose there's any chance he'd
be meeting with Yeltsin, either. Or did he try to meet with Yeltsin?
A: No. No, we're
not trying to ... I don't know that we've ever asked to meet with the
President of Russia.
Bacon: He was supposed
to meet when Vice President Gore was there with the GCC, but he had
to leave before, and the meeting was rescheduled.
Q: Coming at this
time, when there's a bit of uncertainty, how does that affect the themes
of the trip? For instance, is this meeting with the Duma part of the
effort to make sure that the United States' military and defense contacts
with all parts of the government...
A: First of all,
Yeltsin appears still to be functioning in a normal manner. We've all
seen the Kremlin politics of the past and Chernenko propped up with
a stick. We remember Brezhnev's last years. We see the politics of the
Kremlin court, and he's still working very well to play factions off
against each other. So Yeltsin is still very much working, at least
behind the scenes, in the power politics of Moscow.
We believe that
the military-to-military ties are essential. To the degree that Yeltsin's
health has cast a bit of a shadow over what's going on in Russia they're
even more essential. But one of the things that we're trying to do is
break down the legacy of the Cold War, and to make certain that the
military establishments on both sides see each other not as Cold War
enemies. While people may find that somewhat as a "will-of-the- wisp"
goal, if you look back to where we were, even by say, 1960, with the
German military, these things can happen. What you want to do is have
transparency; you want to have opportunities for mutual training; you
want to have educational experiences -- each in the other's schools;
and you want to knock down the threat perception of the other side.
Increased contact and transparency is a major part of that.
So in a time when
there is some stress on the relationship - - and you could even say
the stress is compounded by some Russians who are predisposed to see
NATO expansion as a threat to Russia, which it is not -- this kind of
military interaction is really very, very important. And, as you look
ahead to the very uncertain world in which we're living, it is a very
strong possibility, in my opinion, that we're going to have other operations
in the future, like IFOR, where U.S. and Russian forces will be serving
together. So the need to determine where we are able to operate together
-- and where there are gaps in doctrine; gaps in procedures; gaps in
equipment interoperability -- is absolutely vital, because we have to
get into the field together. We have to be able to work together. We
don't have with the Russians now the kind of history of standard procedures
and equipment that have evolved over the past 45-odd years with NATO.
There's no question that if you go into a NATO operation everybody knows
when you talk about a signal what the signal means -- you know, How
to go through the standard Allied Tactical Publications. We're not there
with the Russians. We need to build this. So there's both a military
benefit and a larger geo- political benefit.
Q: Will Lebed be
discussing relations between NATO and Russia Lebed recently talked,
made some comments to the effect that Russia should be a more active
participant in the Partnership for Peace. Is that something ...
A: The short answer
to your first question is yes, they will be discussing the NATO/Russia>
relationship and Partnership for Peace. They will be discussing, basically
in two categories, how Russia can participate much better with the West.
The first would be the broad NATO/Russia relationship, to get the Russian
forces much more involved with the NATO command structure and much more
involved with NATO's programs. The Russians have not taken the kind
of advantage of Partnership for Peace -- which we would hope that they
would. And Lebed ... I think one of the most important things that happened
with Lebed, is that he recognized Partnership for Peace. With Lebed
and Rodionov, you're dealing with two players who are not particularly
current on Partnership for Peace, or the Nunn/Lugar program,
or perhaps even the state of the drawdowns. Particularly Rodionov, who
worries every day about the problems of maintaining military discipline
in a force that hasn't been paid in three or four or five months. This
is not someone who's up on the subtleties of START II or START I drawdown
curves. The degree to which there have been programs offered in the
past.
So, one area is
the NATO/Russia military relationship. The other is the U.S./Russian
bilateral military relationship, and we'll be hitting both points.
Q: How can you
say that the military, that the overall readiness and quality is, you
said, "spotty" and "mixed," and you admit that no one's been paid in
three or four months ... That must have a tremendous effect on morale.
There's even anecdotal evidence that one military officer killed himself
because he couldn't pay his troops.
A: Sure. In fact,
there's a press report -- I haven't seen any hard evidence -- that Rodionov
said in a press statement that he wasn't going to accept any pay until
all of his troops were paid. So there is a major problem.
But, on the other
hand, you see these guys fly airplanes; you see them drive ships. Their
submarines go to sea and stay out for extended periods of time. They
turn keys and the missiles fire. So when you look at some of the things
they do, the standards of performance are every bit as good as they
were during the Soviet era. If you look at the armed forces as a whole,
clearly the performance levels are not as high. That's why I say it's
mixed.
Q: Do you have
an estimate of, for example, the number of their surface ships that
could effectively get underway and accomplish a mission?
A: I don't. It's
clearly dramatically smaller than it was during the Soviet era. But
again, the answer that I tried to convey to the question was that if
you look at military performance unit by unit, you will find a mixed
record. If you're asking me how does the Russian military compare to
the Soviet military, clearly it is smaller; it is less well equipped.
A lot of equipment has been summarily retired. A lot of the equipment
that has been kept is in a poor state of repair. Yet, there are pockets
of excellence here and there.
Q: Where are the
pockets of excellence and where are the areas of neglect in the Russian
military, then?
A: The areas of
neglect are broad. I think the pockets of excellence continue to be
in some areas of each of the forces. I think some of the air defense
forces are still very good. I think some of the paratroop regiments
are good. The forces in IFOR are performing very well. The strategic
nuclear forces, by and large, are very good. The surface forces completed
a deployment last January down to the Mediterranean where they got the
carrier out there. It had some problems with its evaporators, but anybody
who's been in the Navy knows that when you go to sea you have problems
with your evaporators. It happens to us, too. Large numbers of surface
ships haven't gone to sea. If you don't go to sea, you don't operate;
your skills go down; your engineering skills go down; your sea-keeping
skills go down.
I don't have statistics
for you, and perhaps we could research that and get you something while
we're on the trip as to our own view. I don't know where I would point
to in terms of statistics.
Q: Let me ask you
a question on START II. I think there's a debate in Russia about whether
or not START II actually cost them money because, by getting rid of
their SS-18s, they would have to beef up their other forces to maintain
parity with the U.S.
First of all, I'd
ask your assessment on whether it would cost Russia money. Second, if
it does cost Russia money, will you be discussing START III in the context
of START II, so they don't have to build back up and then build back
down in next round of negotiations?
A: I think you
have accurately described some of the criticisms. I think I would take
three steps back and not agree with the picture that's been painted.
The SS-18s are wasting assets. They were built in Ukraine, and they
are not going to be around after another 10 or so years. Indeed, within
the SS-18 force there are multiple generations. Only the most modern
SS- 18s -- the Mod-5s and Mod-6s -- are the ones that you can really
count on lasting for about 10 or so years. The number of Mod-5s and
Mod-6s is probably in the area perhaps of a third of the 154 that START
I allows them to keep.
Because Ukraine
isn't in the business of producing these missiles any more, it's going
to be very difficult to come up with a process to try to sustain them
and keep them alive, so it's going to cost them money to keep the present
force in the field and that's going to be a wasting asset.
If you worry about
parity from a Russian standpoint, that's why START II is a whole lot
better than START I. You may remember that the START II level of 3,000
to 3,500 occurred when Yeltsin was here in the summer of 1992, and both
sides basically said that START II was going to be 3,500, and then Yeltsin
took a pen and wrote in 3,000-dash- 3,500, signaling then that he was
prepared to live with 3,000 regardless of what the United States did.
If that's the kind of gap -- that's a 500 or 700 warhead gap -- I would
think that a Russian military commander involved with nuclear weapons
would be happier with that than a gap that started to get into several
thousand as Russian force levels declined and U.S. force levels were
maintained at a START I level.
So from the standpoint
of parity, clearly, the START II is in their interest. Do they have
to build forces up? Again, it depends on how far they want to go. There's
a lot of comment that the SSX-27, which is the SS-25 follow-on, is a
system that START II is forcing them to build. In point of fact, that's
not really true. The SSX-27 has been under development for several years.
The specifications in the START I treaty, as to what was a new missile
as opposed to what was a modification of an existing missile, were clearly
tailored to allow the SSX-27 to be counted as a modification of an existing
missile. This is not a system which is a START II inspired system. It's
a system that's been going all along.
Sure, if they want
to build 1,000 of these things it's going to cost them a lot of money.
It's not clear that they have to do that. On the dismantlement side,
the Nunn/Lugar program is prepared to assist them dramatically
in START II reductions. One of the things that we want to make clear
to people is that the Russians are currently well ahead of the START
I drawdown curve. So one of the notions that you sometimes read about
in the press is that START II needs to be extended so that they have
five or six or seven more years to complete their drawdowns, because
it's going to cost them so much money. The facts are they're so far
ahead of the START I drawdown curve, that with Nunn/Lugar assistance
you could meet the 2003 date of the treaty. They could meet that date
without a great deal of difficulty.
START III. In the
summit statement in late September 1994, both President Clinton and
President Yeltsin agreed that with START II in place -- with START II
ratified and in force, and early deactivations under START II underway
-- the sides should meet to begin discussing the possibility of further
reductions. Clearly, another message for the Duma is that the path to
START III, whatever it is, and I don't want to talk about ... roll out
START III. The path to further reductions is clearly through START II.
It's not through saying, Let's throw START II aside and begin all over
again and try and work this reductions package out anew.
Q: There is this
concern, though, that START II will cost them money. Why not say we
support START III ...
A: We support discussions
of follow-on reductions, and clearly that could reduce the level of
new forces that they intend to build. If you ask me -- very much off
the record -- whether I think the size of the SSX-27 force they're going
to build will be dramatically affected between START II and START III
and whether ten years from now we would look back and find that force
materially different as to what they were going to build under START
II, and whether START III might have inspired, I think the answer is,
No. I think there is an SS-25 follow-on program out there, and given
the traditional strength of the Strategic Rocket Forces and its bureaucratic
mode, that there are going to be a fair number of these survivable land-based
missiles. Perhaps, to the detriment of air- or submarine-launched weapons.
But it's a factor. The Duma needs to be given the facts about Nunn/Lugar
assistance and where they are in their current drawdowns.
Q: Who first broached
the idea of the Secretary's speech to the Duma? How long will it last?
A: Thank you for
reminding me. The Duma. The Secretary was invited by two prominent members
of the Duma to come to speak to it about START II.
Q: How long will
it last, the speech?
A: I think we're
looking at a two hour session. There will be a speech, and then questions
and answers.
Q: You mentioned
earlier that the Russians are having problems modernizing because of
lack of funds -- and that's one way you're going to pitch START: that
it will save money and they can use that for their conventional forces
modernization.
A: Modernization
at large, which means, again, replacing the current conscript system
with a professional army; improved training for the forces that are
there as opposed to spotty training across the board.
Q: One thing the
Russians are doing themselves to do that is they're selling a lot of
their inventory. Some of that is very advanced weaponry ... We've seen
in reports now that they're building the SU-37, specifically, for the
export market. Will the Secretary, during this trip, at all address
the issue of asking the Russians to exercise some restraint in selling
more SU- 27s to China or SU-37s to anyone?
A: I don't think
that's a specific part of this trip. There are numerous fora for engaging
the Russians on the sales of high tech weaponry, and the recently-concluded
Wasnnar Agreement offers a forum where the various high tech arms suppliers
are supposed to consult one with another about the sales of weapons
to particular regions and the sales of particular types of weapons.
I don't think there's anything the Russians are doing today that keeps
me up at night in terms of arms sales. If I were a Russian, I think
I might be more concerned about some of the arms sales that they're
doing than I am as an American official. But that would not be high
on my list.
Q: Will North Korea
come up at all?
A: I don't think
we intend to raise North Korea.
Again, the focus
of this trip is going to be on START II and it's going to be on enhancing
and making larger and more comprehensive Russia's military engagement
with the West -- with NATO as an alliance, and with the United States
as a bilateral partner. That all fits under broad geo-politics, but
we have no real burning geo-political issues to sit there and talk with
them about on this. There is a specific focus, it's an ongoing focus
with Rodionov, who is new, but who has exhibited a great deal of interest
in doing these kinds of cooperative activities with us.
Q: Is START II
over there in enough difficulty so if Perry doesn't go over there and
make this pitch that the U.S. fears that this thing is just going to
be shelved forever?
A: No. START II
is clearly in some degree of difficulty. I don't think there's anybody
here who could give you a good vote count right now. If you went out
and took a vote count ... I do not want to make a headline. Ratification,
I think, is not certain, if you took a look at the votes now. But the
signals from the various party leaders have been nuanced. The communists
have not come out and said, across the board, that START II must be
rejected. Various groups have talked about modifications to the treaties
or trying to bring in other kinds of assurances. Two of the criticisms
of START II that you hear most frequently from Duma members have nothing
to do with START II: one is NATO expansion; and the other is the U.S.
theater missile defense program, which is somehow projected -- in the
minds of people who don't know a great deal about it -- to be the U.S.
building a national ABM system.
I was reading,
just the other day, a paper put together by the committee staff of the
geo-politics committee of the Duma, which is dominated by Zhirinovsky's
people. When you read it, you see that they are concerned that the existing
U.S. ABM system is going to be far more capable against SS-25s than
it is against SS-18s. But it talks about the existing U.S. ABM system.
One of the things
that we can do is point out that there is, indeed, an ABM system in
the world today, only one, and that's around Moscow, not around Washington
or any other U.S. facility. So there is a great lack of understanding,
I think, among the broad membership in the Duma. There is a select group
of strategic experts in each of the parties, but even there the knowledge
base is mixed. What we hope to do is broaden the knowledge base and
come up with some sort of a basic level of understanding of the treaty.
Q: When do you
expect a vote on START II? And also, the Duma is often characterized
as really not being too up on the facts. Is that ... What's your characterization
of the ...
A: I think the
Secretary's visit will broaden and deepen the understanding of the facts
of the strategic relationship and of the strategic treaties. I don't
think a vote has been scheduled by the Duma. We're certainly not sending
the Secretary out to save a treaty which is otherwise sinking, but I
think it's fair to say that what we hope to do is establish a factual
basis for their further discussions and to have some materials with
us that we can leave behind that will live on after we leave town.
Q: How do you assess
the security of a [inaudible] in Russia from smuggling out of the country?
A: The nuclear
stockpile?
Q: Yes.
A: I think that
with Nunn/Lugar assistance it's a lot safer than it was three
or four years ago. We have had a broad program of assistance -- which
has upgraded the security of the rail cars in which these nuclear weapons
are transported. We are now working with the Russians to have an ADP
system -- by which to manage the warhead inventory. We're working with
them on the various standards that we use to screen personnel who are
allowed to work with nuclear weapons so they can adapt ... And at their
interest. This is not just our telling them here's how we do it. There's
a great deal of interest in learning how we establish our personnel
reliability program and the screening standards and how we work with
that.
I think a big,
big plus is the fact that through the Nunn/Lugar program Kazakstan
and Ukraine are now denuclearized -- and Belarus will be denuclearized
by the end of 1996. So, where there were four nuclear successors to
the USSR, there is now really 1.1. And the small number of warheads
that remain in Belarus, as I say, will be out within the year. So, by
and large, the situation is much, much safer and much more secure, and
much less liable to theft than it was three years ago. But, the fact
that we are continuing the program and the fact that there are still
major gaps in the Russian nuclear weapon safety and security program
are reasons that we want to continue to stay engaged. There's still
a lot to do in that area.
Press: Thank you
very much.
- END -
