EA - Mar 3, 1995
THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20 BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED INTERIM STORAGE AT THE Y-12 PLANT OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM ACQUIRED FROM KAZAKHSTAN BY THE UNITED STATES U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 DOE Decision Process on Related Actions 2.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION 3.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 3.1 HEU to be Acquired 3.2 Packaging 3.3 Air Transport by U.S. Air Force 3.3.1 Aerial Port of Entry Requirements 3.3.2 Flight from Kazakhstan to Dover AFB 3.3.3 C-5 Aircraft 3.3.4 Air Refueling 3.3.5 Cargo Restraint Transporter 3.4 Transfer at Dover Air Force Base 3.5 SST Transport from Dover Air Force Base to Y-12 3.6 Interim Storage at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant 3.7 Inventory Accountability 3.8 Safeguards and Security 3.9 Environmental, Safety, and Health Protection 3.10 On-Site Transportation at the Y-12 Plant 4.0 ALTERNATE TO THE PROPOSED ACTION 4.1 No Action Alternative 4.2 Alternate Ports of Entry 4.2.1 Fort Campbell, Kentucky as Aerial Port 4.2.2 Air National Guard Base at McGhee Tyson Airport as Aerial Port 4.3 Alternatives Dismissed from Further Consideration 4.3.1 Other Ports of Entry 4.3.2 Other DOE Facilities 4.4 Commercial Facility 5.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 5.1 Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 5.2 Dover Air Force Base, Delaware 5.3 Fort Campbell, Kentucky 5.4 Air National Guard Base, McGhee Tyson Airport, Knoxville, Tennessee 5.5 Global Commons 6.0 POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 6.1 Y-12 Plant 6.1.1 Environmental Effects 6.1.1.1 Land Use and Archaeological and Cultural Resources 6.1.1.2 Air Quality 6.1.1.3 Hydrology and Water Quality 6.1.1.4 Ecological Resources 6.1.2 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure 6.13 Exposure under Accident Conditions 6.14 Environmental Justice 6.1.5 Cumulative Effects 6.1.6 No Action Alternative Effects on the Y-12 Plant 6.1.7 Fort Campbell Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant 6.1.8 McGhee Tyson Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant 6.2 Transportation 6.2.1 Air Transport by U.S. Air Force 6.2.1.1 Incident-free Air Transport From Air Transport of HEU 6.2.1.2 Postulated Air Transport Accident Conditions 6.2.1.2.1 Air Transport Accident Probabilities 6.2.1.2.2 Air Transport Accident Consequences 6.2.2 Transfer of HEU from Aircraft to SST 6.2.2.1 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure from HEU Transfer Activities 6.2.2.2 Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents 6.2.3 SST Transport of HEU to Y-12 Plant 6.2.3.1 Incident-free SST Transport 6.2.3.1.1 Proposed Action: SST Transport of from Dover AFB to Y-12 6.2.3.1.2 No Action 6.2.3.1.3 SST Transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to Y-12 6.2.3.1.4 SST Transport of HEU from McGhee Tyson Airport to Y-12 6.2.3.2 Postulated SST Transport Accident Conditions 6.2.3.2.1 Proposed Action: Postulated SST Transport Accident 6.2.3.2.2 No Action 6.2.3.2.3 Postulated Accident During SST Transport from Fort Campbell 6.2.3.2.4 Postulated Accident During SST Transport from McGhee Tyson 6.2.4 On-Site Transportation Impacts 6.2.5 Non-Radiological Impact 6.2.5.1 Proposed Action 6.2.5.2 Shipment from Fort Campbell 6.2.5.3 Shipment from McGhee Tyson 6.2.6 Cumulative Transportation Impacts 6.2.6.1 Cumulative Radiological Impacts 6.2.6.2 Cumulative Non-Radiological Impacts 7.0 AGENCIES AND PERSONS CONSULTED 8.0 REFERENCES LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A. Affected Environment of Dover Air Force Base, Proposed Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer Site Appendix B. Affected Environment of Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Alternate Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer Site Appendix D. Affected Environment of McGhee Tyson and the Tennessee Air National Guard Air Force Base Alternate Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer Site LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.0-1 Flight Paths for the Proposed Action Figure 3.2-1 Physical Packing with Metal Cans Figure 3.3-1 United States Air Force C-5 Aircraft Figure 3.3.3-1 Cargo Restraint Transporter Loaded Figure 3.3.5-2 Cargo Restraint Transport Unit Loaded and Secured Figure 3.6-1 Location of the Oak Ridge Reservation Figure 3.6-2 Location of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Figure 3.6-3 Location of the Building 9720-5 Warehouse Figure 3.6-4 HEU Storage Birdcage Figure 3.6-5 Y-12 Building 9720-5 Warehouse Tube Vault Figure 3.6-6 Y-12 HEU Modular Storage Vault Configuration Figure 5.0.1-1 Location of Proposed Action and Alternatives Figure 5.2-1 Location of Dover Air Force Base Figure 5.2-2 Location of Dover Air Force Base Airstrip Figure 5.3-1 Location of Fort Campbell, Kentucky Figure 5.4-1 Location of McGhee Tyson Airport, Tennessee Figure 5.42 Layout of McGhee Tyson Airstrip Figure 6.1.2.1-1 Average External Dose to Workers in the Building 9720-5 Warehouse ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AFB Air Force Base ALAR As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANSI American National Standards Institute Be Beryllium CEDE Committed Effective Dose Equivalent CEQ Council on Environmental Quality CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act CFC Chlorofluorocarbons CFR Code of Federal Regulations CSA Criticality Safety Analysis DCG Derived Concentration Guide DOD United States Department of Defense DOE United States Department of Energy DOT United States Department of Transportation DU Depleted Uranium EA Environmental Assessment EDE Effective Dose Equivalent EIS Environmental Impact Statement Energy Systems Martin Marietta Energy Systems EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency ERAD Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersal FAA Federal Aviation Administration FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FFCA Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement FHA Federal Highway Administration FONSI Finding of No Significant Impact FRA Federal Railroad Administration HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HEU Highly Enriched Uranium HF Hydrogen Fluoride HMTA Hazardous Materials Transportation Act IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICC Interstate Commerce Commission ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health IHD Industrial Hygiene Department INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory LCF Latent Cancer Fatality LEU Low Enriched Uranium LTT Lymphocyte Transformation Test MACCS MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System MTU Metric Tons Uranium NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1-969 NESHA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health NMCs Nuclear Material Couriers NOI Notice of Intent NOV Notice of Violation NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System NPL National Priorities List NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ORR Oak Ridge Reservation OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration PEL Permissible Exposure Limit PCB Polychlorinated Biphenyl PEIS Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act SAR Safety Analysis Report SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act SARUP Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program SNM Special Nuclear Material SST Safe Secure Transport STEL Short-Term Exposure Limit SWEIS Sitewide Environmental Impact Statement TDEC Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TEMA Tennessee Emergency Management Agency THP Tennessee Highway Patrol TI Transport Index TIC Time-Integrated Concentration TID Tamper-Indicating Device AFTCOM United States Air Force Transportation Command TSD Transportation Safeguards Division TSR Technical Safety Requirements UN United Nations USEC United States Enrichment Corporation USQD Unreviewed Safety Question Determination Y-12 Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant On September 27, 1993, President Clinton outlined a major principle of U.S. nonproliferation policy: "Our national security requires us to accord higher priority to nonproliferation, and to make it an integral element of our relations with other countries. The President has established the objective of implementing United States nonproliferation policy by selectively acquiring fissionable material from foreign sources in order to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. In furtherance of this policy, the United States and Kazakhstan are pursuing an agreement to relocate highly enriched uranium (HEU) acquired from Kazakhstan in exchange for monetary aid. The prime objective of this bilateral effort is to promote the nuclear nonproliferation policies supported by both governments while providing monetary and humanitarian aid to the government of Kazakhstan. The HEU in question constitutes sufficient material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or more nuclear weapons. 1.1 DOE DECISION PROCESS ON RELATED ACTIONS As part of the decision-making process for the storage and disposition of fissile material, the Department is preparing the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Long-Term Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials (Disposition PEIS). Recent nuclear arms reduction agreements and pledges, along with Presidential decisions concerning what stocks of plutonium, HEU, and other nuclear materials are to be reserved for national defense, will largely determine how much and when material will be declared surplus and become available for disposition. As stated in the June 21, 1994 Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare the Disposition PEIS (59 FR 31935), the disposition PEIS will evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials and for disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials declared surplus to national defense needs by the President The Disposition PEIS would be followed by project specific NEPA documents to the extent necessary to implement any decisions. Although the decision-making process for the long-term storage and disposition of all weapons usable fissile materials has been initiated, final decisions and implementation may require several years. Until these decisions are made and implemented interim storage is needed for fissile nuclear-materials, including HEU. Prior to final approval, the Department released the Environmental Assessment (EA) for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA 0929) to the public and the State of Tennessee in September 1994. The EA is a revised version of a predecisional EA released for review and comment to the State and public. in March 1994. Additional predecisional opportunities for State and public involvement regarding the predecisional EA are planned for the near future. 2.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION The United States Government has determined that action is needed immediately to minimize the nuclear proliferation risk associated with highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Kazakhstan. This HEU constitutes sufficient material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or more nuclear weapons. The present risk of diversion must be addressed expeditiously. In addition, weather conditions complicate the ability to transport the HEU material over the next several months. Action is necessary before the winter season in order to assure that departure of the aircraft transporting the HEU from Kazakhstan is not affected by snow or ice storms. De-icing and snow removal capabilities at the Kazakhstan airport, which is located in the city of Ust Kamenogorst, are extremely limited. The next opportunity to transfer this material would not occur until the spring of 1995. The potential need to acquire and store HEU from foreign sources was addressed in the preapproval Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-0929). That EA includes analysis of interim storage of approximately five metric tons of HEU from foreign sources, which would be no more than one percent of the HEU proposed to be received for interim storage at Y-12 over the next ten years. Approximately 566 kg (0.566 metric tons) of HEU would be acquired from Kazakhstan, which represents approximately 11 percent (0.566) of the five metric tons from foreign sources addressed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA. Interim storage of the HEU from Kazakhstan would be needed until decisions on its disposition can be made and implemented. The Governments of the United States and Kazakhstan have agreed that the HEU would be stored under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is taking the necessary steps to implement this agreement. 3.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION The proposed action is transport of HEU to be acquired by the United States from Kazakhstan to the Y-12 Plant Oak Ridge, Tennessee for interim storage. The HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air Force on two C-5 aircraft from Kazakhstan to Dover Air Force Base (AFB), Kent County, Delaware. At Dover AFB, the HEU would loaded on DOE Safe Secure Transport (SST) Trailers for highway transport to the Y-12 Plant. In accordance with Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, the activities in Kazakhstan are not addressed in this EA because they will be implemented with the full cooperation and involvement of the government of Kazakhstan. These activities, which will be conducted by U.S. personnel include repackaging the HEU into IAEA authorized containers and loading the containers into the two C-5 aircraft. All U.S. repackaging team members would be fully trained in the handling of fissile radioactive materials. This team would consist of 31 persons: * 25 repackaging team members including three nuclear criticality safety engineers, three health physicists, two nondestructive assay experts, one nuclear material control and accountability experts, and one industrial hygienist; * one DOE safety officer; * one DOD doctor/medic; * three DOD interpreters; and * one satellite communicator. The aircrews would consist of 24-30 personnel for three U.S. Air Force C-5 aircraft: two C-5 aircraft would transport HEU and the third would carry only personnel and equipment. The proposed action includes the following activities: air transport by U.S. Air Force C-5 aircraft to the proposed U.S. aerial port of entry, Dover Air Force Base; transfer of HEU from the C-5 aircraft via ten U.S. Department of Energy Safe Secure Transport (SST) vehicles: SST transport of the HEU via highways to the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and interim storage (without processing) at the Y-12 Plant. The proposed flight plan is an approved international route; hence no specific agreements are required. 3.1 HEU TO BE ACQUIRED The HEU to be acquired and relocated to the United States includes approximately 566 kg (0.566 MT) of HEU (nominally 90 percent U-235, 9 percent U-238, and 1 percent U-234). The HEU is contained in about 2,200 kg (2.2 MT) of alloy, metal, and oxide. The HEU includes four material types: uranium oxide; uranium metal; uranium beryllium machined stock as broken alloy rods, turnings, and powders; and uranium beryllium alloy rods which were intended to be used as fuel for a naval reactor project, but never were actually used. All of these materials are unirradiated (i.e., not used in a reactor). The material forms and quantities are shown in Table 3.1-1. (The preapproval EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929) contains information on uranium in Appendix D, Uranium: Occurrence, Uses and Health Effects.) Laboratory analysis of samples indicates that some of the HEU contains trace but measurable concentrations of U-232, U-236, plutonium, and other transuranics. Less than one half kilogram of thorium uranium compound is included in the material. The bulk of the HEU is alloyed with beryllium (Be), of which about half is machine turnings and oxide. It is estimated that approximately 1500 kg (1.5 MT) of beryllium in the 2,200 kg (2.2 MT) of material to be acquired. Beryllium in weapons components as been staged or stored in Building 9720-5 previously. The 1500 kg (l.5 MT) of beryllium to be stored in Building 9720-5 under the proposed action is about equal to the quantity of beryllium in weapon components previously staged or stored in Building 9720-5. Beryllium is a metal used in industrial applications because of its light weight. While beryllium is a toxic metal, the alloy form reduces the toxicity of the material. 3.2 PACKAGING The HEU would be packaged in containers meeting DOT regulatory requirements and IAEA standards. The DOT Type B packaging with the specification 6M (49 CFR 178.354) would be used. This packaging consists of an exterior container, a standard 55-gallon drum, in which an inner container (DOT specification 2R) is suspended by plywood and fiberboard insulation disks. A total of 456 6M-2R containers would be transported to Kazakhstan to repackage the HEU. ** Table 3.1-1 HEU Material Forms and Quantities Material Form Total Weight U-235 Content Description (kg) (kg) Uranium Oxide >26 26/0.26 Powder Form. About 7 containers Uranium Metal >187/0 187 About 0.4-0.6 in diameter x 0.8 - 1.0 in long slugs. 27 containers. Uranium Beryllium About 1,000 167 Finished U/Be rods, about alloy (9-28% by 0.5 in diameter x 4.7 in weight is U) long. About 500 containers. Uranium Beryllium About 1,000 186 Machined turnings, broken machined turnings (10-60% by rods, and powder. About and powder weight is U) 500 containers. Totals >2220 >566 1,025 storage containers and about 6,000 sample bottles containing no more than 3 grams each of oxides representative of materials listed above. ** Type B packaging meets containment and shielding requirements for normal transport, and in addition, is designed and tested to withstand the effects of severe accidents. Evaluation for hypothetical accident conditions is based on the application of free drop, puncture, thermal, and immersion tests. The hypothetical accident condition tests are severe in nature (for example, the thermal test exposes the package to 8000C [1.472 F] heat for no less than 30 minutes and are conducted sequentially to determine the cumulative effect on the package. Except for a limited number of specification Type B packaging described in the regulations (49 CFR 173A16), all Type B packaging designs require prior approval of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or DOE. Packaging design requirements are found in 49 CFR 173 and 10 CFR 71. Packaging would meet all requirements of the NRC regulations for fissile material packages in Part 71 of 10 CFR (Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials). These requirements establish mandatory design and construction criteria and contents limits to assure that subcriticality is maintained by each package. Type B packaging is designed to retain the integrity of containment and shielding required by DOT regulations under normal conditions of transport. In addition, Type B packaging must be designed under both normal and hypothetical accident conditions (10 CFR 71.55), including forklift accidents involving the puncture of a container. Specific standards for each Fissile Class are also prescribed in the NRC regulations (10 CFR 7l.57 through 10 CFR 71.61). These standards identify the shipper requirements for determining the allowable number of packages of a given design and fissile material loading which can be safely transported together in a vehicle. As was the case for individual package design, conveyance loading limits are established for both incident-free and hypothetical accident conditions. In other words, the regulations assure that: (1) individual package design and contents limits preclude nuclear criticality in any single package, and: (2) when packages are stacked together for shipment, their numbers are limited to ensure subcriticality. Packaging must also undergo rigid tests to demonstrate containment capabilities during normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions. While the possibility of a nuclear criticality accident can never be considered zero when sufficient quantities of fissile material are present, it is remote with regard to transportation. The packaging to be used would be the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) approved 6M-2R container (DOT, 1994). The intended use of the DOT Specification 6M packaging is for shipments of enriched uranium. The 2R inner container provides the primary containment boundary to prevent release of the contents to the environment and enhances the shielding capability of the packaging. The inner container also prevents moisture from reaching the contents. The inner container (Figure 3.2-1) holds three or four steel cans (4.75 inch diameter) for uranium compounds such as uranium oxide and broken uranium or uranium alloy metal. The 6M-2R container meets the requirements of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and is in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency Regulations (IAEA 1985, as amended 1990). 3.3 AIR TRANSPORT BY U.S. AIR FORCE The HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air Force in two C-5 aircraft from Kazakhtstan to Dover Air Force Base (AFB). ** Figure 3.2-1 is a technical drawing of the physical packing with metal cans.** 3.3.1 Aerial Port of Entry Requirements To select the proposed aerial port of entry, the following set of requirements were used: * The aerial port should be on a military base with an airstrip where C-5 aircraft can land with minimal risk. * The aerial port runway should have sufficient capacity to accommodate two U.S. Air Force C-5 aircraft and the ten DOE Safe Secure Transport Trailers which would be used for highway transport of the HEU. * The aerial port should have a secure area for the transfer of HEU from the C-5 aircraft to the SSTs. * There should be a relatively low to moderate population in the vicinity of the aerial port of entry, i.e., a suburban or rural area with a population density of less than 500 person/ km2. In addition to these requirements, other factors considered in selecting an aerial port of entry are as follows: * The air flight distance over U.S. territory should be minimized. * Air refueling over U.S. territory should be avoided. * The highway transport distance from the aerial port to the Y-12 Plant should be minimized. Dover AFB meets the aerial port requirements and considerations. Dover AFB routinely handles the C-5 aircraft Dover AFB has more than enough capacity to handle the C-5 aircraft and the SSTs. The equipment and personnel needed to support C-5 flights of this nature are permanently established at Dover AFB. Dover AFB is in an area with a moderate population; Dover AFB is located in a suburban area within Kent County, which has a population of 110,000. The population density within approximately 10 km of Dover AFB is 475.4 persons/km2. Based on the characteristics of the airstrip and support facilities, and the moderate population density surrounding Dover relative to other bases near urban areas, Dover AFB meets the aerial port requirements. When considering the other factors, Dover AFB is distinguished among other possible aerial ports. The air night distance over U.S. territory is very low because Dover AFB is close to the Atlantic coast, and therefore, air refueling over U.S. territory would be avoided. The highway transport distance from Dover AFB to Y-12 Plant is greater than the two alternative aerial ports analyzed in this EA, but is still relatively low, and considerably lower than most other possible aerial ports in the U.S. which are not analyzed in the EA. 3.3.2 Flight from Kazakhstan to Dover AFB The United States Air Force Transportation Command would utilize three C-5 aircraft to transport the HEU personnel, and equipment from Kazakhstan to the United States. Two of the three planes would be used to transport HEU. The total nonstop flight time is approximately 21 hours over a distance of approximately 8,000 miles. The two aircraft with HEU cargo would proceed directly to Dover Air Force Base without any intermediate stop in a foreign country. The third aircraft with the majority of the repackaging team and its support equipment (and no HEU cargo) would make refueling stops in Europe and proceed to McGhee Tyson, Tennessee Air National Guard Base, co-located at the Municipal Airport of Knoxville, Tennessee. McGhee-Tyson is the site from which the team and its equipment would depart from the U.S. to Kazakhstan. 3.3.3 C-5 Aircraft The C-5 is a long-range, high-speed sept-wing aircraft which is designed for use as a heavy logistics transport (USTRANSCOM. 1994). The aircraft is powered by four General Electric engines mounted in individual pods beneath the wing. The C-5 is capable of airlifting in excess of 250,000 pounds of cargo and 75 troops at a speed of 360 knots or 0.875 Mach. With its in-night refueling capability, the range is unlimited. The normal crew consists of six, with seating provisions for seven relief crew members. The C-5 aircraft landing gear is of the fully retractable, modified tricycle type, with four wheels on the steerable nose landing gear and six bogie-mounted wheels on each of the four main landing gear assemblies. The weight of the aircraft is thus distributed among 28 wheels, which allows the aircraft to land or takeoff on unimproved runways. The maximum gross weight of the aircraft is 769,000 pounds with a fuel load of 51,000 gallons weighing approximately 332,500 pounds. The C-5 aircraft has many unique features including: * a forward and aft cargo door system, enabling straight-through loading and unloading; * a landing gear kneeling system which enables the cargo deck to be tilted nose-down or tail-down; or lowered in the level position; * two auxiliary power units, one located in each main landing gear pod to provide electrical, pneumatic, and hydraulic power for engine starting and for ground operations and maintenance requirements. 3.3.4 Air Refueling Each C-5 air refueling event would be accomplished with two KC-135 tanker aircraft for each C-5. There would be a total of four tanker aircraft utilized to refuel both C-5s at the same time. The tankers would take off from their respective bases to rendezvous with the C-5s along the flight route. As the rendezvous approaches, the tankers and the C-5 would be in visual contact separated by 1000 feet in altitude with the C-5 one mile behind the tankers. The C-5 would then maneuver to a position directly behind and below the tanker. The tanker boom operator would directly monitor the C-5 closure on the tanker. Once the C-5 is in position, the boom operator would position the flying boom into the refueling receptacle at the top of the C-5. The fuel would then pass through the boom into the C-5. The transaction would take approximately 20 minutes. After refueling from the first tanker, the C-5 would then maneuver to the second tanker to refuel again. After the second refueling is complete, the tankers would climb and turn away from the C-5 to return to their launch bases. The C-5 would descend 1,000 feet until the tankers have left, then return to the appropriate altitude. The Air force routinely trains personnel on C-5 aircraft refueling and refueling with this tanker is a routine operation. ** Figure 3.3.3-1 is a photograph of an Air Force C-5 Aircraft. ** 3.5.5 Cargo Restraint Transporter Cargo Restraint Transporters are used to load material onto the aircraft and hold the containers in place during transport in a manner that maximizes cargo space and safety (Sandia, 1988). A Cargo Restraint Transporter unit loaded with drums is shown in Figures 3.3-1 and 3.3.5-2. The unit is loaded as follows: * Four drums are placed on the base section; * The center section is placed on top of the four drums; * Four additional drums are loaded on top of the center section; * The top section is placed on top of the four additional drums; * The array is secured with tiedowns through the tiedown rings to the base section. The containers would be placed in cargo restraint transporters as illustrated in Figure 3.3.5-2. It is estimated that approximately 57 CRTs would be loaded with containers. The CRTs would be tied down on pallets or directly onto the cargo bay floor inside the C-5 aircraft. ** Figure 3.3.5-1 is an illustration of a loaded cargo restraint transporter. ** ** Figure 3.3.5-2 is an illustration of a loaded and secured cargo restraint transporter. ** 3.4 TRANSFER AT DOVER AIR FORCE BASE SSTs would be parked in a secure area at Dover AFB to await the arrival of the two C-5 aircraft. The unloading of the containers from the C-5 aircraft would be done by Dover AFB personnel, and loading of the containers into the SSTs would be done by DOE personnel. The loading process could utilize a forklift and/or a K-loader, which is a adjustable-height platform that would be moved up to aircraft and then moved to the SST. The Cargo Restraint Transporter would be loaded onto the SST guided by floor and ceiling tracks. Once in the appropriate position, the Cargo Restraint Transporters are secure to the SST via lug nuts, locking pins, chains, straps, and nets. A Cargo Restraint Net is placed over the array to further secure the material. The net is a multi-strap adjustable net that is designed to secure a varying size of arrays of containers within the SSTs. Detailed instructions and procedures are described in the Document Y/OA-3493, "Cargo Restraint Nets Handling Instructions" (Energy System 1986) and the technical manual, "Cargo Restraint Transporter Handling Instructions (Sandia, 1988). 3.5 SST TRANSPORT FROM DOVER AIR FORCE BASE TO Y-12 The HEU would be transported by Safe Secure Transport (SST) from Dover Air Force Base to the Y-12 plant. Transportation would be conducted by the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) in accordance with the requirements of DOE Orders and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (title 49 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations [CFR ]). Since its establishment in 1975, TSD has accumulated more than 119 million km (74 million miles) of over-the-road experience in transporting DOE-owned cargo, without any accidents resulting in a release of radioactive material. The SST vehicles which would be used to transport the HEU are specially designed semi-trailers pulled by armored tractors, which use penetration resistance and delay mechanisms to prevent unauthorized cargo removal. This design has the added benefit of protecting the cargo from damage or release in the event of a severe accident. A robust tiedown and restraining system to secure the cargo within the SST trailer provides additional protection. Secure Safe Transport vehicles are accompanied by escort vehicles equipped with armored couriers, communications and electronics systems, radiological monitoring equipment and other equipment to enhance safety and security. Redundant communications systems assure that intra-convoy communications and communications between each vehicle and the Security Communications System in Albuquerque, New Mexico, are maintained. The SST vehicles observe special operating procedures designed to promote safety and security. DOE Order 5632.2A, Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials with Vital Equipment, establishes baseline protection requirements for special nuclear materials in transit, providing for an appropriately graded level of protection for each shipment. DOE Order 5610, Transportation-Safeguards System Program Operations, ensures that Transportation Safeguards System operations are accomplished in a manner commensurate with established practices and procedures for cargo safeguards, program continuity, and the protection of national security, personnel, the public, and the environment. Nuclear Material Couriers (NMCs), the Federal Officers of the DOE who drive and escort all shipments of HEU made within the Transportation Safeguards System, are trained to provide an immediate response to any incident. Depending on the incident, the NMCs will assess the integrity of the SST and define an initial response. An emergency notification system for reporting and processing operations information is maintained to ensure that effective and appropriate action is taken during emergency situations. The response may include notifying local authorities and establishing a joint command post, initiating traffic control measures, providing first aid, performing basic radiological surveys, and taking other actions deemed necessary to protect the public and or the public domain. Anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons are included in the types of armament against which DOE facilities must provide strategies and/or systems of protection. The Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has the responsibility for quantifying threats within the continental United States. According to the FBI, the terrorist threat to DOE nuclear facilities is low. For hardened targets (facilities with design features which would mitigate or eliminate the effects of an attack), such as the Transportation Safeguard System and Y-12 Plant, the threat is even lower. DOE Albuquerque assesses threat to near and long-term operations in coordination with the DOE HQ Office of Nonproliferation and National Security and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Support. There is a DOE counterintelligence program designed to provide timely foreign intelligence information to assist in protecting weapons shipments in transit. There has never been an overt attempt to take material from an SST, nor has there ever been a loss of HEU during shipment by the Transportation Safeguards Division program. The Transportation Safeguards Divisions liaison program assures that the States which will be traversed are generally aware of TSD operations and coordinates communication channels between the DOE Albuquerque Office and the State authorities. The States are involved in briefing and training efforts, which include sharing information on the frequency and general routing for TSD shipments and identifying the types of assistance TSD would require in an emergency. The DOE Accident Response Group would respond to any incident involving the SST transport. The mission of the Accident Response Group is to efficiently manage the resolution of accidents involving nuclear materials in DOE custody at the time of the incident. The Accident Response Group handles a broad range of incidents, including an burning of a nuclear component and radioactive contamination, in accordance with the DOE Accident Response Group Procedures Material which is the analog to the Department of Defense Nuclear Accident Procedures. 3.6 INTERIM STORAGE AT THE OAK RIDGE Y-12 PLAN The HEU would be received for interim storage at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge Tennessee, and stored up to ten years. The Y-12 facility is currently in operational standdown to address safety concerns raised by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. The Department of Energy anticipates that the safety concerns raised by the Board will be addressed sufficiently to allow receipt and storage of the HEU at the Y-12 Plant in November 1994. The HEU material would be stored in the Building 9720-5 Warehouse, which is in the southwestern portion of the Y-12 Plant. Building 9720-5 is a single-story warehouse that includes approximately 3,716 m2 (40,000 ft2) of storage space. The Oak Ridge Reservation and the Y-12 Plant are shown in Figures 3.6-1 and 3.6-2. The location of Building 9720-5 within the Y-12 Plant is shown Figure 3.6-3. ** Figure 3.6-1 is a map of the location of the Oak Ridge Reservation. ** ** Figure 3.6-2 is a map of the location of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. ** The SSTs would off-load the HEU material at the Building 9720-5 warehouse. The material would undergo a transfer check consisting of a weight and a tamper-indicating device verification and possibly a non-destructive assay check. Some of the material may be loaded in Y-12 Plant transport vehicles (known as the Blue Goose) for in-plant transport to the Y-12 Plant Laboratory (Building 9995) for confirmatory non-destructive assay measurements as required for nuclear material control and accountability purposes. The material confirmatory measurements may be also be conducted in Buildings 9720 5 or 9212. Following these accountability checks, the HEU material would be transported back to the Building 9720-5 warehouse. The HEU would be placed directly into a vault-type room in building 9720-5 for interim storage, without any processing to convert its existing form. The Kazakhstan HEU material would be in the same forms and type as the special nuclear material already stored in building 9720-5 (e.g. broken metal oxide, solid metal, Beryllium alloys). The materials would be packaged the same as the existing materials and would be subject to the same physical and administrative controls. The bulk of the material is alloyed with beryllium and the Y-12 plant safety documentation does not currently cover the processing of such material. This would be a new type of processing for the Y-12 Plant to which further environmental, safety, and health documentation would be requested. Therefore, the HEU would be placed in storage in its existing form without any pre-storage processing. The authorization basis for interim storage in building 9720-5 is documented in the Unreviewed Safety Question Determination, Interim Storage of Material NMSSS Warehouse, Building 972O-5 (U), September 15, 1994. The determination that there are no unreviewed safety questions is based on the following documents: (l) Final Safety Analysis Reports for the Assembly, Disassembly and Warehouse Project (U), Y/TS-816, September 1984 (Energy Systems. 1984): (2)Phase I Hazard Screening Analysis or the Nuclear Material Safeguarded Shipping and Storage (NMSSS) Facility Building 9720-5 (U). FINAL HS/7/f/2, December 20,1990 (Energy Systems, 1990): (3) Letter from E.D. Brewer to A.K. Zava, Change in Preliminary Hazard Rating 9720-5, December 3, 1991 (Energy Systems,1991); and (4)Operations Safety Requirements for the Enriched Uranium Assembly; Disassembly and Warehouse Operation (U), Y/TS-53, Rev. l, March 7, 1991 (Energy Systems, 1991). Note: The terminology Unreviewed Safety Question Determination refers to the process of determining whether or not there are any safety questions which have not been addressed in other safety documentation. A determination that an action does not constitute an unreviewed safety question means that no new administrative or physical controls will be required to ensure safety. The HEU would be stored within a Material Access Areas in Building 9720-5, which is in the Y-12 Plant Perimeter intrusion Detection and Alarm System protected area. A Material Access Area is a controlled security area that segregates enriched uranium use or storage from other operations areas by physical barriers and specific access controls. All storage configurations would meet criticality safety, environmental, and security requirements. Storage arrays located in vault-type rooms would rest on the floor of existing process locations within Material Access Areas. A vault-type room is a structure having a combination locked door and protected by an intrusion alarm system that is activated by any penetration of walls, floors, ceilings, or openings, or by motion within the room. Fabricated structures commonly referred to as birdcages (Figure 3.64) could be used, to ensure criticality safety while material is stage or laboratory analysis. Upon approval of additional safety documentation, the material may be unloaded from 6M2R containers and stored in tube vaults, modular storage vaults, or transferred to in-plant containers in a vault or vault-type room. A vault is a windowless enclosure with a built-in combination locked steel door and with walls, floor, and ceiling substantially constructed of materials that afford penetration resistance at least equal to that of 3-inch thick reinforced concrete. Any openings in the vault, greater than 96 square inches in area and over 6 inches in the smallest dimension are protected by imbedded steel bars at least 5/8 inches in diameter on 6-inch centers. Metals would be stored in locked steel boxes in fixed, safe trays within reinforced concrete vaults, commonly referred to as tube vaults. Tube vaults (Figure 3.6-5) have concrete floors, ceilings, and walls. Matrices of steel tubes are constructed in two opposing walls in these vaults, and the spaces between the steel tubes are filled with concrete. Trays with fixed spacers are used in the tubes, to hold canned materials in fixed positions on the tray. The trays are pulled out horizontally from the tube vault and loaded with containers, in accordance with Y-12 Plant procedures (Energy Systems, 1994f). A typical tube vault can safely accommodate as much as 40 MTU of HEU, and its design life is estimated to be nearly 100 years (U.S. Congress 1993). The HEU could also be stored in modular storage vaults, (see Figure 3.6) which are structurally equivalent to the tube vaults. A modular storage vault is loaded at the ground level in accordance with Y-12 procedures (Energy Systems, 1994g). Each container would be hand loaded into the storage cavity within the vault, as described in the EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929). The safety analysis documentation for the modular storage vaults allows for the stacking of eight modular storage vaults. ** Figure 3.6-3 is a map of the location of the Y-12 plant building 9720-5 warehouse. ** The interim storage of the uranium material would not generate any radioactive or hazardous waste. The EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at the Y-12 Plant (DOE/EA-0929) describes processing operations that generate waste and that are not involved in this proposed action. 3.7 INVENTORY ACCOUNTABILITY Upon receipt of the enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant, a transfer check would be made as the shipping containers were unloaded from transport vehicles. The transfer check would confirm container item count and identity, verify the integrity tamper-indicating devices (including identification numbers), and compare this information with shipping documentation to ensure that the shipment was received intact. Confirmatory measurements in the receipt facility would include a non-destructive analysis to verify the presence of HEU in the container and a gross weight determination on the containers. Following the confirmatory measurements, the HEU would enter the nuclear materials accounting system at the Y-12 Plant. The Y-12 Plant maintains a database for tracking enriched uranium, documenting nuclear material transactions, and issuing periodic reports. The accounting system supporting the data base, follows generally accepted accounting principles, as promulgated by the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants, and meets the requirements of DOE Order 5633.3A, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials, which requires a physical inventory of materials to determine the quantities of nuclear materials on hand. Statistical random sampling of enriched uranium inventories is required to verify and confirm the contents. Materials sealed with tamper-indication devices (TIDS) would be visually inspected one at a time to assure that the seals are undisturbed and the integrity of the container has not been jeopardized. ** Figures 3.6-4 - 3.6-6 are illustrations of HEU storage facilities. ** 3.8 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY In terms of safeguards and security, special nuclear materials (SNM) are categorized according to their attractiveness to theft or diversion and according to their quantity (DOE Order 5633.3A, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials). The Y-12 Plant uses a graded safeguards system designed to provide varying degrees of physical protection, accountability, and material control to different types, quantities, physical forms, and chemical or isotropic compositions of nuclear materials, consistent with the risks associated with threat scenarios. Safeguarding and securing HEU at the Y-12 Plant is accomplished through a combination of four approaches: access control, material surveillance, material containment, and detection and assessment of unauthorized removal. Each approach may vary in extent depending on the quantity and form of HEU. Access control refers to physically restricting access to enriched uranium to properly authorized personnel. Most of the Y-12 plant is a high-security facility with restrictions, fencing, and other physical barriers that exclude trespassers. This physical barrier to unauthorized entry, combined with Y 12's highly trained security force and drills and exercises in various security breach scenarios, limits the possibility of accidental or intentional incidents resulting from uncontrolled access. Material surveillance refers to the monitoring of HEU to detect unauthorized activities. Protective force personnel and process operators are present in most areas of the plant around the clock. These personnel are further supported by full-time security and emergency staffs who can provide immediate aid in the event of any security breach or environmental incident. Material containment involves assuring that HEU is kept only in Material Access Areas. Materials transferred in or out of these areas are rigorously accounted for. A physical inventory of all HEU in interim storage is taken on a DOE-approved, fixed schedule. All areas that contain HEU establish separate material control codes for accounting purposes. Transfer between storage and processing areas is documented, and individual items are identified with a batch card system. The inventory schedule is adhered to by all storage and processing areas. Detection and assessment of unauthorized removal of HEU is accomplished through such means as tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) and physical or electronic searches of vehicles, personnel, packages, and other containers at enriched uranium storage and process areas. 3.9 ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND HEALTH PROTECTION As described in the EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at the Y-12 Plant (DOE/EA-0929), the Y-12 Plant has extensive programs and procedures for environmental, safety, and health protection. It is the policy of the Y-12 Plant site management to conduct operations in a safe and environmentally sound manner, and in compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations and with all applicable DOE Orders. The air, groundwater, and surface water in and around the Y-12 Plant are monitored routinely to identify and minimize the impacts to the environment from its operations. Worker safety is addressed throughout the receipt, prestorage processing, intra-plant transport, and storage operations by the Y-12 Plant's implementation of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements through applicable DOE Orders. A detailed report on monitoring results, estimates of the current environmental impacts, and regulatory compliance at Y-12 appears annually in the Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report, which has been published since 1971 and is available to the public. 3.10 ON-SITE TRANSPORTATION AT THE Y-12 PLANT Transportation between Y-12 Plant buildings would be accomplished by means of vehicles specifically designed for on-site use. These vehicles are commonly referred to as Blue Goose vehicles because of the color of the cargo body and cab. Each vehicle can transport cargo weighing up to 1.814 kg (4000 lb.). Numerous security and safety systems have been installed on the Blue Goose and there is no access to the cargo body from the cab. On-Site Transportation Safety (Energy Systems 1991) establishes safety requirements and guidelines for handling and moving materials at the Y-12 Plant which ensure protection equivalent to that provided by the DOT regulations (49 CFR). These guidelines include packaging, marketing, labeling, placarding, and emergency response requirements. Blue Goose vehicles operate in the Protected Area of the Y-12 Plant to transport material to and from the Material Access Areas, which are the controlled security areas containing special nuclear materials. 4.0 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION The alternatives to the proposed action considered in this EA include the no action alternative and two alternate aerial ports of entry for the C-5 aircraft landing in the United States: Fort Campbell, a U.S. Army base which is located in southwestern Kentucky and the Air National Guard base (hereafter called McGhee Tyson) which is collocated with McGhee Tyson Airport, the commercial airport in Knoxville, Tennessee. Fort Campbell and McGhee Tyson Airport were selected as representative aerial ports of entry which meet the criteria established in Section 3.3.1, Aerial Port of Entry Requirements. The impacts of using either Fort Campbell or McGhee Tyson as the aerial port of entry are analyzed in Section 6. 4.1 NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE Under the no action alternative, the United States would not acquire the HEU from Kazakhstan. This would not meet the U.S. objectives for nonproliferation and would not reduce the global nuclear danger. As discussed in Section 2, the HEU in Kazakhstan constitutes sufficient material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or more nuclear weapons. 4.2 ALTERNATE PORTS OF ENTRY 4.2.1 FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY, AS AERIAL PORT Under this alternative, Fort Campbell, located in southwestern Kentucky, would be the aerial port of entry for the C-5 flight into the United States. Fort Campbell meets the port of entry requirements. Fort Campbell is a U.S. Army base with an airstrip that can accommodate the C-5 aircraft and the SSTs. The equipment and personnel needed for C-5 operations would be transported to Fort Campbell. However, Fort Campbell would not have the added measure of safety offered by Dover AFB which has more experience with C-5 aircraft. Fort Campbell has sufficient capacity in a secure area to accommodate the two C-5 aircraft and 10 SSTs. Fort Campbell is within a three-hour drive to the Y-12 Plant, which is considerably closer to the Y-12 Plant than Dover AFB. Fort Campbell is located in a rural area within four counties which have a population of approximately 189,000. The population density within 10 km of Fort Campbell is 3.7 person/km2. Based on these characteristics of the airstrip and support facilities, and the low population in the surrounding area, Fort Campbell meets the aerial port requirements. In considering the "other factors," as described in Section 3.3.1, Fort Campbell would not be as desirable as an aerial port as Dover AFB in most respects. The air flight distance from the East Coast of the U.S. to Fort Campbell is approximately 600 miles while Dover is essentially on the East Coast. No additional refueling would be required for the Fort Campbell alternative. The factors which are more favorable under this alternative than Dover are the facts that Fort Campbell has a lower population density, and this alternative would require less highway transport distance to Y-12 than the Dover alternative. 4.2.2 AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE AT MCGHEE TYSON AIRPORT AS AERIAL PORT Under this alternative, the Air National Guard Base at the McGhee Tyson Airport in Knoxville, Tennessee would be the aerial port of entry for the C-5 flight into the U.S. McGhee Tyson meets the port of entry requirements. The Air National Guard Base is a military aerial port collocated with a commercial airport. McGhee Tyson has sufficient capacity in a secure area to accommodate the C-5 aircraft and the SSTs. The equipment and personnel need for C-5 operations would be transported to McGhee Tyson. However, McGhee Tyson would not have the added measure of safety offered by Dover AFB because of Dover's greater experience with C-5 aircraft. Also, McGhee Tyson does not have as much ramp space as Dover AFB does for parking the C-5 aircraft and SSTs. McGhee Tyson is much closer to the Y-12 Plant than either Dover AFB or Fort Campbell. McGhee Tyson is located in Blount County, which has a population of approximately 86,000. The center of the City of Knoxville, which is a relatively large urban area is 10 miles from the McGhee Tyson airport. The population density within 10 km of McGhee Tyson is 17.8 person/km2, which is lower than Dover AFB population density of 475.4 persons/km2. Based on these characteristics of the airstrip and support facilities and the low population in the area within 10 km of the airport, McGhee Tyson meets the aerial port requirements. In considering the other factors described in Section 3.3.1, McGhee Tyson would not be as desirable an aerial port as Dover AFB in most respects. The air flight distance from the East Coast to McGhee Tyson is approximately 400 miles, while Dover is essentially on the East Coast. No additional refueling would be required for the McGhee Tyson alternative. The factors which are more favorable under this alternative than Dove AFB or Fort Campbell alternatives are the facts that the McGhee Tyson alternative has a lower population density and would require much less highway transport distance to Y-12 than the Dover alternative. 4.3 ALTERNATIVES DISMISSED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION 4.3.1 Other Ports of Entry The three ports of entry analyzed in this EA provide a range of reasonable alternatives which meet the port requirements established in Section 3.3.1. Additional ports of entry farther west than Fort Campbell, Kentucky, were determined not to be reasonable because they would require additional air refueling, but would not provide any substantial benefit when compared to the three ports of entry analyzed. 4.3.2 Other DOE Facilities The Department is proposing to consolidate storage of HEU from the DOE weapons complex at the Y-12 Plant in order to minimize the cost of storage and maximize the security of the material, as discussed in the preapproval EA for Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level (DOE/EA-0929). It would not be reasonable to create a separate DOE secure storage facility solely for the limited amount of material of foreign origin which may be stored for nonproliferation purposes. 4.4 COMMERCIAL FACILITY Because the eventual United States policy goal is to dispose of surplus HEU (see Section 1.1), it could be beneficial to transport the Kazakhstan HEU directly to a commercial nuclear processing facility for storage rather than to the Y-12 facility, if an acceptable arrangement can be concluded in the time available. The Babcock and Wilcox Company has expressed tentative interest in obtaining the HEU in order to process and blend it to a low enriched from at their Lynchburg, Virginia facility for use as fuel in power reactors. The Department of Energy has been advised by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), that the Lynchburg facility could store the material pending a decision on its disposition. This approach could eventually provide a method to dispose of the material more expeditiously and also avoid the need to re-transfer the material from Y-12 at some later date. Minimizing the period of storage could also reduce the attendant costs. Initially, any agreement with Babcox and Wilcox would be for storage only until the legal, regulatory, environmental, and policy issues associated with commercial disposition of the material could be resolved. An analysis of transporting the material to the Lynchburg facility is in preparation and the results will be available before a final decision is made regarding the destination of the Kazakhstan HEU. 5.0 DESCRIPTION OF AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT The locations of the Y-12 Plant and Dover Air Force Base are shown in Figure 5.0-1, as well as the alternative aerial ports. 5.1 Y-12 PLANT, OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE The Y-12 Plant is located on the DOE-owned Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) which is within the corporate boundaries of the city of Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Y-12 Plant, which is situated at the eastern boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation, has surrounding buffer zone of about 1,133 hectares (2,800 acres) and is about 4.8 km (3 miles) from the population center of the city of Oak Ridge. The estimated residential population within an 80-km (50 mile) radius of the Oak Ridge Reservation is approximately 880,000. A major urban center, Knoxville (the approximate population of which is 165,000), is located about 32 km (20 miles) to the east. The City of Oak Ridge has a population of about 27,000. Except for Knoxville and the city of Oak Ridge, the land within 80 km (50 miles) of the Oak Ridge Reservation is predominantly rural and is used primarily for residential, commercial, recreational, and agricultural purposes. The preapproval EA for Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge Tennessee, released to the State of Tennessee and the public in September 1994, provides the full description of the Oak Ridge Reservation affected environment (DOE/EA 0929). 5.2 DOVER AIR FORCE BASE, DELAWARE Dover AFB is located in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 50 miles southeast of Wilmington, Delaware and 80 miles southeast of Philadelphia. The region where Dover AFB is shown in Figure 5.2-1 and the airstrip is shown in Figure 5.2-2. Dover AFB is the home of the 436th Airlift Wing and since 1973, has been the only all C-5 base in the Air Mobility Command. Dover AFB houses the largest aerial port facility on the East Coast, and is the focal point for cargo and passenger movement to Europe and the Middle East aboard both the 436th Airlift Wing C-5s. The mission of the 436 Airlift Wing is to provide strategic global military airlift capability for worldwide support of contingency and emergency war plans. Additional information on Dover AFB is provided in Appendix A. ** Figure 5.0-1 is a U.S. map with the locations of proposed actions and alternatives. ** **Figure 5.2-1 is a map of a portion of Delaware with the Dover Air Force Base highlighted. ** ** Figure 5.2-2 is a layout of the Dover Air Force Base Airstrip. ** 5.3 FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY Fort Campbell is located in southwestern Kentucky and north-central Tennessee in portions of four counties: Montgomery and Stewart counties in Tennessee, and Christian and Trigg Counties in Kentucky. The installation is approximately eight miles north of Clarksville, Tennessee, and seventeen miles south of Hopkinsville, Kentucky (see Figure 5.3-1). Of the 105,303 total acres of land occupied by the Forces Command installation, approximately two-thirds are in Tennessee and the remainder in Kentucky. The primary mission of Fort Campbell is to support, train, and prepare the 101st Airborne Division for combat readiness. Additional information on Fort Campbell is in Appendix B. 5.4 AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, MCGHEE TYSON AIRPORT, KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE McGhee Tyson Airport is one of five major air carrier airports in the state of Tennessee. McGhee Tyson Airport is located approximately 30 miles from Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The airport is located adjacent to the corporate limits of Alcoa, Tennessee, approximately 10 miles southwest of the Knoxville Central Business district. The region where McGhee Tyson airport presently shares its airfield facilities with the 134th Air Refueling Group of the Tennessee Air National Guard and the Army Aircraft Support Facility. The Tennessee Air National Guard occupies 323 acres on the west side of the airport. The 134th's primary mission is to provide refueling support for military aircraft and it has assigned eleven KC-135E tankers. McGhee Tyson Airport is categorized in the National Plan of Integrated Airport systems as a medium-haul commercial service airport. This category does not restrict or prevent its use by general aviation or military aircraft. The runways are adequate for landings and takeoffs by the largest Air Force cargo aircraft, including the C-5A. Fuel storage and fueling services for general aviation, air cargo, and the airlines is handled on-site by the fixed base operators. Additional information on McGhee Tyson is provided in Appendix C. The high natural radionuclide levels make the ocean ecosystems the highest background-radiation domains in the biosphere (IAEA, 1976). Radionuclides have been discharges into the oceans since 1944. However, in 1981, it was estimated that the total input of radionuclides, essentially from waste disposal and nuclear weapons testing, approached 0.7 percent of the natural radioactivity present in the oceans (Needler, 1981). The total inventory of natural radioactivity in the oceans is approximately 5.0 x 10E11 Ci(IAEA, 1976). The relationship between environmental concentrations of radionuclides and the concentration found in organisms is important in the study of food web (as occurs with organic pesticides in terrestrial environments) is observed in marine food webs. In the marine environment, uranium has not been found to bioaccumulate in fish and only slightly bioaccumulates in crustaceans and mollusks (IAEA, 1976). The readiness with which other constitutes of spent nuclear fuel may enter the food web is variable, but generally low (DOE, 1980). The deep sea bottom dwellers, or benthos, are highly diverse, with many taxonomic groups being represented there by more species than most shallow-water communities (Hessler, 1976). However, the number of individual organisms in a given volume does decrease in the deep seas and this dramatic reduction in standing stock or biomass on the deep ocean floor. In round figures, the total weight of bottom-living organisms in and on each square meter seabed decreases from 10-100 grams on the continental shelf, to 1-10 grams on the continental slope, and to only 0.1-1.0 gram on the abyssal plain. (Rice, 1978). The continental shelf, averaging 65 km (40.3 miles) wide and less than 200 m (0.124 miles) deep, has the greatest biomass concentration in the ocean and is where most fisheries are located. The deep ocean is an average of 4 km (2.48 miles) deeper than the continental shelf (Pickard, 1979). Specific flow estimates for the North Atlantic are up to 5.0 x 10E6 m3/s for the total volume of water crossing the Iceland-Scotland ridge (Steel, 1962). From the Greenland Sea, the flow through the Denmark Strait has been estimated to be 5.0 x 10E6 m3/s (Swallow, 1960). Water from the Arctic that enters the Atlantic leaves mainly to the south toward midlatitudes (NEA, 1988). ** Figure 5.3-1 is a map of the location of Fort Campbell, Kentucky. ** ** Figure 5.4-1 is map of the location of McGhee Tyson Airport, Tennessee. ** 5.5 Global Commons Because the proposed action would involve air transport over the oceans, the potential impacts on the global commons are analyzed in this EA, in accordance with Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions. Seawater is a complex solution containing the majority of the known elements. The average salinity of ocean water is about 35 parts per thousand. A significant feature of sea water is that while the total concentration of dissolved salt varies from place to place, the ratios of the more abundant components remain almost constant. This may be taken as evidence that over geologic time, the oceans have become well mixed. (Pickard, 1979). ** Table 5.1 Oceanic Concentrations of naturally occurring Uranium Isotopes U-234 1.04 - 1.30 pCi/l U-235 0.04 - 0.07 pCi/l U-238 0.9 - 1.30 pCi/l Note: one picocurie (pCi) = 1.0 x 10E12 Ci ** Naturally occurring radionuclides such as uranium-234, uranium-235, and uranium 238 are present in seawater and in marine organisms at concentrations generally greater than their concentrations in terrestrial ecosystems. The ocean water concentrations of uranium isotopes are shown in Table 5.1. 6.0 POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS This section examines the potential impacts of the proposed action and alternatives under incident-free and accident conditions on: the global commons; the aerial ports of entry and their surrounding areas; the Y-12 Plant and the surrounding area, and the areas along the highway routes on which the HEU would be transported. 6.1 Y-12 PLANT The preapproval EA for Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, released to the State of Tennessee and the public on September 23, 1994, provides and analysis of the impacts of prestorage processing and interim storage of up to 500 metric tons of HEU, including 5 metric tons of HEU which could be acquired from foreign sources, and 7,105.9 metric tons of LEU for up to 10 years (DOE/EA 0929). This EA references applicable sections of the Y-12 Interim Storage EA (DOE/EA 0929). 6.1.1 Environmental Effects 6.1.1.1 Land Use and Archaeological and Cultural Resources Because there will be no new buildings constructed or demolished for the proposed action, there will be no effects on land use or archaeological and cultural resources. (DOE/EA 0929). 6.1.1.2 Air Quality The proposed action is to provide interim storage of the HEU without any prestorage processing, which is the greater source of air emissions, relative to storage activities. There would be no additional releases of airborne contaminants beyond the effects analyzed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA (DOE/EA-0929) because no processing would be required. Atmospheric discharges from Y-12 Plant production operations are minimized through the extensive use of air pollution control equipment. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are used to essentially eliminate particulate emissions (including uranium) from numerous production facilities. HEPA filters remove more than 99% of the particulates from the exhaust gases. Radioactive and nonradioactive airborne discharges would continue to be emitted from the Y-12 Plant under the proposed action, with prestorage processing being the primary source of emissions. An estimated 0.055 curies of uranium was released into the atmosphere in 1993 as a result of Y-12 Plant operations, primarily from processing operations. There has been a general downward trend in the total curie discharges of uranium from the Y-12 Plant, with 0.15 curies released in 1989, 0.08 curies released in 1990, 0.06 curies in 1991 and 1992, and 0.055 curies in 1993. The decreased uranium emissions reflect: the reduction since 1989 in other types of process activities that are still operating; and improvements in contamination control throughout the Y-12 Plant. 6.1.1.3 Hydrology and Water Quality The proposed action would involve only interim storage operations, and therefore, does not involve the types of wastewater discharges resulting from prestorage processing. The effects on hydrology and water quality analyzed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA (DOE/EA-0929) would continue primarily as a result of other Y-12 Plant operations. 6.1.1.4 Ecological Resources As there is little natural vegetation or fauna within the Y-12 Plant, and there would be no new construction or demolition of buildings under the proposed action, no effects on ecological resources would occur. The effects on ecological resources analyzed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA (DOE/EA-0929) would continue primarily as a result of other Y-12 Plant operations. **Figure 6.1.2.1-1 Average External Dose to Workers in building 9720-5 Warehouse 1987 0.16 rem 1988 0.125 rem 1989 0.07 rem 1990 0.025 rem 1991 0.03 rem 1992 0.02 rem 1993 0.025 rem ** 6.1.2 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure This section discusses the potential radiological effects to workers and the public from the proposed action under incident-free conditions. Under incident-free conditions, radiological exposures to workers could occur through direct exposure to the uranium material. Facility workers who would be in close proximity to the HEU material are the only population group at risk from direct exposure to this source because HEU emits low penetrating radiation. These direct exposures may result in an external dose to the workers. The twelve workers involved in handling the HEU acquired from Kazakhstan to place the containers in interim storage would receive a collective dose of 0.1 person-rem. The individual dose would be 0.008 rem. Using the worker dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose of 0.1 person-rem would be estimated to result in 4 x 10E-5 excess latent cancer fatalities among those 12 workers. (0.1 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] = .00004). This means that there would be a probability of 4 x 10E-5 or approximately 4 chances in 100,000 that even one excess cancer fatality would occur among the 12 workers as a result of the proposed action. The worker exposure from ongoing operations in Building 9720-5, which would continue regardless of whether the proposed action is undertaken, is shown in Table 6.1. The estimated exposures are based on actual 1993 dosimetry data derived from dosimeters worn by Y-12 workers. The average annual dose and the dose to the maximally exposed worker for each building are shown. These annual doses are well below the Y-12 Plant annual limit of 1 rem. The doses resulting from routine storage operations have substantially decreased since 1987 due to new shielding and operational procedures. The proposed action would be doses received over a short duration and would not increase the annual doses received by workers in Building 9720-5. Under incident-free operations, there would be essentially no uranium releases to the atmosphere and therefore, there would be no dose to the public caused by the proposed action. The annual dose to the maximally exposed individual from ongoing Y-12 Plant operations would continue to be approximately 0.0013 rem (1.3 mrem), which is the 1993 dose, regardless of whether the proposed action is implemented. EPA standards for releases, such as the NESHAP regulations, limit the dose to an individual member of the public from radionuclide releases to the atmosphere to 10 mrem per year. The annual collective dose from ongoing Y-12 operations to the public within 50 miles of Oak Ridge Reservation would continue to be 12 person-rem, which is the 1993 collective dose, regardless of whether the proposed action is implemented. In the postulated fire in Building 9720-5, the uranium and beryllium could potentially ignite and become airborne. The radiological effects of credible bounding uranium fires are analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929). A postulated fire that causes beryllium to become airborne is one of toxic chemical release accident scenarios identified in that EA (see Table 6.3). However, the consequences of that fire are not analyzed because it is not the bounding chemical release accident at Y-12 Plant: the anhydrous hydrogen fluoride leak is the bounding chemical accident, and it is analyzed in depth in the EA. The bounding uranium fire accident analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 is postulated in Building 9212, rather than Building 9720-5; it should be noted that Building 9212 contains processing operations, whereas Building 9720-5 is only a warehouse and does not contain processing operations. The consequences of the Building 9212 fire are a dose of 0.03 rem to the involved worker, and a collective dose to the worker population of 7,100 person-rem, which is the mean dose. The 95th percentile collective dose is estimated to be 40,000 person rem. For the public, the dose to the maximally exposed individual from this accident would be 7.2 rem (30 rem - 95th percentile dose), and the collective dose to the population within 50 miles would be 100 person rem (380 person-rem - 95th percentile dose). The health effects of the worker and public doses are presented in the EA for Interim Storage at Y-12. As an example, the collective dose of 100 person-rem would result in 0.02 excess latent cancer fatalities, based on the public dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 (NRC, 1991) (100 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.05). This means that there would be a probability of 0.05 or one chance in 20 that even one excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire population within 50 miles of the Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore, it is expected that not a single member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the bounding criticality accident. The acute effects of airborne beryllium are respiratory distress such as: pulmonary edema (fluid on the lungs) and chemical pneumonitis (chemical toxicity of the pulmonary system). Beryllium-induced acute respiratory effects range from a mild inflammation of the nasal mucous membranes, to a severe chemical pneumonitis. Acute pneumonitis is encountered only rarely due to improved control methods and prompt medical treatment of beryllium exposures. Recovery can take up to six months for acute pneumonitis. Severe cases may become fatal. In addition, beryllium is potentially a strong skin sensitizer and can cause contact dermatitis, which is characterized by itching and reddened, elevated, or fluid- accumulated lesions. Following cessation of exposure and with simple local treatment, the skin eruptions usually disappear within one to two weeks. Table 6.1 Radiation Doses for Y-12 Workers in Building 9720-5 Population Population Annual Dose 10-Year Dose Latent Cancer Size to Worker (rem) Fatalities Collective 37 0.024 8.9 person 3.6 x 10E-3 rem Maximally 1 0.092 0.92 rem 3.7 x 10E-4 Exposed Individual 6.1.3 Exposure under Accident Conditions Building 9720-5 is a warehouse with no processing operations. Therefore, the postulated bounding accident is a fire or a criticality, either of which could be initiated by natural phenomena (earthquake, tornado, lightning), an aircraft crash, or inadvertent ignition of combustible materials. The probability of an aircraft crash is on the order of 1 x 10E-7 per year or less (approximately 1 chance in 10,000,000). The probability of an earthquake of the magnitude to collapse the building (peak ground acceleration of .18g) is 5 x 10E-4 or approximately 1 chance in 2,000. The probability of a tornado of sufficient magnitude to collapse the building is 2 x 10E-5, approximately 1 chance in 50,000. (Kennedy, et al 1990) Fire Accident Scenario The probability of ignition of combustible materials in Building 9720-5 has not been calculated; as described in the EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929), the Safety Analysis Reports for Y-12 are in the process of being updated. The Final Safety Analysis Report for the Assembly, Disassembly and Warehouse Project (Energy Systems 1986) determined that the probability of a fire occurring is not "credible," which is a safety analysis term for an accident with a probability greater than 1 x 10E-6. Beryllium toxicity can be manifested in adverse effects on the human immune system; epidemiological studies have not determined the mechanism for these effects. Some persons suffering acute beryllium exposure experience these symptoms, whereas others may not. There are uncertainties concerning the dose-response relationship. However, historic epidemiological data indicate that approximately 4 percent of workers exposed to beryllium have a positive response to the Lymphocyte Transformation Test (LTT), which is a potential indicator of berylliosis or acute beryllium disease. There is currently no standard for Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) for beryllium issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) gives an IDLH value of 10mg/m3 for 30 minute exposure. (NIOSH, 1990) The OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) for an 8 hour time weighted average is 2ug/m3, and the Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL) is 5 ug/m3 over a 30 minute time period. In a beryllium fire, the workers could be exposed to concentrations greater than the NIOSH IDLH standard or the OSHA PEL or the STEL. At high concentrations of airborne beryllium, workers fatalities could potentially occur. It is extremely unlikely that members of the public would experience acute effects. Criticality Accidents: Postulated criticality accidents are analyzed in detail in EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929). The bounding criticality accident analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage is a ground- level release in Building 9212, which results in fatalities among the involved workers and an average dose of 0.1 rem to the uninvolved worker (0.8 rem - 95th percentile dose). For the total worker population, the mean dose from the criticality accident is estimated to be 870 person-rem (4,800 person-rem - 95th percentile dose). For the public, the dose to the maximally exposed individual from this accident would be 1.3 rem (3.2 rem - 95th percentile dose), and the collective dose to the population within 50 miles would be 9 person-rem (40 person-rem - 95th percentile dose). The health effects of worker and public doses are presented in the EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929). For example, the collective dose of 40 person-rem would result in 0.02 excess latent cancer fatalities, based on the public dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 (NRC 1991), (40 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.02). This means that there would be a probability of 0.02, or one chance in 50, that even one excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire population within 50 miles of the Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore it is expected that not a single member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the bounding criticality accident. Beyond-Design-Basis Building Collapse: The EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the bounding scenario of the beyond-design-basis collapse for Building 9212 could result from an extreme natural hazard (tornado or earthquake) or an airplane crash. This postulated accident bounds the consequences of the collapse of Building 9720-5. Fatalities to the involved workers would be expected as a result of the building collapse and the criticality that is postulated in this scenario. In addition, a fire and simultaneous release of HEU is postulated. The estimated exposure to uninvolved workers is an average dose of 2 rem. The average collective dose to all the workers on-site at Y-12 would be 14,000 person-rem. The average collective dose of 14,000 person-rem from the collapse of Building 9212 is estimated to result in five excess cancer fatalities (14,000 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] = 5). For the public, there would be a collective dose of 190 person-rem from the beyond-design-basis accident, which is estimated to result in 0.1 excess latent cancer fatalities (190 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.1). This means that there would be a probability of 0.1, or one chance in ten, that even one excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire population within 50 miles of the Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore it is expected that not a single member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the beyond-design-basis accident. 6.1.4 Environmental Justice On February 11, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898. Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations (59 FR 7829). The order requires each Federal agency to make environmental justice "part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities on minority populations and low-income populations..." By December 11, 1994, each agency must develop a proposed agency-wide environmental justice strategy and the strategy must be finalized by February 11, 1995. While the DOE strategy is not yet final, President Clinton directed all agencies to take necessary steps to implement several specific directives immediately. Each Federal agency must analyze the environmental effects, including human health, economic and social effects, of Federal actions, including effects on minority communities and low-income communities, when such analysis is required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). Mitigation measures outlined or analyzed in an environmental assessment, environmental impact statement, or record of decision, whenever feasible, should address significant and adverse environmental effects of proposed Federal actions on minority communities and low-income communities. In addition, each Federal agency is required to provide opportunities for community input in the NEPA process, including identifying potential effects and mitigation measures in consultation with affected communities and improving the accessibility of meetings, crucial documents, and notices. The EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the effects of interim storage of enriched uranium on two potential low income populations and minority populations, which are located in census tracts 201 and 205. The EA does not identify disproportionate effects on these two communities. 6.1.5 Cumulative Effects The EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the cumulative effects of interim storage of enriched uranium. The Oak Ridge Reservation includes the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), K-25 Site, and Y-12 Plant. All three sites contribute to radioactive air emissions, as reported in the Oak Ridge Reservation Environmental Report (Energy Systems 1994h). During 1993, approximately 2,232 curies of radionuclides were released to the atmosphere from the DOE ORR facilities. Almost all of the radioactivity released was from ORNL and primarily consisted of tritium, radioiodine, and the inert radioactive gases argon, xenon and krypton. At the K-25 site, the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) incinerator is the only major radionuclide source and is the primary K-25 contributor to offsite dose. The total discharge of radionuclides from the K-25 site to the atmosphere in 1993 was approximately 0.42 curies. Of the total discharges of radionuclides from the K-25 site, less than 0.02 curies were uranium. The total discharge of radionuclides to the atmosphere from the Y-12 Plant in 1993 was approximately 0.055 curies from Y-12 uranium processing (Energy Systems 1994h). In addition to the ORR facilities, five non-DOE offsite sources of minor radioactive air emissions are located in the vicinity. A NESHAP-permitted waste processing facility located on Bear Creek Road adjacent to and west of the ORR reported a maximum individual dose of 0.06 mrem due to airborne emissions in 1993 (Energy Systems 1994h). A depleted uranium processing facility and a decontamination facility on Illinois Avenue and Flint Road, respectively, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, also reported 1993 emissions (Energy Systems 1994h). The other two sources are the Kingston and Bull Run coal-fired steam plants. Based on a study conducted to determine the radiological impact of airborne effluents of coal-fired and nuclear power plants, a hypothetical plant similar to the Kingston and Bull Run plants was estimated to release approximately 0.02 curies of uranium per year (McBride, et al. 1977). Table 6.1-2 summarized 1993 airborne radionuclide emissions from both DOE and non-DOE sources in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation. A network of ambient air and effluent samplers provide data from individual plant emissions, cumulative emissions from ORR sources, and offsite locations. This network consists of three distinct categories: site monitors, perimeter monitors, and remote monitors. Analysis of the perimeter air sampling data shows that the operations at Oak Ridge Reservation slightly increase the local airborne concentrations of radionuclides. No major changes in the concentration of these radionuclides were detected between 1992 and 1993 at the remote monitoring samplers. A hypothetical maximally exposed individual could receive 1.4 mrem/yr from radionuclides release into the atmosphere from ORR (Energy Systems 1994h). The collective EDE to the 879,546 persons residing within 80 km (50 miles) of the ORR. Thus, based on the perimeter air sampling data, the ongoing operations have a slight effect on local air quality. The local impact is well within EPA's National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) regulatory limit of 10 mrem/year to the maximally exposed individual of the public (40 CFR 61, Subpart H). Table 6.1-2 1993 Airborne Radionuclide Emissions in the Vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation Site Location Radionuclides Maximally Exposed Off-site Released Off-site Individual collective (curies) TEDE (mrem) EDE (person-rem) DOE/ORR ORNL 2,231 0.1 6 K-25 Plant 0.42 0.1 8 Y-12 Plant 0.055 1.3 12 Non-DOE Water process- Not avail. 0.06 Not avail. ing facility on Bear Creek Road Depleted uran- 0.05 kg Not avail. Not avail. ium processing (approx. (approx. less facility on 2 x 10E-5 than 0.0006 Illinois Ave. curies) mrem) Decontamination Not avail. 0.0001 Not Avail. facility located on Flint Road. Kingston coal- 0.02 curies <0.0001 Not Avail. fired steam of uranium plant (estimate) Bull Run coal 0.02 curies Not avail. Not avail. fired steam of uranium plant (estimate) In addition to the extensive monitoring programs described in the annual Oak Ridge Reservation Environmental Report, a new soil monitoring program was implemented in 1992. The soil provides an integrating medium that can "record" contaminants released to the atmosphere, and soil sampling can be used to evaluate the long-term accumulation and estimated environmental radionuclide inventories. Soil plots were established at nine of the perimeter ambient air sampling stations. Initial soil plot samples collected in 1993 will form a baseline for comparison and trend analysis in future years for use in determining cumulative impacts. In recent years there has been a general decline in the level of air emissions and worker and public exposures, as a result of mission changes at Y-12 and improved administrative controls. The dose to the maximally exposed individual from all ORR sources is estimated to be approximately 14 mrem. Since implementation of the proposed action would not result in radioactive air emissions which are greater than those recently reported, the cumulative impacts from implementation of the proposed action are expected to remain at current levels. These doses are well below the 100 mrem annual regulatory limit for individuals off-site from all exposure pathways. 6.1.6 No Action Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant Under the no action alternative, the Y-12 Plant would continue to provide interim storage for enriched uranium which is stored on site. Pending the outcome of the EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929), the effects would either be the effects of the No Action Alternative analyzed in that EA or the effects of the proposed action of storage of enriched uranium above the maximum historical storage level. 6.1.7 For Campbell Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant Under the alternative in which Fort Campbell would be the aerial port of entry, the HEU would be stored at Y-12 just as under the proposed action. Therefore, the effects at Y-12 Plant would be the same as the proposed action, as analyzed in Section 6.1.1 6.1.5. THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20 BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/956.2 Transportation Direct radiological exposure resulting in an external dose may occur from radiation emitted by packages aboard vehicles in transport and during stops. In addition, accidents during air and highway transport could result in external and internal radiological exposure from the release of material. Nonradiological impacts of the generation of pollutants and mechanical injuries during normal transport and physical trauma during accidents are other potential impacts. Impacts on the transportation crew and the public from the HEU shipping campaign were calculated by means of a RADTRAN risk analysis (Sandia 1992). RADTRAN is a computer code that yields conservative estimates (i.e. overstates the risk) of radiological exposure to the transportation crew and potentially exposed public. 6.2.1 Air Transport by U.S. Air Force Under the three alternatives, the HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air Force. 6.2.1.1. Incident-free Air Transport From Air Transport of HEU The transport of under incident-free conditions would result in radiological exposure only to the personnel on the aircraft. There would be no radiological exposure to the public caused by incident-free air transport. The radiological exposure received by persons on the C-5 aircraft would be approximately the same whether the aerial port of entry is Dover AFB, Fort Campbell, or McGhee Tyson. This is because of the minimal difference in flying time to the three destinations, in terms of percentage of total flying time. The maximum individual dose resulting from proximity to the HEU is estimated to be 0.01 rem. This would be added to the background individual dose of 0.015 rem resulting from the cosmic radiation on a flight (round trip). The maximum collective dose to the 34 (maximum) persons on board is estimated to be 0.34 person-rem. Using the worker dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose of 0.34 person-rem would be estimated to result in 1.4 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities (0.34 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] = 0.00014). This means that there would be a probability of 0.00014, or about 1 chance in 7000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among the crew. Under incident-free conditions, there would be negligible effect on the global commons from the C-5 aircraft flight from Dover, Fort Campbell, and McGhee Tyson. Air emissions of criteria pollutants from C-5 and tanker aircraft flights would consist of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and particulate matter. Emissions at the altitudes the aircraft will fly over the global commons would constitute a very temporary and minor addition to those already emitted by other aircraft and ships. Similarly, the additional C-5 operations would constitute a very temporary 2.24 percent increase in daily operations and, therefore, would result in very minor increases of airborne emissions. The additional emissions from these aircraft operations and associated ground vehicles would fall below EPA specified threshold levels, and, therefore, an air conformity determination is not required. Under the no action alternative, there would be no flight and therefore, there would be no effects. 6.2.1.2 Postulated Air Transport Accident Conditions 6.2.1.2.1 Air Transport Accident Probabilities The C-5 aircraft has an excellent performance history. The historical data indicate that the probability of accidents is extremely low (No class A accidents or 0 per 100,000 flying hour average for the last three years). For the of this EA, the accident probabilities are conservatively assumed to be comparable to very large cargo planes. Six categories of accident severity derived from simple air-mode fault trees were used in the RADTRAN risk analysis. These are: * Category 1: no forces on packages exceed Type A standards * Category 2: no forces on packages exceed Type B standards * Category 3: impact forces exceed Type B standards; no fire; 15 percent of packages fail * Category 4: impact forces do not exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire for more than 30 min.; 30 percent of all packages fail * Category 5: impact forces exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire for more than 30 min.; 50 percent of all packages fail * Category 6: impact forces exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire for more than 30 min.; 70 percent of all packages fail. Two separate fault trees (based on smaller aircraft than the C-5) were used for two sets of accident scenarios: one for landing/low altitude stalls; and one for in-flight accidents. In the event of an accident, the probability that one of the six accident categories would occur are as follows: Landing /Stalls In-flight Category 1: 0.208 0.230 Category 2: 0.540 0.130 Category 3: 0.050 0.3850 Category 4: 0.060 0.014 Category 5: 0.128 0.217 Category 6: 0.014 0.024 _____ _____ 1.00 1.00 For Dover AFB, the accident scenario of most concern is the landing/stall accident. For landing/stall accidents, there is a 75 percent probability that an accident would not breach a container. For the alternate ports of entry, (Fort Campbell and McGhee Tyson) , the probability of occurrence of a landing/stall accident is the same as for Dover AFB, but the probabilities of an in-flight accident are greater because the routes traverse greater distances over U.S. territory. (The air flight distance to Dover = 600 nautical miles; the distance to Fort Campbell = 1190 nautical miles; and the distance to McGhee Tyson = 105 nautical miles). In-flight accidents have higher probabilities causing the breach of some of the containers. For example, the probability that an accident would not breach a container drops to 36 percent. If there were an accident during overflight of U.S. territory, the probability that it would occur in a rural population zone was estimated to be 80 percent. The probability that any accident that might occur would be in a suburban area, estimated to be 19 percent; and in an urban area, 1 percent. These percentages represent the national average occurrence of rural, suburban, and urban population densities. In the global commons, only in-flight accident probabilities are applicable because no landings would occur in the global commons. Although air refueling would occur in the global commons, there are no landings involved. 6.2.1.2.2 Air Transport Accident Consequences Air Transport Accident Consequences Over U.S. Territory The consequences of a bounding accident(Category 6) over U.S. territory are given for in-flight and landing/stall accidents in Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 respectively. For in-flight accidents, the consequences were calculated for a generic high-population urban area; a conservative generic population estimate is used because it is not possible to predict the exact location of such an accident. The probability of occurrence of such an accident varies with total distance of flight over U.S. territory as shown in Table 6.2-1. For each port of entry, the collective dose would be 15.6 person-rem distributed among the generic population of 5,210,000. This would result in 7.8 x E-4 latent cancer fatalities in the exposed population. There is about a 1 in 1,300 chance of a single latent cancer fatality occurring as a result of this dose among the exposed population. A maximum-consequence (Category 6) landing/stall accident has an equal chance of occurring (2.0 x 10E-8) at any of the proposed ports of entry, but the collective dose varies according to differences in the size of the surrounding populations. Thus, the collective dose to persons potentially under the plume (5,000) (see footnote "a" under Table 6.2-1) for Fort Campbell, would be lowest at 0.03 person-rem. The collective dose at McGhee Tyson to persons potentially under the plume (24,000) would be 0.12 person-rem. The collective dose at Dover to persons potentially under the plume (26,500) would be 0.13 person-rem. The collective dose at Dover AFB would result in 6.5 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities. This would be a probability of 0.000065, or about 7 chances in 100,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur in the surrounding population. ** Table 6.2-1 Air Transport In-Flight Accident Consequences For Bounding Accident in Urban Area No. of Persons Accident Collective Latent Cancer Exposed Probability Dose Fatalities (person-rem) Proposed Action: 5,210,000 6.7 x 10E-10 15.6 7.8 x 10E-4 Flight to Dover AFB No Action 0 0 0 0 Alternative Fort Campbell 5,210,000 2.0 x 10E-9 15.6 7.8 x 10E-4 Alternative McGhee Tyson 5,210,000 1.3 x 10E-9 15.6 7.8 x 10E-4 Airport Alternative ** ** Table 6.2-2 Air Transport Landing/Stall Accident Consequences For Bounding Accident in Urban Area No. of Persons Accident Collective Latent Cancer Exposed Probability Dose Fatalities (person-rem) Proposed Action: 26,500 2.0 x 10E-5 0.13 6.5 x 10E-5 Flight to Dover AFB No Action 0 0 0 0 Alternative Fort Campbell 5,000 2.0 x 10E-5 0.03 1.5 x 10E-5 Alternative McGhee Tyson 24,000 2.0 x 10E-5 0.12 6.0 x 10E-5 Airport Alternative Note: The number of persons exposed gives the number persons under the plume based on the production density surrounding the airport; persons located closest to the airport(within 1 to 2 kilometers) would receive the majority of the dose. This result is generally unaffected by the presence of a city or other population center a few miles away. ** Air Transport Accident Consequences in the Global Commons Because the proposed action would involve air transport over the oceans, this EA analyzes the potential environmental impacts of the proposed action on the global commons in accordance with Executive Order 12114. Under accident conditions, any containers which withstood the accident and did not sink to an unrecoverable depth (200m) could possibly be retrieved. Containers that sank deeper than 200 meters could possibly be retrieved, but for the purposes of this analysis, it is conservatively assumed that the containers of HEU in depths greater than 200 m would be breached, and the HEU would be instantaneously released into the ocean. It is more likely that the container would be eventually breached and that there would be a slow release over time which would have less effect on the marine environment. The existing oceanic environment contains substantial quantities of uranium and its daughter products from naturally occurring processes (see Section 5). As a result, marine organisms are exposed to relatively high levels of background radiation. Since uranium has not been found to bioaccumulate in fish and only slightly bioaccumulates in other marine organisms, an accidental release would result in only slight increases in the exposure of marine organisms which tend to be more radiation resistant than terrestrial mammals and which are already exposed to similar concentrations of uranium. The beryllium in the material could have a toxic effect on marine organisms, but as discussed in Section 6.1, the effects are somewhat uncertain. Depending on the concentrations in the sea water, either the uranium and beryllium could potentially result in fatalities to marine organisms. As a result of the large volumes of water, the mixing mechanisms within it, the background concentrations of uranium, and the radiation resistance of aquatic organisms, the radiological and toxic impact of this very low probability accident releasing uranium and beryllium into the ocean would likely be localized and of short duration. 6.2.2. Transfer of HEU From Aircraft to SST The HEU would be immediately transferred from the C-5 aircraft to the waiting SST vehicles at Dover AFB under the proposed action, or at Fort Campbell, or McGhee Tyson Airport under the alternatives. 6.2.2.1 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure From HEU Transfer Activities Incident-free radiological exposures to workers and the public from HEU transfer activities are shown in Table 6.2.3. Package handling modeled with RADTRAN identifies two exposed groups of workers: the handlers themselves, who are in this case operators of the K-loader; and 30 other workers/guards within a 50-m radius. The other workers/guards are not subdivided into civilian and military personnel. Because unloading would occur in a secured area at a distance from the public, the dose under incident-free conditions would be negligible. Even at McGhee Tyson, where the military installations are separated from the civilian airport facilities by two parallel runways, one of which is used only by military, the public is sufficiently distant to avoid being exposed. ** Table 6.2-3 Incident-free Radiological Exposure for HEU Transfer from Aircraft to SST Under the Proposed Action and Alternatives Population Transfer of HEU to SST Population Dose LCF's Size (person-rem) K-loader Collective 2 0.088 3.6 x 10E-5 Operations Population Maximum 1 0.044 1.8 x 10E-5 Individual Dose -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Other Collective 30 1.5 x 10E-2 6.0 x 10E-6 Loading Population Workers Average 1 0.50 mrem 2.0 x 10E-7 Individual Dose -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Public Collective none none none within Population 500 m Average none none none Individual Dose ** Handling is modeled as occurring in the same way at all three aerial ports of entry. It was estimated to take 30 minutes per Cargo Restraint Transporter (CRT), or 14.50 hours for complete transfer of all of the CRTs on one C-5 aircraft to the SSTs if both planes are unloaded at the same time. No interim storage was assumed to occur during this process. The incident-free radiological exposure resulting from HEU transfer activities would be the same at Dover AFB, Fort Campbell, and McGhee Tyson. The maximum collective dose to two workers who unload all CRTs is estimated to be 8.8 x 10E-2 person-rem. The maximum individual dose is estimated to be 4.4 x 10E-2 rem. Using the worker dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose of 8.8 x 10E-2 person-rem would be estimated to result in 3.6 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.088 person-rem x 0.004 [risk factor] = 0.000036). This means that there would be a probability of 3.6 x 10E-5, or about 1 chance in 28,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among the workers as a result of exposure incurred during HEU transfer activities. The dose to other persons at the handling location is estimated to be 1.5 x 10E-2 person-rem for an average individual dose of less than 0.5 mrem. Under the no action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore there would be no transfer of HEU. 6.2.2.2 Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents The postulated HEU transfer accident is that the K-loader pierces a package. It is conservatively assumed that the accident damages the package so severely that the inner and outer containers fail and some fraction of the contents of that package are dispersed as particulate material. Persons nearby and downwind would receive a dose via inhalation of particulates. The contents of the damaged packaged are conservatively assumed to be oxide in powder form. The package is assumed to release 50 percent of its contents as aerosols, five percent of which are respirable. The effects of an accident during HEU transfer would be the same at Dover AFB, Fort Campbell, and McGhee Tyson. The maximum individual dose received by a K-loader operator primarily by inhalation, is estimated to be 0.088 rem. For other workers, the collective dose to the 2 operators is estimated to be 0.176 person-rem. Workers are modeled as being able to move from the immediate location to at least 100 m away. These workers would receive an average dose of 0.021 rem. Using the worker dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4x10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose of 0.176 person-rem would be estimated to result in 7 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.176 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] = 0.00007). This means that there would be a probability of 0.00007, or about 1 chance in 14,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among workers during HEU transfer activities. ** Table 6.2-4 Radiological Exposure for Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents Population Transfer of HEU to SST Population Dose LCF's Size (person-rem) Other Collective 30 0.6300 3.6 x 10E-5 Workers Population Maximum 1 0.0210 1.8 x 10E-5 Individual Dose --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Loading Collective 2 0.1760 7.0 x 10E-5 Workers Population Average 1 0.0880 3.5 x 10E-6 Individual Dose -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Public Collective 8,100 0.0400 2.0 x 10E-5 (Beyond Population 500 m) Average 1 0.0019 1.0 x 10E-6 Individual Dose ** The 50-year collective dose to the public from an accident during transfer activities is estimated to be 4 x 10E-2 person-rem per year. This collective dose is conservatively assumed to be distributed among an estimated 8,100 persons. The population of 8,100 persons represents a conservative estimate of the maximum number of persons within the plume which would rise from the accident site and descend at approximately 500 meters away. This does not represent the entire population within the 500 meter radius of the accident location, because only those people in the area where the plume descends would be affected. Any differences among aerial ports, in terms of population or meteorological conditions, are bounded by the conservatism in the assumption of 8,100 persons as the affected population. The maximally exposed member of the public, who is assumed to be at a distance of 500 m downwind from the accident would receive a dose of about 2 mrem. Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose to the public of 4 x 10E-2 person-rem would be estimated to result in 2.0 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.04 person- rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.00002). This means that there would be a probability of 0.00002 or about 1 chance in 50,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among the affected population of approximately 8,100. Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of an accident during transfer of HEU. Under the no action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore, there would be no transfer of HEU. THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20 BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/956.2.3 SST Transport of HEU to Y-12 Plant Transportation impacts were analyzed for SST highway transport from Dover Air Force Base to the Y-12 Plant. Representative SST routes maximizing the use of interstate highways were developed with the HIGHWAY routing code. No credit was taken for shielding provided by the SST walls, which would, in fact, decrease actual exposures. Routes typical of those used for SST transport were selected and are documented in the transportation analysis (Sandia, 1994). Route data for rural, urban, and suburban population densities were used to define the properties and characteristics of the transportation routes for the RADTRAN analysis of HEU shipments by SST. Table 6.2-5 summarizes the annual radiological exposure from incident-free transport to three populations under the proposed action and alternatives: (1) the transportation crew; (2) the workers (e.g., escorts, security personnel) who may be exposed when a SST makes a rest stop; and (3) the public, including persons sharing the transportation route at the time of shipment, persons near the transportation route, and persons at stops. SST stops would occur only under the proposed action and the Fort Campbell alternative; McGhee Tyson Airport is close enough to the Y-12 Plant that stops would not be necessary. Under the proposed action the SSTs would make stops only in low-population-density areas and park only in areas which are located well away from other trucks at the stop. 6.2.3.1 Incident-free SST Transport 6.2.3.1.1 Proposed Action: SST Transport of HEU from Dover AFB to Y-12 The collective dose to the public for incident-free SST transport would be 2.9 x 10E-4 person-rem per year. This collective dose would be shared by the estimated 320,000 persons within 800 meters (0.5 miles) of the center line of the highway routes that lie between Dover AFB and the Y-12 Plant and by the persons at SST stops. The maximum in-transit dose to an individual member of the public would be 3.6 x 10E-5 mrem. Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose to the public of 2.9 x 10E-4 person-rem would be estimated to result in 1.4 x 10E-7 latent cancer fatalities (.00029 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = .00000014). This means that there would be a probability of .00000014, or 1 chance in 7 million, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among the affected population of approximately 320,000 people. Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed transportation of HEU by SST from Dover AFB to Y-12. 6.2.3.1.2 No Action Under the no action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore, there would be no SST transport of HEU. 6.2.3.1.3 SST Transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to Y-12 Under this alternative, the average individual dose to a SST transportation crew member from transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to the Y-12 Plant is estimated to be 4.6 x 10-4 rem. The collective dose to the public for incident-free SST transport from Fort Campbell to Y-12 would be 7.2 x 10E-5 person-rem per year. This collective dose would be shared by the estimated 74,000 persons within 800 meters (0.5 miles) of the highway routes that lie between Fort Campbell and the Y-12 Plant. The maximum in-transit dose to an individual member of the public would be 3.6 x 10E-8 rem. Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose to the public of 7.2 x 10E-5 person-rem would be estimated to result in 3.6 x 10E-8 latent cancer fatalities (.000072 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = .000000036). This means that there would be a probability of .000000036, or 1 chance in 28 million, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among the affected population of approximately 74,000. Based on these doses and the estimated latent fatalities, it is expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed transportation of HEU by SST from Fort Campbell to Y-12. 6.2.3.1.4 SST Transport of HEU from McGhee-Tyson Airport to Y-12 Under this alternative, the maximum individual dose to a SST transportation crew member from transport of HEU from McGhee Tyson Airport to the Y-12 Plant is estimated to be 9.25 x 10E-5 rem. The collective dose would be shared by the estimated 24,000 persons within 800 meters (0.5 miles) of the center line of the highway routes that lie between McGhee Tyson and the Y-12 Plant. The maximum in-transit dose to an individual member of the public would be 3.6 x 10E-8 rem. Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-5 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose to the public of 4.4 x 10E-5 person-rem would be estimated to result in 222 x 10E-8 latent cancer fatalities (.000044 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 22 x 10E-8). This means that there would be a probability of 22 x 10E-8, or 1 chance in 500 million, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among the affected population of approximately 24,000. Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed transportation of HEU by SST from Fort Campbell to Y-12. ** Table 6.2-5 Incident-free Radiological Exposure for Transport Under the Proposed Action and Alternatives Information has been deleted from table because it contains classified information ** 6.2.3.2 Postulated SST Transport Accident Conditions Under postulated SST accident conditions, radiological consequences would result primarily from release of respirable radioactive particulates and subsequent inhalation by persons downwind of the accident, either directly or after resuspention. Other exposure methods would include direct radiation from the cloud of airborne material and from contamination on the ground. SST Threat Assessment The safeguards and security systems for SST transportation are designed to protect against sabotage and other adversarial actions. The approved DOE design basis threat addresses acts of terrorism. Since the RADTRAN model does not address terrorist attack scenarios, the Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersal (ERAD) computer model has been used by the Transportation Safeguards Division to analyze consequences due to attack. The most immediate and severe threat to workers and members of the public from a terrorist attack by military-equipped forces is death or injury from weapons-fire. It is quite likely that one or more of the DOE transportation workers (couriers), who are trained and responsible for protecting the shipments would suffer fatalities during the attack. Depending on the proximity of the members of the public to the shipment at the time the attack occurs, civilian casualties may also be expected from the weapons fire. While the radiological hazard associated with weapons fire is substantially less than the physical hazard, it is possible for an accurately aimed, energetic projectile fired at an SST to cause a dispersal of HEU into the atmosphere. The effects of such a dispersal can be bounded. Based on tests done for the Nuclear Emergency Search Team program, the fraction of material aerosolized would be less than 5 percent for this type of event. The bounding conditions for the postulated accident were as follows: the accident occurs in an urban area; there is maximum loading of the SST (equivalent to 1000 kilograms [454.5 pounds] of 93 percent enriched uranium); and quiet, night-time meteorological conditions prevail, resulting in low dispersion of contaminants. Under these conditions, the contaminated area would be 3 square kilometers (1.16 square miles), and the maximum individual dose would not exceed 30 mrem. The upper bound for the collective dose would be approximately 4,000 person-rem resulting in 2 excess latent cancer fatalities. The anticipated impacts due to weapons fire would be lower than the bounding case, resulting in the containment area of 1.5 square kilometers(0.58 square miles), a maximum individual does of 5 mrem, and either 0 or 1 excess latent cancer fatalities in the collective population. The anticipated impacts are based on yearly average meteorological data. The threat analysis for SST shipments is discussed in more detail in the "EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above The Maximum Historical Storage level at the Y-12 Plant" (DOE/EA-0929). RADTRAN Accident Analysis RADTRAN is a computer model which calculates the collective dose from a postulated accident to a single exposed population (workers and the public are not differentiated). The transportation accident model in RADTRAN assigns accident probabilities to a set of accident categories. For the truck analysis, the eight accident severity categories defined in NUREG- 0170 (The Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Nodes [NRC 1977]) were used. The least severe accident category (Category 1) represents low magnitudes of crush force, accident impact velocities, fire duration, or puncture impact speed. The most sever category (Category 8) represents a large crush force, high impact velocities, long fire durations, and high puncture-impact speed (an 88-km/h [55mph] collision into the side of the vehicle and 982C [1800F] fire lasting 1.5 hours to produce a release of the HEU). The bounding accident is the highest category accident used in the analysis and is associated with a probability of occurrence for each populations density area. The Department of Energy had conducted more that 119 million km (74 million miles) of SST operations without accidents that resulted in any release of radioactive materials. However, to provide a conservative estimate of the probability of postulated accidents, accident rates from Department of Transportation data for the entire commercial shipping industry (i.e., accidents on interstate highways involving at least one commercial tractor-trailer regardless of contents) were used, and are documented in the transportation risk assessment report (Sandia 1994). The probability of an SST accident resulting in a release of radioactive material would actually be lower that the probability of a commercial accident. In order to determine the risk of truck transportation accident, the response of a package to accident conditions must be predicted. NUREG-0170 (NRC) was also used to determine the amount of material which would be released from Type B packaging for the eight accident severity categories. Using NUREG-0170 release fractions, the bounding accident for SST shipment would be a Category 8 accident, since the consequences are maximized at these severity levels. Table 6.2-6 summarizes the potential action and alternatives. The population size shown in Table 6.2-6 represents the maximum populations which could be affected in the urban area along the route for this alternative. The maximum potentially affected urban population along the route from Dover would be 3,000,000 persons, while for the Fort Campbell and McGhee Tyson alternatives, the maximum urban population would be 2,850,000 and 2,380,000 respectively. 6.2.3.2.1 Proposed Action: Postulated SST Transport Accident Under the proposed action, the dose due to the bounding SST accident (that is, the accident with the greatest potential consequences, even though it might have a small probability of occurrence) is estimated to be 1.1 person-rem in an urban area. The probability of the bounding SST accident occurring in an urban area is estimated to be 4.9 x 10E-12. Given the conservatism in these estimates and the fact that an SST accident has never occurred which resulted in the release of radiological material, the actual probability may be much lower. The consequences would be diminished if the accident occurred in suburban areas or rural areas. The transportation crew and the public are considered as one population for the purposes of the accident consequences, and the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities (1.1 person-rem x .0005 [risk factor] = .00055). This means that there would be a probability of .00055, or approximately 1 chance in 2,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur. ** Table 6.2-6 Radiological Exposure for shipments due to Bounding Accidents in Urban Areas Population Probability Collective Latent Cancer Size of Occurrence Dose Fatalities (person-rem) Proposed Action: 3,000,000 4.9 x 10E-12 1.10 5.5 x 10E-4 SST Shipment from Dover AFB SST Shipment 2,850,000 4.5 x 10E-12 1.10 5.5 x 10E-4 from Fort Campbell SST Shipment 2,380,000 1.0 x 10E-12 0.92 4.6 x 10E-4 from McGhee Tyson Airport ** 6.2.3.2.2 No Action Under the no action alternative, no SST transport would occur, and therefore, there would be no potential for an SST accident. 6.2.3.2.3 Postulated Accident During SST Transport from Fort Campbell Under this alternative, the dose due to the bounding accident during SST transport from Fort Campbell to Y-12 is estimated to be 1.1 person-rem in an urban area. The probability of the bounding SST accident occurring in an urban area if estimated to be 4.5 x 10E-12. Given the conservatism in these estimates and the fact that an SST accident has never occurred which resulted in the release of radiological material, the actual probability may be much lower. The consequences would be diminished if the accident occurred in suburban areas or rural areas. The transportation crew and the public considered as one population for the purposes of the accident consequences, and the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person- rem (NRC, 1991) is used. The collective dose of 1.1 person-rem in the SST accident would be estimated to result in 5.5 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities (1.1 person-rem x .0005 [risk factor] = .00055). This means that there would be a probability of 0.00055, or approximately 1 chances in 2,000, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among the affected populations. 6.2.3.2.4 Postulated Accident During SST Transport from McGhee Tyson Airport Under this alternative, the dose due to that bounding accident during SST transport form McGhee Tyson Airport to Y-12 is estimated to be 0.92 person-rem in an urban area. The probability of the bounding SST accident occurring in an urban area is estimated to be 1 x 10E-12 for the proposed action. Given the conservatism in these estimates and the fact that an SST accident has never occurred which resulted on the release of radiological material, the actual probability may be much lower. The consequences would be diminished if the accident occurred in suburban areas or rural areas. The transportation crew and the public are considered as one population for the purposes of the accident consequences, and the general population doe-to-risk factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991) is used. The collective dose of 0.92 person-rem in the SST accident would be estimated to result in 4.6 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities (0.92 person-rem x .0005 [risk factor] = .00046) in this extremely unlikely accident. This means that there would be a probability of .00046, or approximately 1 chances in 2,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur. 6.2.4 On- Site Transportation Impacts Intra-plant transportation between facilities is accomplished by means of Blue Goose transportation vehicles. Criticality safety requirements include limitation of enriched uranium, appropriate spacing, and other criticality safety parameters documented in a Criticality Safety Approval. Blue Goose operators are trained and certified through a Blue Goose training program and are qualified in the same manner as the state of Tennessee and the Department of Transportation requires for off-site transportation. Each Blue Goose vehicle has received commercial driver's license training by the Y-12 Plant Transportation Safety Department. Drivers must be medically certified to be physically qualified and are subject to testing for controlled substances. The Transportation Safety Department performs periodic announced and unannounced audits on Blue Goose vehicle operations to ensure that they are performed in the formally prescribed manner. Incident-Free On-Site Transportation Two transportation workers are involved in Blue Goose operation for any given shipment. Exposure data for Blue Goose transportation workers for 1993 show that the collective dose was 0.048 person-rem. Under the proposed action, it is estimated that the dose would be no greater that 0.048 person-rem. Using a factor of 4 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities per person-rem, the collective dose of 0.048 person-rem would be estimated to result in 0.00002 latent cancer fatalities among the Blue Goose workers. This means that there would be a probability of 0.00002, or a 1 chance in 50,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among these workers. There were three Blue Goose transportation workers in 1993 who collectively received this dose, and it is estimated that there would be no more than three workers under the proposed action. It is estimated that the maximally-exposed Blue Goose Operator would receive a dose of 0.046 rem, which was the maximum for 1993. The 0.046 rem dose would result in an estimated 0.00002 latent cancer fatalities. It is expected that not a single Blue Goose Operator would die form cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed on-site transportation of enriched uranium. There would be no exposure to the public during incident-free on-site transportation. Accident Conditions During On-site Transportation There has never been a Blue Goose accident that has resulted in the release of radioactive material. The Final Safety Analysis Report on the Transportation and Certification of Enriched Uranium Weapons Parts (Energy Systems 1983) includes information on a postulated bounding criticality accident. The postulated accident scenario is that Blue Goose carrying a full load of forty 52 centimeter (20-inch) birdcages is struck on the right side by another vehicle, instantaneously rupturing the gas tank and causing a fire in the cargo area. The fire is then assumed to reduce spacing between the birdcages due to bowing, wrapping, or melting, resulting in a Category B type criticality (i.e., slow assembly of unmoderated U-235 metal). This criticality could result in yields of 1 x 10E19 fissions (spike and total). Radiation exposure would vary from greater than 600 rem at the site of the accident to 50 rem at 36.6 meters (120 feet). This would produce acute radiation sickness within a radius of up to 36.6 meters (120 feet) with a probable mortality rate of less than 5 percent. At distances less than 50 feet, the mortality rate would be 100 percent. 6.2.5 Non-Radiological Impact One hazard of transporting radioactive material (or any material) arises from the generation of non-radiological pollutants during travel (e.g. vehicle exhaust, particulate from tire wear caused by tires being abraded on a paved surface and dust generated in the wake of a vehicle). The generation of these pollutants may cause health effects (such as latent cancer fatalities) which can be estimated. The assumptions and models used for calculating these health effects are conservative, and the results may be considered bounding(RAO et al. 1982). A second hazard arises from accidents that occur during transport even if no radioactive material is dispersed. These accidents may cause serious injuries and even death as a result of physical trauma. Accident statistics regarding the number of deaths per kilometer traveled were used to predict accident fatalities. All non-radiological impacts include return of the conveyance to the origin site (i.e., round trip). Table 6.2.7 summarizes the non-radiological impacts for SST transport under the proposed action and alternatives, except for the no action alternative which would not involve transportation. 6.2.5.1 Proposed Action: Non-radiological Impacts Under the proposed action, the SST transport from Dover AFB to Y-12 would have a probability of 6.9 X 10E-5 ( or one chance in 14,500) inducing any excess latent cancer fatalities as a result of the non-radiological pollution generation by the conveyance. It is estimated that "INFORMATION DELETED" worker and 8.2 x 10E-4 public fatalities could potentially occur as a result of traffic accidents during the SST shipment. It is expected that not a single transportation worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to pollution during normal operations or from physical trauma as a result of a traffic accident during the proposed SST transport. ** 6.7-7 Total Non-Radiological Transportation Impacts Proposed Health SST Shipment from Shipment from Effects (LCFs) Fort Campbell McGhee Tyson to Y-12 to Y-12 Pollution Health 6.9 x 10E-5 1.4 x 10E-5 3.2 x 10E-6 Effects Accidental 8.2 x 10E-4 3.4 x 10E-4 2.4 x 10E-5 Fatalities (Public) ** 6.2.5.2 Shipment from Fort Campbell: Non-Radiological Impacts Under this alternative, the SST transport from Fort Campbell to Y-12 would have a probability of 1.4 x 10E-5 (or approximately 1 chance in 100,000) of inducing any excess latent cancer fatalities as a result of the non- radiological pollution generated by the conveyance. It is estimated that "INFORMATION DELETED" worker and 3.4 x 10E-4 public fatalities could potentially occur as a result of traffic accidents during the SST shipment. It is expected that not a single transportation worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to pollution during normal operations or from physical trauma as a result of a traffic accident during the proposed SST transport. 6.2.5.3 Shipment from McGhee Tyson: Non-Radiological Impacts Under this alternative, the SST transport from McGhee Tyson Airport to Y-12 would have a probability of 3.2 x 10E-6 (or approximately 1 chance in 300,000) of inducing any latent cancer fatalities would occur as a result of the non-radiological pollution generated by the conveyance. It is estimated that "INFORMATION DELETED" worker and public fatalities could occur in the worker and public populations respectively as a result of traffic accidents during the SST shipment. Therefore, it is expected that not a single transportation worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to pollution during normal operations or from physical trauma as a result of a traffic accident during the proposed SST transport. 6.2.6 Cumulative Transportation Impacts The effects of incident-free SST transport under the proposed action are considered below in the context of the potential future SST shipments to the Y-12 Plant. The predecisional EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above The Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the proposed shipment of bounding quantities of HEU and low enriched uranium (LEU) to Y-12 from sites within the United States over the next ten years. 6.2.6.1 Cumulative Radiological Impacts Table 6.2-8 presents the cumulative impacts of these two proposed shipping campaigns: (1) SST transport of HEU from Dover AFB to Y-12, and: (2) other proposed SST shipments of HEU and LEU to Y-12 from sites other than Dover AFB. The ten-year collective dose to the public from SST transport from sites other than Dover AFB is estimated to be 486 person-rem, with 33 person-rem resulting from HEU transport and 453 person-rem from LEU transport. The collective dose from the proposed action, which would occur in 1994 only, would add .0003 person-rem. The cumulative collective dose to the public would therefore be approximately 486 person-rem. Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the cumulative collective dose to the public of 486 person-rem would be estimated to result in 0.2 latent cancer fatalities (486 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor]=0.243). This means that there would be a probability of 0.2, or 1 chance in 5 that even one excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire affected population along the highway routes which would be greater than 9 million persons. Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the cumulative effects. ** Table 6.2-8 Cumulative Radiological Impacts of SST Transport This table applies to the proposed bounding of HEU and LEU shipments to Y-12 over the next 10 years. Population Collective Dose Latent Cancer (person-rem) Fatalities HEU shipments Transport crew 20 0.008 by SST from sites other Workers at SST 2 0.0008 than Pantex stops Public 10 0.005 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- HEU shipments Transport crew 36 0.01 by SST from Pantex Workers at SST 45 0.002 stops Public 23 0.001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commercial HEU Transport crew 0.0005 2 x 10E-7 shipments Public 0.0002 8 x 10E-4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commercial LEU Transport crew 183 0.07 shipments Public 453 0.2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total Transport crew 239 0.1 Workers at stop 65 0.003 Public 486 0.2 Note: Latent cancer facilities are calculated by multiplying the dose by the dose-to-risk conversion factor (5 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities per person-rem is used for the general population and 4 x 10E-4 for workers [NRC 1991])** 6.2.6.2 Cumulative Non-Radiological Impacts Table 6.2-9 presents the cumulative non-radiological impacts of these two proposed shipping campaigns: (1) SST transport of HEU from Dover AFB to Y-12, and: (2) other proposed SST shipments of HEU and LEU to Y-12 from sites other than Dover AFB. ** Table 6.2-9 Cumulative non-radiological transportation impacts has had information deleted and is not displayable. ** THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20 BY D.P. 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"Response to the Ohio Delegation Regarding Loss of Jobs at Portsmouth." Memorandum from La Grone, Manager, DOE Oak Ridge Field Office to E.C. Brolin, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, DOE. June 15. La Grone, J. 1994. "Management of Highly Enriched Uranium Materials at the Y-12 Plant, DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office." Memorandum from J. La Grone, Manager, DOE Oak Ridge Field Office, to V. Reis, Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, DOE. February 22. Letter from E.D. Brewer to A.K. Zava, Change in Preliminary Hazard Rating for 9720-5, December 3, 1991 (Energy Systems 1991x) List of Activities or Decisions Points for Project Sapphire (U), K/GH- 3591 Rev 1, A.W. Riedy, Martin Marietta Energy Systems National Security Program Office, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. September 19, 1994. Loar, J.M. et al. 1992. First Report on the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Biological Monitoring and Abatement Program for East Fork Poplar Creek. Y/TS-886. Prepared by the Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory for Environmental Surveillance Section, Health, Safety, Environment and Accountability Division, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. July. McBride et al. 1993. Radiological Impact of Airborne Effluents of Coal Fired and Nuclear Power Plants. Technical Report ORNL-5315. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Tennessee. Mishima, J. 1993 (April 21). Recommended Values and Technical Bases for Airborne Release Fractions (ARFs), Airborne Release Rates (ARRs) and Respirable Fractions (RFs) for Materials from Accidents in DOE Fuel Cycle, Ex-Reactor Facilities. Draft Rev. 2 ETM, Richland Washington. NCRP (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements) 1987. Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the United States. NCRP Report No. 93. Bethesda, Maryland. Needler G.T. and Templeton, W.I., 1981, "Radioactive Waste: The Need to Calculate an Oceanic Capacity," Oceanus, 24, 6067. 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HIGHWAY 3.1, An Enhanced Highway Routing Model: Program Description, Methodology, and Revised User's Manual. ORNL TM-12124. Phase 1 Hazard Screening Analysis for the Nuclear Material Safeguarded Shipping and Storage (NMSS) Facility Building 9720-5 (U), FINAL HS/7/f/2, December 20, 1990 (Energy Systems, 1990) Phenomena Hazards. Technical Report UCRL-15910. Prepared for the Department of Energy Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, Office of Safety Appraisals. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. Pickard, G.L. "Descriptive Physical Oceanography," 3rd Edition, Pergamom Press, 1979. Powell C.A., G.A. Bollinger, M.C. Chapman, M.S. Sibol, A.C. Johnson, and R.L. Wheeler. 1994. "A Seismotectonic Model for the 300-Kilometer Long Eastern Tennessee Seismic Zone," Science 254; 686-688. Project Sapphire (U), Lt. Col. Phillips, United States Air Force Transportation Command Center, Scott Air Force Base, IL, September 12, 1994. Rao, R.K., E.L. Wilmot, and R.E. Luna. 1982. Non-Radiological Impacts of Transporting Radioactive Material. SAND81-1703. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Revised Plan for the Shipment of HEU Product to the Y-12 Plant for Storage, Action Plan, and Discussion of Options (U), K/NSP-206 Rev.1, S.D. Moses, and A.W. Riedy, Martin Marietta Energy Systems National Security Program Office, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, September 20, 1994. Rice, A.L., "Radioactive Waste Disposal and Deep Sea Biology," Oceanol, Acta, 1, 483-491, 1978. Rothschild, E.R., et al. 1984. Resource Management Plan for the U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Reservation, Vol. 10 ORNL 6026/v10. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Rusk, D. 1994. Minutes for the public meeting on the Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Interim Storage of Highly Enriched Uranium above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, held on March 24, 1994, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 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Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Stone, J, 1994. Personal Communication from J. Stone, Y-12 Plant Waste Management deputy Manger, Energy Systems, to C. Wilkinson, Y-12 Plant NEPA Compliance Coordinator, Energy Systems (February 25). Taylor, R. 1993 (August 6) Personal Communication from R. Taylor, Enriched Uranium Operations, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., to C. Wenzel, Staff Scientist, Science Applications International Corporation. U.S. Federal Register, "Designated Critical Habitat: Norther Right Whale," Proposed Rule, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 58 FR29186, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1993. U.S. Federal Register, "Final Guide for Implementation of Executive Order 12114," 46 FR 1007, Washington, D.C. January 5, 1981 United States Congress. 1993. Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials, OTA-O-572. Office of Technology Assessment. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Unreviewed Safety Question Determination, Interim Storage of Material in NMSS Warehouse, Building 9720-5 (U) September 15, 1994. USEC (U.S. Enrichment Corporation) "Environmental Assessment for the Purchase of Russian Low Enriched Uranium Derived from the Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union," USEC/EA-94001, USEC, Bethesda, Maryland, 1994. White House. 1993 (September 27). Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy. Fact Sheet Office of the Press Secretary. APPENDIX A AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT OF DOVER AIR FORCE BASE, PROPOSED AERIAL PORT OF ENTRY/HEU TRANSFER SITE Location Dover AFB is located in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 3.5 miles southeast of the city of Dover and one mile west of Delaware Bay. Dover AFB is located in the town of Dover, in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 50 miles southeast of Wilmington, Delaware and 80 miles southeast of Philadelphia. Current mission of Dover AFB Dover AFB is the home of the 436th Airlift Wing and, Since 1973, has been the only all C-5s and airplanes from the variety of other flying organizations around the country. The mission of the 436 Airlift Wing is to provide strategic global military airlift capability for worldwide support of contingency and emergency war plans. In peacetime the 436 Airlift Wing services the world by providing a range of airlift support on a daily basis around the globe. One fourth of the nation's strategic airlift capability is represented by the people and aircraft at Dover AFB. Aircraft Operations The primary aircraft authorized for the 438th Airlift Wing and its reserve counterpart the 512th Airlift Wing are 38 C-5 Galaxy's. The 436th Airlift Wing is comprised of three airlift squadrons (ALS): 3rd ALS, 9th ALS, and the 31st ALS. These units are augmented by the 326 ALS and the 709 ALS from the 512 Airlift Wing. Operating the same C-5 Galaxy aircraft, the 436 Airlift Wing and the 512 Airlift Wing provide daily support around the globe as well as strategic airlift support of contingency and emergency war plan. On an average day, 134 aircraft operations occur at Dover AFB primarily on Runway 01/19. An operation is defined as either one departure, one approach, or half a closed pattern. A closed pattern consists of both a departure portion and an approach portion, i.e., two operations. The principal aircraft operating from Dover AFB and average number of daily operations per aircraft type are shown in Table A-1. ** Table A-1 Dover AFB Aircraft operations Type of Aircraft Daily Operations C-5 A/B 108 C-141 6 C-130 18 747 2 ** Air Quality The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) were established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and specify safe concentration levels for six criteria pollutants. Table A-2 lists the federal air quality standards for the criteria pollutants. ** Table A-2 National Ambient Air Quality Standards Pollutant Unit Averaging National Standards Time O micro g/cu. m 1 hr Primary Secondary CO micro g/cu. m 1 hr 235 same 8 hr same NO2 micro g/cu. m AAM 100 same SO2 micro g/cu. m 3 hr none 1,300 24 hr 365 same AAM 80 same PM10 micro g/cu. m 24 hr 150 same AAM 50 same Pb micro g/cu. m 1/4 year 1.5 same ** The State of Delaware adopted the NAAQS, but maintained a total suspended particulates (TSP) standard in conjunction with the new standard for particulate matter less than 10 microns in size (PM10). The Delaware primary TSP standards are 260 micrograms per cubic meter (ug/m3) as a 24-hour average and 75 ug/m3 as a 12-month geometric means. Air quality is determined by comparing ambient air concentrations with the appropriate primary or secondary NAAQS for each criteria pollutant. Areas not meeting NAAQS are designated as nonattainment areas for the specific pollutant causing the violation. The closet air quality monitoring station to Dover AFB is located at the Dover City Place Station approximately 3.5 miles to the northwest of the base. Sulfur dioxide, total suspended particulates and ozone have been monitored at this site since 1984. All pollutant levels observed at this monitoring station were below the national ambient air quality standards in 1992 (Delaware, 1992). The entire State of Delaware is classified of ozone nonattainment. The state is not classified as nonattainment for any other air pollutant. The ozone standard is attained when the expected number of days per calendar year with maximum hourly concentrations above the standard is less than or equal to one. No exceedances of ozone levels were observed during 1990, 1991, or 1992 at the Dover City Police Station. However, the classification of nonattainment resulted from previous years of exceedances that averaged greater than 1.0. An air emissions inventory summarizing expected annual emissions at Dover AFB was prepared in January, 1992 (USAF, 1992c). This inventory of emission sources and associated estimates of pollutant quantities generated serves as a baseline to track and plan future changes in base pollutant emission quantities. The estimated yearly emissions of criteria pollutant, in tons of pollutants per year were: PM-511, carbon monoxide (CO)-2,177, nitrogen oxides (N0x)-356, sulfur oxides (SOx)-107, and hydrocarbons (HC)-1,086. Additionally, according to this 1992 report, Dover AFB is categorized as a major source of hazardous air pollutants and volatile organic compounds. A source is considered a major source if it emits more than 100 tons of a single pollutant per year. Climate and Meteorology Dover AFB is located in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 3.5 miles southeast of the city of Dover and one mile west of Delaware Bay. Dover AFB has a continental type of climate with considerable modifying influences on the climate. The annual precipitation at Dover AFB averages approximately 42 inches, which includes 17.1 inches of snow (USAFETAC, 1992). The month distribution is fairly uniform during the year the wettest month is August with a monthly average of 4.67 inches and February is the driest with 3.10 inches of precipitation. The mean annual temperature for Dover AFB is 55.5 degrees F with the warmest month being July with a monthly average temperature of 77 degrees F. The coldest month is January with mean temperature of 33 degrees F. The extreme temperatures range from 103 degrees F to 5 degrees F. Westerly winds from the Atlantic Ocean and Delaware Bay tend to raise the normal winter temperatures and lower the normal summer temperature. The prevailing wind directions for Dover AFB are from the northwest (September to April) and from the southwest (May to August). The average annual wind speed is 6.2 miles per hour (MPH). Geology The base is located in the Atlantic Coastal Plain Province. This area slopes slightly (gradient changes within Kent County are usually on the order of a few feet per mile) from Delaware Bay to the Chesapeake watershed. The area consists of unconsolidated sediments overlying crystalline rock that dips toward the southeast. Depth to bedrock in the Dover area exceeds 1,400 feet. The geology consist of the Columbia Formation and the Chesapeake Group/Calvert Formation and other Ternary and Cretaceous Formations. The typical lithology of these formations consists of sands and gravels separated by smaller amounts of slits and clays (U.S. Air Force, 1992s). There are no unique geological features at Dover AFB. The potential for geologic hazards in this area is quite low. The area is rated as Zone 1 with only minor damage expected from seismic activity. Soils Soils in Kent County developed from parent materials consisting of sediments carried by water, wind and glacial ice. These materials were deposited in a shallow sea which emerged to form the Delmarva Peninsula (SCS, 1971). The size range of the parent material is evident in the texture of the soils. Layers of course-sediments and sands are generally interbedded with confining layers of fine silts and clays. Kent County Soil Survey Reports identify the soil associations that occur within the base boundary. The three soil associations identified on Dover AFB are the Sassafras-Fallington, Othello-Matapeake-Mattapex, and the Tidal Marsh soils. The locations and general characteristics of each association are provided below. The Sassafras-Fallington is found in the central part of the base. The soils are sandy loams with moderate to moderately rapid permeability. The depth to the water table ranges from about one foot to greater than five feet. This soil has a low potential for shrink-swell and is generally suited for construction with the exception of a high water table in some areas. The Othello Mattapex is located in the northern part of the base. These soil are silts loams and sandy loams with moderately slow permeabilities. These soils have a low to moderate shrink-swell potential and have moderate to severe limitations for construction because of slow drainage and a high water table in some areas. The Tidal Marsh Association is found along the southern edge of the base. The soil properties of the Tidal Marsh have not been estimated because of a high water table. An extensive drainage system is in place to accommodate drainage problems in this soil. Soil susceptibility to wind and water erosion is generally minor to moderate for all three soil associations. The soil in the area of the flight line were very disturbed during the construction of the flight line. Grading equipment was used and fill introduced to help make the area level. The base IRP program has identified eight sites with soil contamination that would be affected during the construction of the proposed action. Groundwater The aquifers on and around the base, in stratigraphic order, are the Columbia, Fredrica, Cheswold, and Piney Point aquifers. All aquifers, with the exception of the Columbia Aquifer, are confined. The Columbia infiltration of precipitation. The saturated thickness of this aquifer ranges from approximately 15 to 20 feet in the western portion of the base to over 70 feet in the eastern portion of the base. The Columbia Aquifer consists of medium to course sand. Although the Columbia Aquifer is not used as a water supply source for Dover AFB, it is an important groundwater resource used primarily for irrigation and as domestic water supply throughout the state. The City of Dover is looking into the feasibility of using the Columbia Aquifer as a potential potable water supply source because the deeper aquifers are being used at their capacity. The Fredrica Aquifer underlies the Columbia Aquifer. The Fredrica Aquifer is separated from the overlying Columbia Aquifer by a silty clay confining layer. The Fredrica Aquifer is primarily sand and gravel and is also approximately 22 feet thick near Dover AFB. The Fredrica Aquifer is not used as a drinking water source in the immediate area of Dover AFB but is used by a few towns south of the base. The water supply for Dover AFB is derived entirely from groundwater supplies. The Cheswold and Piney Point Aquifers serve as the primary water supply for Dover AFB, the City of Dover, and major industries within the greater Dover area. The Piney Point Aquifer is used extensively by Dover AFB and the City of Dover as a source of water and is at a point of almost complete utilization. Both the Cheswold and the Piney Point Aquifers have been extensively utilized. Base groundwater wells, which are at 697 feet and 560 feet, however, are not in jeopardy. Surface Water Dover AFB is well drained and has not experienced disruption of services due to flooding. Dover AFB is located within the St. Jones River and Little River drainage basins. The position of the northwest/southeast runway marks the approximate location of the surface water runoff north of the divide discharges into the Morgan Branch and Pipe Elm Branches of the Little River. Surface water on the southern portion of the base flows southwest to the St. Jones River through the tributary that bisects the golf course. Both rivers discharge into the Delaware Bay two to three miles to the east. Most local streams receive up to 75 percent of their base flow from the Columbia Aquifer through groundwater discharge. Stormwater runoff at Dover AFB is controlled by a series of open drainage and buried drain pipes which discharge stormwater into surface water drainage channels at the edges of the base. The base has an NPDES permit of the stormwater drainage system. The stormwater is not treated before discharges into the surface streams. The stormwater drainage has altered the natural drainage for some areas of the base, mainly the industrial area and changed the areas of the drainage basins. The airfield and the industrial area east of Atlantic Street discharge into the Pipe Elm Branch of the Little River. The industrial area west of Atlantic Street discharges into the Golf Course tributary of the St. Jones River. Dover AFB has approximately 43 acres of tidal and nontidal unimproved wetlands located in three areas; adjacent to the Pipe Elm Branch on the east side of the north/south runway, in the area around the explosive ordinance storage, and adjacent to the golf course in tidal marsh of the St. Jones River (Ecological Assessment, Dover AFB, undated). Dover AFB also contains an estimated 33 acres of unimproved 100-year floodplain located adjacent to the St. Jones River and the golf course tributary, and adjacent to the Pipe Elm Branch in the northern part of the base. Water Quality All aquifers discussed provide potable water and have good water quality within the EPA and state mandated standards. Because of drawdown, the Columbia Aquifer is most susceptible to degradation/contamination. The HAZWRAP current situation report (U.S. Air Force, 1992a) identifies 12 areas with groundwater contamination on Dover AFB which encompass at a minimum approximately 220 acres, about 6 percent of the base area. These areas of known contamination are part of the installation restoration (IRP) at Dover AFB. The contaminants in the groundwater include organics (e.g., benzene toluene, xylene) metals (e.g., lead, chromium, and barium), and petroleum aromatic hydrocarbons. The sewage effluent from Dover AFB is piped off base and treated at the Kent County sewage treatment plant. The Little River and St. Jones River are both used for agricultural and industrial purposes. The St. Jones and Little Rivers have been designated for the following uses: industrial water supply, primary and secondary contact recreation, fish, aquatic life and wilderness, and agricultural supply. Water quality is generally good in the streams on Dover AFB. Data collected on the base from 1980 to 1988 showed dissolved oxygen average pH, and mean phenol all within state standards. Cultural Resources The main areas of Dover AFB with the potential for archaeological sites are along the St. Jones River, located adjacent to the eastern boundary of the base. Archaeological surveys have revealed sites which show prehistoric utilization of the area along the banks of the river. The St. Jones River continued to be the focus of early settlements, with the earliest English settlements located along the river and surrounding areas (U.S. Air Force, 1985). Biological Resources Vegetation Dover AFB contains approximately 2,543 acres of improved and semi-improved ground. The 2,413 acres of improved ground is comprised of Kentucky Bluegrass, Chewing Fescue, Colonial Beatgrass, and Red Top. The 130 acres of unimproved grounds consist of Sorup Pine, Black Gum, Cedar, and March Grass. Approximately 77 acres of land on Dover AFB consists of shrubs, small trees, and wood vines such as Red Cedar, Tree of heaven, Black Locust, Sumac, Rose Multiflora, Blackberry, Honeysuckle, Trumpet Vine, Poison Ivy, Sassafras, and Black Cherry. Wildlife Large animals in the area that are occasional inhabitants of the base include whitetail deer (Odonolieus virginianus). Other mammals observed at Dover AFB are woodchuck (Marmota monax), muskrat (Ondatra zibethica), Striped Skunk (Mephltis), Easter cottontail (Sylvilagus floridanus), Opossum (Dedelphis marsupialis), Red fox (Vulpes fuvia), and the raccoon (Procyon lotor). Smaller wildlife present on Dover AFB consists of squirrels, wild turkeys, snakes, rodents, and groundhogs. Threatened and Endangered Species There are no known threatened or endangered plant or animal species on Dover AFB. A Natural Resources inventory completed by the State Natural Heritage Program found the following rare plants present on base: tiny headed golden rod; green frog fruit, and Hussop-leaf Hedge-Nettle. The upland sandpiper, a species of state concern, has been seen on base and is considered a migrant on the base. Wetlands Wetland areas on base cover a total of 43 acres, with sub-units ranging in size from 0.3 to 17 acres. The wetlands on Dover AFB are categorized as Emergent Tidal Wetlands and can be divided into three communities based on salinity and the frequency of inundation. Tidal communities are generally recognized as highly productive, providing spawning, and nursery areas for aquatic fauna. These communities also provide food forage and nesting habitat for a variety of species. One community, frequently flooded fresh marsh, is found along the Pipe Elm Cheek on the east side of the north/south runway and in an area around the explosive ordinance storage. The semi-permanently inundated fresh march community occurs intermittently with the flooded tributary to Pipe Elm in the northeast corner of the base and along the St. Jones River south of the golf course. Noise Noise is defined as any unwanted sound that interferes with normal activity or in some way reduces the quality of the environment. Noise may be intermittent or continuous, steady, or impulsive. It may involve a broad range of sound sources and frequencies and by generally nondescript, or it can have a specific, readily identifiable sound source. There is a wide diversity among human responses to noise, which vary not only according to the type and characteristics of the noise source, but also according to the sensitivity and expectations of the receptor, the time of day, and the distance between the noise source and the receptor. In general, noise levels around Air Force installations result primarily from aircraft operations at the base, vehicle traffic in the vicinity, or other background noise sources. Dover has conducted the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Study which identifies noise contours for the base. Environmental Programs The environmental office at Dover manages the installation's environmental program. These programs include hazardous material and hazardous waste management and minimization, solid waste and waste disposal, and asbestos management. All programs are managed in accordance with all applicable Federal state, local, DOD and Air Force regulations, standards, and laws that apply to the installation. Hazardous materials that are used at Dover AFB are purchased and distributed through Base Supply. Hazardous materials are used in refueling, corrosion control, routine operations, and maintenance of aircraft, and vehicle and grounds maintenance. The fuel systems at Dover AFB have a storage capacity of four million gallons and annual throughput of 70 million gallons of JP-4. Each organization is responsible for the control and proper use of hazardous materials. The use of hazardous materials generates hazardous waste. The management of the hazardous wastes consists of the collection, storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes as required by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Delaware Hazardous Waste Management Regulations. Hazardous wastes generated at Dover AFB include solvents, fuels, lubricants, stripping chemicals, oils, point-related materials, an other wastes from C-5 maintenance, base transportation, and civil engineering activities. The responsibility for managing hazardous wastes lies with the generating organization and the Dover environmental office who has designated 14 locations as 90-day hazardous waste satellite accumulation points. Each organization appoints accumulation point managers and alternates to provide for the proper identification, handling, storage, and record keeping of hazardous waste. The generating organizations are also responsible for transporting the waste to the conforming storage facility on base. Conforming storage facilities are RCRA-permitted facilities that are used to store hazardous wastes until they are transported off-base for recycling or disposal. One facility is in Building 1306, and a second is a 5,000 gallon aboveground industrial waste tank located near Building 610. The tank is used to collect waste from tank cleaning activities and miscellaneous operations. The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office contracts of recycling or disposal of these hazardous wastes. The environmental office is responsible for manifest tracking, submitting reports, operating, and maintaining the storage facility. Training is performed by the CEV personnel and includes the subjects of labeling, inspections, and contingency procedures. Personnel from the CEV office also perform random inspections of the accumulation points to ensure regulatory compliance. The total amount of hazardous waste manifested by Dover AFB to off-site facilities in 1992 was approximately 90,000 pounds. An additional 130,000 pounds of non-RCRA wastes were also generated by the base in 1992 (Helmetag, 1993). Solid Waste/Wastewater The Resource, Recovery, and Recycling Program and the management of solid waste on Dover AFB includes the collection and disposal of solid waste by contract. There are no active landfills on the base. Dover AFB, including the housing area, currently generates about one million pounds of solid waste per month (Helmetag, 1993). Receptacles are placed throughout the base for solid waste disposal. The Delaware Solid Waste Authority, under contract managed by the 436 CES/CEC, hauls the waste off-base to the state operated Sandtown Landfill. Asphalt, concrete, and similar waste are hauled off by a separate contractor. Scrap metal is recycled through the CRMO. Wastewater at Dover AFB is collected by a central wastewater collection system and transferred to the Kent County Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for treatment. Preliminary treatment is performed by a central oil-water separator prior to wastewater entering the main base distribution system. Storm water runoff from industrial areas exits the base at nine major locations. The base obtained an AMC group Storm water runoff permit which included these nine locations. Restoration Program Past waste management activities at Dover AFB have contributed to soil and groundwater contamination at the base. Under the mandate of federal statutes and regulations implementing CERCLA and SARA, the Air Force is actively pursuing a program to address, and as necessary, remediate environmental concerns created by these past practices. The Installation Restoration Program is the basis for response action on Air Force installations under the provisions of CERCLA and SARA. In some cases, an existing hazardous waste site may be regulated under RCRA rather than CERCLA. Both laws are intended to achieve the same end result-site closure. Dover AFB was placed on the National Priority List (NPL) by the EPA in 1989. Because of their inclusion on the NPL, the EPA and state regulatory agencies plan an active oversight role in their program. Dover AFB is operating under a Federal Facility Agreement with the EPA and the State of Delaware. A technical Review Committee has been established and is involved with the ongoing remediation work. A total of 56 IRP sites have been identified at Dover AFB and are currently in the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) stage of investigation. These sites include refueling areas, cargo loading areas, fuel tanks, fire training areas, landfills, pesticide wash areas, and others. Fuel The Fuels Management Flight is responsible for the management and control of fuels at Dover AFB. About 70 million gallons of JP-4 are issued annually for the petroleum, oils, and lubricants facilities. Dover AFB will soon be purchasing JP-8 instead of JP-4. The replacement fuel generates less sulfur when burned and has a lower vapor pressure, which reduces levels of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), than JP-4. Fuel is piped onto the base and stored in bulk storage tanks (Facilities 730 734). It is then transferred by underground pipelines to three hydrant systems, or pumped into tank trucks for aircraft refueling. The bulk storage area includes four floating-roof and one fixed-roof, aboveground storage tanks with a combined capacity of approximately four million gallons. The containment dikes surrounding all of the aboveground tanks at the bulk storage are sloped earth covered with concrete. At the three hydrant pumphouses, fuel is stored in 26 underground storage tanks that distribute it to the hydrant pumphouses, fuel is stored in 26 underground storage tanks that distribute it to the hydrant system on the flight line. A truck fill stand is located at the south pumphouse and two are located in the north storage area. The combined capacity of the underground storage tanks at these pumphouses is approximately one million gallons. Gasoline and diesel fuel for military vehicles are stored and dispensed from three underground storage tanks at the motor pool (Building 637). Gasoline and diesel fuel is also dispensed by three mobile refuellers to vehicles unable to use the motor pool and to organize tanks throughout the base. The Liquid Fuels Maintenance Shop performs mandatory inspection of these facilities in with accordance Air Force Manual 86-16. The Liquid Fuels Maintenance personnel perform tank inspections every three to either years depending upon tank construction and protection. The pipelines are pressure checked annually and are hydrostatically tested every five years. Permanent records of these inspections are maintained. Fuels Management and Civil Engineering personnel are trained on the operation and maintenance of equipment to prevent fuel discharges as required by technical orders and civil engineering regulations and manuals. Transportation Kent County is traversed north-south by U.S. Route 13. Dover AFB is located between U.S. Route 113, which runs along the southwestern boundary of the base, and State Route 9, which is to the east of the base. Both U.S. Routes are four-lane divided highways. The state highway department is involved in a major road construction project involving a by-pass of the City of Dover. The by-pass project will intersect Route 113 in the area of Dover AFB. Route 113 is currently undergoing modifications to create a limited access highway in the areas of the base gates. Socioeconomics: Employment and Economic Characteristics Total 1989 employment in Kent County was approximately 56,500. Employment in the county grew by 22 percent between 1980 and 1989, slightly more than in the United States as a whole. Employment growth for the State as a whole was much stronger, increasing by more than 33 percent over the decade. Dover is the State capitol of Delaware as well as the home of the Dover AFB. As such, it has a high proportion of employment in the government section, accounting for one-third of all employment. Almost sixty percent of these government employees work for the State or for local government, nearly 30 percent are military personnel, and the remainder are federal civilian employees. Services and trade are the next largest sectors, each accounting for almost 20 percent of employment. Manufacturing provides 12 percent of all jobs in the county, while the remaining sectors are quite small. Unemployment for the Dover area (Kent County) averaged 8.3 percent for the first nine months of 1991, while the state average for that period was 6.8 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990a; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1991). Income and the Construction Economy Total personal income (as of 1989) in Kent County was $1.5 billion. Annual per capita income is approximately $14,000 roughly 80 percent of the United States average per capita income and 75 percent of the Delaware average (U.S. Bureau of Analysis, 1991). The Dover area appears to have a fairly healthy construction economy. The dollar value of all 1992 building permit in the combined area of Kent County and the City of Dover was approximately $118.5 million. Population Characteristics Kent County had a 1990 population of nearly 111,000 representing more than one-sixth of the Delaware population. Population growth in the county over the decade was nearly 13 percent, slightly more than for the state as a whole (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990a). Housing Characteristics According to the 1990 Census, there are more than 42,000 housing units in Kent County. Approximately 70 percent of the units are owner-occupied. Vacancy rates (and of the 1990 Census) were very low - 1.4 percent for owner-occupied homes, while the percentage of vacant rental units was 5.0 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990b; USAF, 1992d). ** Employment: Kent County, Delaware, 1989 Government 33.1% Service 19.7% Trade 18.4% Manufacturing 12.3% Construction 5.2% Fire 4.9% Transportation 3.7% Other 3.7% ** APPENDIX B AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT OF FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY ALTERNATE AERIAL PORT OF ENTRY/HEU TRANSFER SITE Location Fort Campbell is located in southwestern Kentucky and north-central Tennessee in portions of four counties: Montgomery and Stewart counties in Tennessee, and Christian and Trig Counties in Kentucky. The installation is approximately eight miles north of Clarksville, Tennessee, and seventeen miles south of Hopkinsville, Kentucky. Of the 105,303 total acres of land occupied by the Forces Command installation, approximately two thirds are in Tennessee and the remainder in Kentucky Mission Fort Campbell is organized as a combined headquarters of division, staff, and post elements, and sanctions a number of operational, training, and support missions. The primary peacetime mission of Fort Campbell is to support, train, and prepare the 101st Airborne Division for combat readiness. This mission includes supporting the U.S. Army Reserves and the National Guard. Fort Campbell has been the home of the 101st Airborne since 1956. Climate Fort Campbell is located in the southeastern section of the United States on the Kentucky/Tennessee border. This geographic setting typically produces a warm and temperate climate. Summers are hot and humid with temperatures ranging between 68 and 89 degrees. Average relative summer humidity is 55 percent. The winter months are damp but mild with a mean high of 45 degrees and average low of 28 degrees. Annual precipitation averages 47 inches. The winter months are the wettest with January, February, and March each averaging about 5 inches. The driest month is October, which averages about 40 percent of the rainfall of the wettest months. Wintertime precipitation generally comes from systems of low pressure and associated cold fronts which produce widespread and uniform areas of precipitation, while summer rainfall is deposited mainly in the form of scattered convective showers. Prevailing winds are southerly throughout the year, with the exceptions of February and October, when the direction turns to northerly. The average wind speed ranges from 9.33 miles per hour in February and March, to 4.25 mph in July and August. Extremely strong winds are not common; a record peak gust being just over 62.19 mph. Two types of air masses influence the regional climate: the first from the Gulf of Mexico, brings warm moist air over the area; the second brings cool, dry continental air from the northwest. Air Quality Air pollutant emissions are generated at Fort Campbell mainly through heating plants and motorized vehicles. Less significant contributors are emissions from paint spray booths and woodworking shops, vapor emissions associated with liquid fuel transfer to and from storage tanks, and dust emissions from the gravel roads in the western portion of the reservation. Estimates of total emissions are high but the total land area over which these emissions are distributed is sufficiently large that pollution levels do not violate federal or state standard under normal operating conditions. Water The primary source or potable water for Fort Campbell is ground water pumped from Boiling Springs which is an artesian spring with excellent water quality. Red River is an alternate or emergency source with a pumping station located southeast of the installation. Although the total capacity of Boiling Springs is not known, the sources has an apparent capacity great enough to support the current needs of Fort Campbell. Fort Campbell has an existing water treatment plant which was constructed between 1942 and 1944 and enlarged in 1954-1955. This facility is in adequate condition and is expected to be capable of meeting the current maximum demand as long as Boiling Springs continues to be the primary source of raw water. Fort Campbell is currently studying various problems related to groundwater contamination. A technical review committee has been formed and mitigation plans are being developed. Surface Hydrology Fort Campbell is located in the Cumberland River watershed, approximately 9.3 miles north of the Cumberland River. The installation is drained by three subwaterways: Little West Fork, Saline, and Casey Creeks. All of the surface water at Fort Campbell drains from these subwatersheds into the Cumberland River, then via the Ohio and the Mississippi Rivers to the Gulf of Mexico. Streamflow is naturally increased during rainfall events but flooding is not considered to be a problem. Ponding does occur after a particularly heavy rainfall event where sinkholds serve as a natural detention pond for surface runoff. No existing buildings are currently threatened by flooding. Two man-made lakes are within the area. Lake Taal, a 28 acre lake with an earthen dam and concrete spillway, is located south of Clarksville Base. Joe Swing Pool is an 8 acre lake surrounded by limestone cliffs, in an abandoned quarry located near the golf course. Wetlands The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services has completed the National Wetlands Inventory mapping for all of Fort Campbell. These have not be field examined. There has not been a comprehensive wetlands survey prepared for Fort Campbell. The Department of Environment and Health has however, contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Nashville District for a detailed wetlands survey to be performed. Review of the country soils report Montgomery and Christian counties indicate the presence of karst areas dotted with depressions, and may contain hydric soils and wetlands. Montgomery County in the southeast portion of Fort Campbell contains broad areas of hydric soils. Geology Fort Campbell is located within the Pennyrile physiographic section, which is one of two plateaus compromising the Mississippi Plateau. This region is typically a karst plain, consisting of rolling topography and underlain rocks of middle Mississippian age, which form a series of alternating sandstone, limestone, and shale layers. Numerous sinkholes and subterranean drainage systems have developed in this area. The limestone bedrock is covered by a thick overburden, consisting of residual soil developed in place through weathering of the cherty limestone parent material. This residuum consists of highly plastic red clay and contain smaller amounts of silt, fine chert (a tough rock composed mainly of silica), and limestone fragments. Cross sections constructed from test borings indicate that this clay residuum is between 26 and 49 feet thick. Soils: There are a wide variety of soils found on the reservation all of which were formed in loess (wind deposited material). These soils range from a fertile dark brown silty clay loam in the eastern portion to a light brown silt loam on gentle slopes. Fragipan or impervious soils occur on the rolling slopes to the west. Soil permeability is generally poor (0.6 - 2.0 inches per hour) and available water capacity is medium to high. Slopes are predominantly less than 10 percent but range from 2 to 35 percent. Soil compressibility is low to medium and soil strength is low. Noise Several factors contribute to the general noise condition at Fort Campbell. Major sources of noise pollution are from aircraft activities (fixed-wing and rotary-wing), training exercises, motor vehicle traffic, railroad operations, and military construction activities. Areas such as the hospital facilities, schools, library, guest homes, parks, and the majority of family housing are not currently adversely impacted by aircraft noise. Vegetation Total site vegetation includes forest, scrub, grasslands, and agricultural crops. Prior to 1941, when the federal government secured the land and that was to become Fort Campbell, the are had mostly been cleared for agriculture use. Since that time, half of the installation has developed tree cover due to natural regrowth and extensive planing by Fort Campbell forestry personnel. Wildlife Development and human activity have forced the native populations to less disturbed areas of the installation. In those areas, a relatively large animal community exists. The installation provides a home for the white tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), cottontail rabbits (sylvilagus floridanus), grey squirrel (Sciurus macroura), bob white quail (Colinus virginianus), mourning doves (Zenaidura macroura), wild turkey, duck species, over 40 species of reptiles, 30 species of amphibians, and at least 50 species of birds. The streams contain whitesucker (Catostomus virginianus), silver redhorse (Moxostoma anisurum), shiners (Notropis spp.), and Tennessee snubnose darter (Etheostoma simoterun). Threatened and Endangered Species There are five lists of threatened and endangered species of plants and animals in Kentucky and Tennessee. Each state wildlife agency and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service maintains the lists. In Christian and Montgomery Counties, the following are found: Christian County: Grey bat - Myotis grisescens (E) Southeastern bat - Myotis austroriparis (SR) Eastern woodrat - Neotoma floridana magister (SR) Hellbender - Crytobranchus allenganiensis (SR) Armored rocksnail - Lithasia armigera (SR) Hall's bullrush - Scripus hallii (SR) Harper's umbrella plant - Eriogonum longifolium var. harperi (SR) Montgomery County: Grey bat - Myotis grisescens (E) Indiana bat - Myotis sodalis (E) Pink mucket pearly mussle - Lampsillis orbiculata (E) Tan riffle shell - Epioblasma walkeri (E) Rough pigtoe pearly mussel - Pleurobema plenum (E) Dromedary pearly mussle - Dromus Dromas (E) Orange-footed pearly mussel - Plethobasus cooperianus (E) Prince's potato bean - Apios priceanan Eastern woodrat - Neotoma floridana magister (SR) Small-footed bat - Myotis leibii (SR) Bachman's sparrow - Aimophila aestivalis (SR) Appalachian Bewick's wren - Thryomanes bewickii altus (SR) Hellbender - Crytobranchus allenganiensis (SR) Copperbelly water snake - Nerodia erythrogaster neglecta (SR) Muddy rocksnake - Lighasia salebrosa (SR) Onyx rocksnake - Leptoxis praerosa (SR) Appalachian bugbane - Cimicifunga rubifolia (SR) Short's bladderpod - Lesquella globosa (SR) False foxglove - Aureolaria patula (SR) Gattinger's lobelia - Lobelia appendiculata var. gattingeri (SR) Eastern bluestar - Amsonia tabernaemontana var. gattingeri (SR) Land Use Land use at Fort Campbell is managed by the Fort Campbell Master Plan Report into three general categories as shown in Table B-1. ** Table B-1: Fort Campbell Land Use Categories Training and Maneuver areas 70,000 acres Range and Impact areas 20,700 acres Built-Up areas 14,000 acres ** Historical and Archaeological Resource Historical and archaeological resources are protected under the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, and the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act. Currently, no historic districts, sites, buildings, or structures at Fort Campbell are listed in the National Register of historic Places. However, Fort Campbell recently celebrated its fiftieth anniversary and many structures may now be eligible for inclusion on the Register. Fort Campbell is therefore considering negotiation of a Programmatic Agreement with the Fort Campbell Base Commander, the Kentucky Heritage Council, the Tennessee Historical Commission, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to identify archaeological and historic resources, outline a maintenance plan for preservation, and produce a resource management plan to guide future federal activities. An archaeological survey was conducted in the early 1980's by the University of Kentucky. Evidence of human occupation from Paleo-Indian through historic times was obtained from over 400 sites. Prehistorically, the area appears to have been used primarily for hunting grounds with few intensively occupied sites until the late prehistoric (early Mississippian) period. The bulk of settlement in the Fort Campbell area took place between 1800 and 1820 primarily as agrarian population. Numerous small communities sprang up in and around the Fort Campbell area. Communities to note included Lafayette, Garretsburg, Jorden Springs, Ashbury, Weaver's Store, New Providence, Pardertown, Oak Grove, and Legate. The Department of the Army purchased these lands in the early 1940's. A total of 68,592.28 acres from Tennessee, and 33,163.16 acres from Kentucky. Most of the existing buildings were razed and graves were relocated. Socioeconomics Fort Campbell is a community of over 190,000 people including military personnel, Department of the Army and other civilian employees and military dependents residing on the post in family housing. Fort Campbell also provides support to military dependents residing off-post and retired military personnel and their families who have access to post facilities. As a community, Fort Campbell functions much like any other. It requires shopping, community and social services, security services, health care, churches and schools in order to meet community needs. Population The installation population breakdown as of fiscal year 1993 shown in Table B-2. ** Table B-2: Fort Campbell Population Military Personnel 24,216 Reserve Components 21,680 Department of the 4,702 Army Civilian Personnel On-Post Dependents 10,383 Off-Post Dependents 23,850 Retired Military 105,226 and Dependents ** Economic Base Fort Campbell has a substantial impact on the economy of surrounding communities. As of fiscal year 1990, Fort Campbell payroll, for both military and civilian personnel totaled roughly $718 million. Miscellaneous disbursements for appropriated funds, non-appropriated funds, commissary purchases for resale from local vendors and supplies, and services for installation operation totaled 197 million per year. General maintenance and repair plus military construction activities generated expenditures of $566 million. Federal impact funds paid on behalf of dependents of Fort Campbell military personnel attending off post schools contributed $622,000 to the local economy. Operations at Fort Campbell generate substantial revenues to the local economies. Fort Campbell is the largest employee in the four-county region and it is estimated that the installation contributes approximately $1.75 million daily to the area's economy. APPENDIX C AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT OF MCGHEE TYSON AND THE TENNESSEE AIR NATIONAL GUARD AIR FORCE BASE, ALTERNATE AERIAL PORT OF ENTRY/HEU TRANSFER SITE Location McGhee Tyson Airport (TYS) is one of five major air carrier airports in the state of Tennessee. Its proximity to the Oak Ridge area makes it an ideal candidate for an alternate port of entry. McGhee Tyson Airport is located approximately 30 miles from Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Great Smoky Mountains National Park is located approximately 20 miles to the southeast of McGhee Tyson Airport. McGhee Tyson Airport is situated on a 2,250 acre tract in northern Blount County, Tennessee at an elevation of 981 feet above mean sea level. The airport is located adjacent to the corporate limits of Alcoa, Tennessee, approximately 10 miles southwest of the Knoxville Central Business district. The cities of Alcoa and Maryville lie southeast of the airport. Much of the land to the southwest of the airport is currently undeveloped, vacant or in agricultural use. Areas of residential development bound the airport to the northwest, south, and southeast. Military Presence McGhee Tyson has historically enjoyed a strong military presence by both the U.S. Air Force and the Tennessee Air National Guard. McGhee Tyson Airport presently shares its airfield facilities with the 134th Air Refueling Group of the Tennessee Air National Guard and the Army Aircraft Support Facility. The Tennessee Air National Guard occupies 323 acres on the west side of the airport. The main gate of the Air National Guard Base is immediately south of the air traffic control tower site. Once inside the main gate, there are about 40 structures which support the operations of the Air National Guard. The 134th's primary mission is to provide refueling support for military aircraft, and it has been assigned eleven KC-135E tankers. Most of the tankers are parked on the northern ramp within the Air National Guard complex, whereas one tanker is positioned on the south ramp. Also assigned to the Base is the 110th/119th Tactical Air Command Control and the 228th Combat Communications Squadron. Air Traffic Activities With 1.2 million passengers per year, McGhee Tyson was identified in 1990 by the National Transportation Research Board as one of the 28 underutilized airports in the United States. Delays from air traffic congestion are therefore unusual at this facility. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 established the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as the responsible agency for the control and use of navigable airspace within the United States. Administratively, control of air traffic at McGhee Tyson Airport is assigned to the FAA Southern Region located in Atlanta, Georgia with coordinating efforts from the Memphis Airports District Office. Together, it is the responsibility of Air Traffic Control, the FAA and each pilot to ensure that procedures are followed which maintain proper separation between aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control Tower is operated continuously 24 hours per day to control the movements of all aircraft within a five mile radius of the airport up to an altitude of 2,500 feet. Other control systems are in place for distances further out. Annual aircraft operations (takeoffs and landings) remained within a range of about 120,000 to 167,000 operations per year. Air carrier operations have remained between 17,000 and 26,000. Military traffic has leveled off to slightly more than 20,000 annual operations. Table 1 shows an overview of operations summary by category for the last 5 years. Commercial airlines that service the airport are: Delta, Northwest, United and USAir. Commuter Airlines include American Eagle, Atlantic Coast (United Express), CC Airlines (US Air Express), Comair Airlines (Delta Connection), Mesaba Airlines (Northwest Airlink), and Trans World Express. The top five markets from McGhee Tyson are Atlanta, New York, Washington D.C., Chicago, and Memphis. In addition to passenger service, McGhee Tyson Airport is serviced by three all-cargo airlines: Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and Airborne Express. In 1993, nearly 18,999 tons of air freight and air mail was loaded onto aircraft at McGhee Tyson Airport. ** Table C-1 Historical Operations Summary by Category at McGhee Tyson Airport Year Air Carrier Air Taxi General Military Total Aviation 1990 22,407 30,186 90,811 23,501 166,905 1991 21,035 25,379 80,122 19,893 146,429 1992 20,640 22,108 64,091 21,038 127,877 1993 20,231 24,660 65,830 20,320 131,041 ** Air Cargo Facilities The air cargo facilities at McGhee Tyson Airport are in two locations. The primary area for all-cargo airlines is located at the northwest end of the airfield. Specifically designed for Federal Express, United Parcel Service and Airborne Express, the area provides more than 55,000 square feet of automobile/truck parking and circulation. In addition, the U.S. Customs Service operates a port of entry for international freight shipments. Air Support Facilities McGhee Tyson Airport is an air carrier facility under certification by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14, Part 139, governs the operations of land airports serving DOT certificated air carriers using aircraft with greater that 30 seats. Within these regulations, specific requirements for the operation of aircraft rescue and fire fighting equipment and service have been established. In addition, the airport is required to maintain and update an FAA approved Airport Certification Manual which outlines operational procedures and personnel responsibilities for the safe operation of the airport. The fixed base operators (KnoxAir and Cherokee Aviation) provide fueling services to the airlines and general aviation aircraft. There are separate fuel storage sites on the airport between Alcoa Highway and Runway 5R-23L for KnoxAir and Cherokee Aviation. Total fuel storage in underground tanks consists of 225,000-gallons of Jet-A-fueling trucks which directly fuel airline and general aviation aircraft. In addition to these fuel supplies, the airport and KnoxAir maintain a supply of gas and diesel fuel for maintenance and snow removal vehicles. Highway Transportation Corridors Access to McGhee Tyson is available via Interstates 75, 40, and 140. Interstate 75 is a primary north-south ground transportation route accessing the Southeastern United States and Upper Midwest. Interstate 40 is one of the most widely used trucking routes connecting the east and west coasts of the United States. Interstate 140 connects to Pellissippi Parkway and provides ready access to Oak Ridge bypassing downtown Knoxville. Easy access to I-40, I-140, and I-75 is provided by U.S. Highway 129 (Alcoa Highway). Airport Facilities McGhee Tyson Airport is categorized in the National Plan of Integrated Airport systems as a medium-haul commercial service airport. This category does not restrict or prevent its use by general aviation or military aircraft. Rather, the categorization of airports according to the typical "haul" or "stage" length of its commercial airline fleet is intended to provide a general overview of the airport's role in the national airport system. McGhee Tyson airport is also categorized as a "small hub" air passenger market. This means that McGhee Tyson Airport annually enplanes between 0.05 and 0.25 percent of all certified airline emplanements in the United States. Runways This existing airfield includes two parallel runways oriented in a northeast/southwest direction. Runway 5L-23R is 9,008 feet long and 150 feet wide. In addition, there are 1,000-foot concrete/asphalt overruns beyond each end of Runway 5L-23R which provide safety margins for aircraft operations. The runway is concrete (with a wire-combed surface) and is strength rated at 90,000 pounds for single wheel gear load aircraft, 200,000 pounds for dual-wheel gear aircraft, 350,000 pounds for dual-tandem gear aircraft, and 540,000 pounds for double dual tandem gear aircraft. Runway 5R-23L is 9,000 feet long and 150 feet wide. This runway is made of asphalt with a grooved surface treatment. The pavement of this runway is strength rated at 250,000 pounds for dual-tandem gear. The strength ratings for each runway are not necessarily operational threshold limitations. Each of these runways are capable of handling many aircraft in the civilian and military fleet. Most of the existing airfield components currently meet or exceed Airport Reference Code D-IV design standards. The length of both runways will also accommodate the majority of large airplanes weighing up to 60,000 pounds. The runways are adequate for landings and takeoffs by the largest Air Force cargo aircraft including the C-5A. Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Requirements for Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting services at an airport are established under the Federal Aviation Regulation Part 139. The airport's Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting facility is located directly south of the passenger terminal apron. The Air National Guard maintains a rescue and fire fighting facility on the west side of the airport as well. There is an agreement between the Airport Authority and Air National Guard which provides equipment if the need arises. Fuel Storage Fuel storage and fueling services for general aviation, air cargo, and the airlines is handled by the fixed base operators. Available storage includes 225,000-gallons of Jet A and 39,000-gallons of 100 low lead (Avgas) located within a 1.5 acre site at the north end of the general aviation area. In addition, several fueling trucks with various capacities are used for actual disbursement of fuel for aircraft. Climate The predominant wind direction is from the southwest and over 90 percent of the recorded wind speed at the airport is less than 10 knots. Normal daily mean temperatures range form 38.8 degrees Fahrenheit in January to 77.1 degrees Fahrenheit in July, with an annual average daily mean temperature of 58.4 degrees Fahrenheit. Temperatures occasionally rise above 100 degrees Fahrenheit and fall as low as 5 degrees Fahrenheit. The average annual precipitation in the area is 48 inches. The precipitation is mostly in the form of rain and is fairly evenly distributed throughout the year with the summer months being slightly wetter. The area receives approximately 12 inches of snow per year. Air Quality An air quality analysis is required for projects at airports with passengers in excess of 1.3 million at commercial service airports. While McGhee Tyson Airport is not forecast to reach this level of emplanements until 2015, coordination would be required with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation on air quality issues prior to any new construction. In a letter dated April 25, 1994, the Department of Environment and Conservation stated that Blount County is currently in attainment for all Air Quality Standards. There are currently ten airport sources of air pollution which have permits from the Division of Air Pollution Control. The proposed action would not result in new construction/demolition activities that would impact these resources. Water Quality The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has established a requirement for permits on all storm water runoff from industrial activities, including airports. The Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority has joined a group permit application process. This group permit application has been completed through the American Association of Airport Executives. Historic, Architectural, Archaeological, and Cultural Resources There are no properties eligible for or listed on the National Register of Historic Places at McGhee Tyson Airport. Endangered or Threatened Species of Flora and Fauna Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency is not aware of any rare or endangered plants or animals that would be adversely impacted. Wetlands The Department of the Army, in a letter dated May 5, 1994, indicated the presence of several streams on airport property. Also, previous meetings with airport personnel reviewed that there are wetlands on airport property as well. A delineation of the potential wetlands areas is not available. Noise The Transportation Systems Center of the U.S. Department of Transportation at Cambridge, Massachusetts has developed a noise model for determining the noise levels that occur in and around an airport. This model for determining the level of noise impacts at an airport has been accepted as a standard by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This model provides an objective standard to determine noise impacts and defines areas where noise impacts are sufficient to require action to be taken. The Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority will be conducting a Federal Aviation Regulation Part 150 Noise Compatibility Study for the airport. Socioeconomic Data Socioeconomic data for the Greater Knoxville area has been collected and reprinted by several sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau, Greater Knoxville Area Chamber of Commerce and the Knoxville Urban Area Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC). An airport service area is generally described as the area from which the primary demand for airline passengers may be found. For McGhee Tyson Airport, the primary service area is considered to be the sixteen counties which comprise the eastern Tennessee district. Therefore, socioeconomic data for these sixteen counties was obtained. Sevier and Blount counties had the most significant rates of population increase between 1980 and 1990, at 23.24 percent and 10.54 percent, respectively. The entire sixteen county area experienced a growth rate in population of 5.32 percent between 1980 and 1990, from 845,121 to 890,049. ** Table C-2 Historic Population Estimates East Tennessee District (16 Counties) 1970 1980 1990 Change 1980-1990 East Tennessee District 705,445 845,121 890,049 5.32% ** ** Table C-3 Top Ten Employers in the Greater Knoxville Area Name # of Employees Type of Business Martin Marietta Energy 16,059 Systems Inc. Knox County Pulic 6,125 Schools University of Tennessee 4,990 University of Tennessee 4,072 Medical Center Fort Sanders Alliance 3,788 Levi Strauss and Co. 3,519 Aluminum Company of 1,600 America State of Tennessee 2,596 Knox County 2,500 City of Knoxville 2,482 ** THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20 BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95