QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER
DISPOSITION OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN THE BALTICS
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew have the Baltic nations indicated any interest in claiming all or part of the Soviet TLE on their territory?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW.[Deleted.]
Senator WARNER. Assuming the Soviets retain ownership of this equipment, they would presumably move it back to Soviet territory. Are the numbers of TLE in the Baltics sufficient to cause a breach of the treaty ceilings on equipment in the flank zone if it were moved to the Leningrad Military District?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. [Deleted.]
COMPLIANCE OF SOVIET REPUBLICS WITH CFE
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, in response to a question submitted by Senator Biden concerning the obligations which flow from Soviet ratification of the CFE Treaty, Secretary Baker, responded that:
Ratification by the new Union will place a binding obligation under international law on the Union to comply with the CFE Treaty. If will be up to central Union authorities to see that treaty obligations are fulfilled throughout the territory which comprises the Union.
In the aftermath of the coup, central authorities have not had great success in getting the compliance of the republics with Union-wide agreements, the most recent example being the agreement on economic union which was signed by only 8 of Soviet's remaining 12 republics. Given this record, do you think it is realistic to assume that the central authorities will be able to secure the compliance of its independence-minded republics to the CFE Treaty?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. Despite continuing uncertainties about the nature of the relationship between the center and constituent republics, we think it is realistic to expect the compliance of republics with the CFE Treaty.
- Officials of both the center and republics have repeatedly stated their intention that all international accords and obligations undertaken by the U.S.S.R., including those in the area of arms control, should be strictly observed.
- And, we have received no indications whatsoever that there is opposition in any of the republics to ratification and implementation of CFE. In particular, Ukrainian officials have repeatedly expressed support for CFE and their intention of participating and at a joint press conference on October 30, Ukraine and Russian leaders announced their republics' commitment to early ratification of the treaty.
- We also may be seeing a tendency toward more cooperation in other areas. With regard to the economic union, for example, we understand that now Ukraine and Moldova have signed, bringing the total to 10 republics, leaving out only Georgia and Azerbaijan.
- Certainly the wish of both a new Soviet union (and presumably of its constituent republics), and of any former republics which opt for complete independence, for acceptance by and assistance from the international community are powerful incentives for supporting CFE, which is seen by the United States and all major European power as the cornerstone of a new security order.
Senator WARNER. What are the implications for Western security if the central authorities are unsuccessful in their attempts to secure such compliance by the republics?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. There could, of course, be implications for Western security if the central Soviet authorities were unsuccessful in securing compliance CFE obligations by and assistance from republics remaining in a union or opting out. much of a threat might be posed would depend on the particular circumstances.
- The amount of equipment in the smaller republics (Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) is small. For example, data submitted by the Soviet Union under CFE shows the Soviet Union holds in those republics, respectively, only 1 percent, 1.5 percent, 5.1 percent and 2.4 percent of the total number of Soviet tanks located in the ATTU-portion of the U.S.SR. As for the larger republics, Ukraine and Byelorussia, with a reported 39 and 13.6 percent of the tanks, respectively, their full cooperation in implementation CFE will be more important. All indications so far are, however, that both fully support CFE.
- We believe that authorities of these and other republics recognize the importance of implementing and complying with CFE and this is reflected in their statements of support for the treaty.
- From a military standpoint, the union and the republics stand to gain as much as other signatories from the stable, predictable structure or security relations CFE will institute. Moreover, the presumed wish of all for acceptance by and assistance from the International community should be powerful incentives for supporting CFE, which is seen by the United States and all major European powers as the cornerstone of a new security order. Any republics opting for full independence will have similar motivations.
- Should a republic nevertheless refuse to cooperate to ensure Soviet-compliance with the treaty, the United States and its allies would consider an appropriate response, depending on the circumstances prevailing at the time.
- Ultimately, the United States and other participants will always have the option, should they believe their supreme interests are jeopardized by non-compliance on the part of any participant or any other extraordinary event related to the treaty, to withdraw from the treaty.
UKRAINIAN MILITARY FORCES
Senator WARNIER. Secretary Bartholomew, on October 22, the Ukrainian legislature voted to create its own military with a strength of up to 450,000 troops. In addition, the Ukraine claimed earlier jurisdiction over the Soviet soldiers and military equipment-including nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.
Notwithstanding the joint Ukrainian-Russian Federation preige statement of October 80, such actions by the Ukraine seem to indicate that the Ukraine does not envision acceding to deal with the prospect of a very large and independent Ukrainian military force facing treaty-limited nations in eastern and western Europe?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. We do not agree that Ukrainian actions indicate that it does not envision participating in the CFE Treaty.
- Ukrainian officials have on a number of occasions--in addition to the October 30 statement you cite-indicated their support for the CFE Treaty and its early implementation and their intention of participating. Ukrainian leader Kravchuk, along with other Republic leaders, have In the past pledged to honor previous arms control agreements, including the CFE Treaty.
- Moreover, the October 30 statement, which was released by Ukraine and Russia following talks between their Foreign Ministers, is a clear expression at least of Ukraine's intention to abide by CFE provisions pertaining to equipment on their territory and to support early ratification and implementation.
- The two republics "reaffirmed their readiness to observe the clause" (of the START and CFE Treaties] concerning armaments situated on their territories" and pledged as well "Jointly with the other republics concerned, to undertake the necessary steps for these documents to come Into force as soon as possible."
- In light of the fact that the CFE Treaty is seen by the United States and all the major European powers as the basis of a new European security system, and that the acceptance by and economic assistance from the international community will be crucial to an independent Ukraine, we believe there would be powerful political, military and economic incentives for Ukraine to participate in CFE.
- One specific incentive, we believe, would be the limitations the regime would impose on Ukraine's neighbors, including Russia.
- We and some of our key allies have addressed Ukrainian officials on this matter and we will continue working with them to ensure the viability of the treaty.
UKRAINIAN MILITARY PLANS
- The Ukrainian parliament has passed legislation allowing the establishment of an armed force of up to 450,000 personnel, comprising ground forces, a navy and an air force, collectively totaling no more than 420,000 men and a National Guard of no more than 30,000.
- Ukrainian leader Kravchuk has indicated that the republic military should be "much smaller" than this.
- Thus, Ukrainian policies do not appear likely to present any threat to the equipment limitations imposed by the CFE Treaty.
- We believe the Soviet General Staff had planned to station as many as 17 active maneuver divisions in Ukraine, and this force would have been within the requirements for treaty-limited equipment. If the Soviets were to allow Ukraine to absorb some of the TLE entitlement, a republic force of the size being discussed would not exceed the treaty's provisions.
IMPLICATIONS OF NONCOMPLIANCE BY THE UKRAINE
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, in response to a question submitted by Senator Biden, Secretary Baker stated:
The treaty regime would not be endangered by a further shrinking of the union-unless a republic holding significant amounts of equipment, such as the Ukraine, were to withdraw and refuse to accede to the treaty as an independent.
Given the announcements regarding creation of an independent military by the Ukraine in late October, a Ukrainian decision to both withdraw from the Union and refuse to accede to the CFE Treaty appears to be a very real possibility. How does the administration plan to address this problem?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. All signs so far point to strong Ukrainian support for CFE. Among other assurances on this score, Ukrainian and Russian leaders-led by their Foreign and Defense ministers---reaffirmed in a public statement on October 30 their readiness to observe CFE and to undertake the necessary steps to bring the treaty into force as soon as possible. We believe there are significant military, political and economic incentives for them to participate, and that they recognize this. Moreover, based on what we have heard-to date of Ukrainian military plans, we believe that equipment holdings should still be below CFE ceilings applicable to that area.
- It is the position of the administration that, in order, to maintain the integrity of the treaty regime, an independent Ukraine holding significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories would almost certainly need to be a CFE participant. Representatives of both the United States and other CFE signatories have made that clear to Ukrainian officials. We will continue to address this issue with them, making clear the negative implications of non-adherence.
- Should an independent Ukraine nevertheless refuse to participate in the treaty, the appropriate U.S. response would depend on the precise circumstances at the time. A decision to withdraw, e.g., would always be an option. Senator WARNER. In response to a question by Senator Biden concerning impact of a decision by Russia, Ukraine, or Belorussia to rejoin the CFE Treaty regime, Secretary Baker said:
If the Ukraine proceeds along the path to independence with large military forces, what response would you consider "appropriate?" In order to safeguard U.S. and allied interests, should the Senate attach a condition to its advice and consent of the treaty which would require some type of Ukrainian compliance with CFE?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. All signs so far point to Ukrainian support for CFE. We believe there are significant military, politic and economic incentives for them to do so, and that they recognize this. Moreover, based on what we have heard to date of Ukrainian military plans, we believe that equipment holdings should still be below CFE ceilings applicable to that area.
- Should Ukraine become independent and nevertheless refuse to participate in the treaty, the appropriate U.S. response would depend on the precise circumstances at the time. A decision to withdraw, e.g., would be an option, but might not be appropriate in terms of the situation prevailing at the time.
- The administration does not believe it is necessary for the Senate to attach conditions to the CFE Treaty. In the case of Ukraine, it is already the administration's position that, in order to maintain the viability of the treaty, it almost certainly would be necessary for a fully independent Ukraine with significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories to become a treaty participant-and as such, to comply fully with CFE obligations.
- Again, however, an absolute requirement for Ukrainian adherence to the treaty might not be the appropriate response in the situation pertaining at the time.
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty in November 1990, the Soviet Union reported significantly less treaty limited equipment (TLE) within the ATTU zone than had been estimated by U.S. intelligence agencies. While there remains some disagreement over the exact numbers of TLE omitted from the Soviet data declaration, there is agreement within the intelligence community that at least some TLE was not reported. Some analysts believe that he amount of unreported TLE is significant and that more than half of this equipment remains within the ATTU.
The under-reporting of TLE significantly reduced the Soviet Union's reduction obligations under the treaty. More importantly, General Colin Powell testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he believed the amount of unreported TLE was potentially militarily significant. Secretary Baker also indicated in his July testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this was a serious issue and that discussions with the Soviets were underway to resolve this issue.
Is it the position of the administration that the Soviets should agree to revise upward their previous data declarations in order to accurately reflect their TLE holding a in the ATTU, with a corresponding increase in their reduction obligations? Does the administration intend to resolve this issue prior to exchanging instruments on ratification of CFE?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. [Deleted.]
ACTIONS OF OTHER SIGNATORIES TOWARD RATIFICATION
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, to date only three signatory countries to the CFE Treaty have actually ratified the agreement---Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In light of the recent coup attempt and current upheaval in the Soviet Union, some hesitation on the part of our NATO allies and the countries, of Eastern Europe is not surprising.
What is your impression of each country's current attitude toward ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty? What do you believe are their primary reasons for delaying ratification? When do you estimate the other signatory countries will complete ratification of the agreement?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. Our indications are that all CFE signatories are committed to prompt ratification of the treaty. With one or possibly two exceptions (which are the result of particular constitutional or political circumstances) all signatories have assured us they expect to ratify the treaty by the end of this year.
FORMER WARSAW PACT
Bulgaria: Ratified.
Czechoslovakia: Ratified.
Hungary: Ratified.
Poland: Awaiting President's Signature (which constitutes ratification); expected to take place before November 19.
Romania: Treaty scheduled to be considered shortly by the Supreme Council for Defense and will then be taken up by Parliament. Government firmly supports treaty, but exact timeframe for decision is difficult to predict, although the Foreign Ministry expects ratification by the end of the year.
U.S.S.R.: The Soviets want to move ahead with ratification. However, it is too early to predict what effect Ukrainian failure to participate in deliberations of the Council of Republics will have on ratification. Nonetheless, at a joint press conference on October 30, Russian and Ukrainian Defense Ministers reiterated their commitment to ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty
NATO
Belgium: Ratified
Canada: On October 3, Orders in Council were issued by the Governor General of Canada to ratify the CFE Treaty and associated agreements of June 14, 1991. The instrument of ratification will be sent to the treaty depositary (the Government of the Netherlands) before the end of November. Completion of this process constitutes ratification for Canada.
Denmark: Government plans to submit treaty to Parliament in the very near future and complete the process by year's end.
France: The National Assembly is unlikely to consider the treaty before the end of November with ratification expected sometime before year's end.
Germany: Parliamentary approval has been given. Completion of the ratification process expected by early December.
Greece: The government intends to submit the treaty to the full Parliament shortly; ratification---is expected to occur promptly.
Iceland: Parliament expected to consider in November, with ratification expected by year's end.
Italy: The treaty was forwarded to both houses of Parliament on September 13 with a request for approval by the end of November.
Luxembourg: Ratification is expected before year's end.
Netherlands: Ratified.
Norway: The government has expressed optimism that ratification will occur before November 19.
Portugal: Although there is no question but that the treaty will be ratified, the Portuguese have told us they may not do so until 1992, due to elections and EC Presidency responsibilities. We and other allies continue to press them.
Spain: The treaty will be submitted to the Parliament in the next few weeks; ratification is expected by the end of December or beginning of January.
Turkey: The Turks hope to ratify by late November/early December.
United Kingdom: The government expects the treaty to be ratified by mid-November.
OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET RATIFICATION OF CFE
Senator WARNEIT. Secretary Bartholomew, despite the stated intentions of Soviet President Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin, the CFE Treaty does not appear at this time to be commanding the attention of the Soviet political process. More urgent matters, such as the economic situation, appear likely to remain priorities for some time. In addition, the Soviet Union has not yet acted on a defense budget for the coming year. In view of the economic and political chaos in Moscow, what do YOU, believe is a realistic estimate of the prospects for ratification of the CFE Treaty in the Soviet Union?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The Soviets have begun the ratification process in the Supreme Soviet for both treaties.
- The rapid evolution of the political landscape in the Soviet Union since the coup has obviously injected a new measure of uncertainty.
- Nonetheless, we were assured by leaders in the Soviet Union during Secretary Baker's visit there in September that ratification of both treaties is a high priority item for them. This was reiterated during high-level meetings in October.
- More recently, Ukrainian and RSNR officials agreed to work toward speedy implementation of CFE and START during their discussions October 30 on security issues of mutual concern.
- Recent comments by Soviet military leaden, including an October 30 interview by Defense Minister Shaposhnikov in lavestiva, seem to reflect a working assumption in the Ministry of Defense that CFE and START will be implemented.
- While the precise role of the republics in the process remains uncertain at this point, we have received no indications whatsoever that there is opposition in any of the republics to ratification, and implementation of CFE (and START). Officials Of both the center and republics have repeatedly stated their intention that all international accords and obligations undertaken by the U.S.S.R., including those in the area of arms control, should be strictly observed.
- We are monitoring proceedings in the Council of the Republics closely. It is too early to predict whether the failure, so far, of Ukraine to participate in the deliberations of that body will ultimately affect the Soviet ratification process.
OBLIGATIONS OF INDEPENDENT REPUBLICS
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, as more republics of the former Soviet Union move toward independence, how is the security regime which is established by the CFE Treaty affected?
Do such newly independent states have any obligations under international law to comply with the treaty?
If not, the Senate is considering attaching a condition to the treaty designed to protect Western interests which could be compromised if new states, such as the Ukraine, create large military forces. Does the administration have any thoughts as to how such a reservation should be structured?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW.
Effect of Events in U.S.S.R. on CFE Security Regime
- In the administration's view, CFE's value is heightened by recent developments in the Soviet Union. Indeed, implementation of the treaty is more advantageous to the United States and to all involved today than ever before.
- Above all, it will provide a reliable, stable structure for security relations. a structure is needed especially during unsettled times and to serve as a base for further cooperation developments in the security sphere.
- Implementation of the treaty, with ceiling, limits and other provisions intact, will reduce levels of dey offensive armaments, limit the amounts of equipment which can be held collectively and individually, vastly increase information about force structure and equipment deployments, and provide a stable foundation for European political and economic development.
- Current disputes and the long history of ethnic tension among the Republics and their neighbors in Eastern Europe highlight the need to implement CFE.
- In our view, we would be far better off during these unsettled times if CFE were in force-providing an internationally-recognized framework of constraints on military activities and a forum for addressing questions and disputes.
- CFE ceilings are set by Group but there are no group obligations. All treat responsibilities fall on individual nations, and independent republics which participate in the treaty would be expected to fulfill those responsibilities. Each participant, e.g., has maximum equipment levels and a quota of inspections which can be conducted against it.
- The treaty is thus not only well suited to a Europe of independent countries, but is the only legally binding mechanism readily available for regulating security relations in this new, more uncertain environment. The basic structure of the treaty would not be affected by the addition of new states on the Eastern side; the Group of Six would expand and its equipment entitlements would be reallocated.
- It will be some time before we know the exact nature and configuration of the entity or entities that will emerge from the political transformation under way in the U.S.S.R., but we have carefully analyzed a range of outcomes and have concluded that moat would require only minor changes to the treaty text---such as name changes. The addition ;f participant states would require a reallocation of Group equipment entitlements and inspection quotas; such changes are provided for under the treaty.
- We have already accounted for one change. On October 18, the 22 CFE signatories agreed to a legally-binding statement whereby equipment of the Soviet Union in treaty categories in the Baltics will be subject to all treaty provisions.
- While the composition of some subzones might change as result of accessions of republics from the union, and new sovereign states might acquire control of subzone elements, it is unlikely that more than tracking fixes would be required to adapt the treaty text.
- The major territorial components of the subzones will remain part of the treaty regime (e.g., an independent Ukraine), and the principle behind subzonal limited-i.e., the prevention of undue force concentrations---particularly on the flanks and in central Europe-will remain valid.
- The military districts of the Soviet Union---as defined pieces of territory---were used along with independent countries as elements in the zonal scheme. Even if those pieces of territory are no longer part of the Union, they can continue to be elements in the zonal sublimit system. That applies as well if a new state includes more than one military district and has territory in more than one subzone.
Ukraine
- The administration does not believe it is necessary for the Senate to attach conditions to the CFE Treaty.
- In the case of a republic such as Ukraine, if it becomes independent and holds significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories, it is already the administration's position that it almost certainly would be necessary for it to be a treaty participant.
- Moreover, Ukrainian officials have on a number of occasions stressed to us their support for the CFE Treaty and its implementation. Republic leaders, in. eluding Ukrainian leader Kravchuk, have in the past pledged to honor previous arms control agreements, including the CFE Treaty.
- We will continue working with Ukrainian officials to ensure the viability of the treaty.
Legal Obligations
- As to whether a newly-independent republic would have treaty obligations, this is a complicated and unsettled area of international law. The least precedents on state succession are somewhat contradictory and commentators on that law hold differing views. Some precedent supports the views that a seceding state is entitled to a "clear slate" as a matter of law, while other precedent indicates that treaty obligations remain binding on such a state. Given the uncertainty about the law, we should, as a matter of policy, insist on Ukrainian participation in CFE. Indeed, on October 30, the Ukraine indicated its support for CPE and stated that it will observe the treaty.
- As a general matter of international law, ratification of a treaty by the U.S.S.R. would be binding on the Ukraine until it became an independent state-which could happen either if the U.S.S.R. recognized Ukrainian independence or the Ukraine meets the requirements for statehood under international law. (Of course, such a conclusion does not depend simply on a state's assertion of independence, without regard to the facts of the situation.)
- However, it is not clear whether the Ukraine would be obligated under international law to abide by CFE if it subsequently becomes independent and does not indicate its intention to be bound. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States (to which the United States is not a party) takes the position that (in cases other than former colonies) where a part of a state breaks away to form a new state, treaty relations continue and the new states does not have the option to pick and choose which treaties it will adhere to.
- On the other hand, the Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law takes the position that, in such a situation, a new state has the right to a "clear slate"---that is, to decide which of the treaty obligations of its "parent" state it will accept and which it will not. (We have taken the views that the Baltic States are entitled to a "clear slate," but in that case the United States had never accepted the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union in the first place.)
- Given the importance of Ukrainian participation in CFE, we will want to take affirmative steps to ensure such participation rather than simply relying on assertions about international law. Under the circumstances, we should engage the Ukrainians at the appropriate point and insist on their agreement that they will apply the CFE Treaty.
CONCERNS LEADING TO CFE TREATY
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, in his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations committee on July 11, 1991, Secretary Baker outlined the following as U.S. concerns which led to the CFE negotiations:
- The massive preponderance of Soviet offensive forces capable of attacking Western Europe;
- The danger of short warning blitzkrieg created by military secrecy and closed societies in the East;
- The political weight of Soviet occupation forces in Central and Eastern Europe, burdening the prospects for reform; and
- The economic costs of defending against the threat.
In my view, all of these concerns have been greatly reduced by what has already happened in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Please explain what overriding concerns we now have that continue to make it in the best interests of the United States and our allies to ratify this treaty.
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. We agree that all the listed concerns have been significantly reduced by recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There is, however, a world of difference between a military threat reduced by circumstance--- which is always subject to change-and a military balance established in perpetuity by treaty obligations. This is one of the key assurances CFE will provide.
- The CFE Treaty, however, evolved during its negotiation to being far more than a means of establishing an East-West balance of conventional forces at lower levels and of containing the Soviet Union. We believe, in fact, that the treaty is more advantageous to the United States and to all involved in the more fluid situation existing today than ever before.
- Above all, CFE will provide a reliable, stable structure for security relations. Such a structure is needed especially during unsettled times and to serve as a base for further cooperative developments in the security sphere.
- Implementation of the treaty, with ceilings, limits and other provisions intact, will reduce levels of key offensive armaments, limit the amounts of equipment which can be held collectively and individually, vastly increase information about force structure and equipment deployments, permit extensive on-site inspections, and provide a stable foundation for European political and economic development.
- Current disputes and the long history of ethnic tension among the Republics and their neighbors in Eastern Europe highlight the need for CFE.
- In our view, we would be far better off during these unsettled times if CFE were in force----providing an internationally-recognized framework of constraints on military activities and a forum for addressing questions and disputes.
- CFE ceilings are set by Group but there are no group obligations. All treaty responsibilities fall on individual nations. Each participant, e.g., has maximum equipment levels and a quota of inspections which ran be conducted against it.
- The treaty is thus not only well suited to a Europe of independent countries, but is the only such legally-binding mechanism readily available for regulating security relations in this new, more uncertain environment.
- The United States and the West can only gain from CFE--even if uncertainties persist about our Soviet treaty partner. The treaty's reductions, limits, information exchanges and on-site inspections will impose minimal constraints on us, but major ones on Soviet successors who will continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe.
U.S. INSPECTION CAPABILITIES
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, does the United States have enough language-trained and technically qualified people to verify the CFE Treaty along with INF and START?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. Yes. Currently the On-site Inspection Agency has about 2,500 names in its database of qualified inspectors and escorts for all arms control regimes. Recently, we have augmented our teams with specialists from a variety of interagency fields to enhance OSIA's inspection capability and to provide opportunities for U.S. technical experts who have studied CPE Treaty-related TLE. Inspection: teams consist of a core of six people, including linguists and military members with combat arms or aircrew experience. Core teams are augmented by up to three individuals with Soviet or area CFE expertise. The variety of experience on, the inspection teams provides the flexibility necessary to conduct inspections of all treaty-limited equipment subject to the CFP, Treaty adequately.
U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, it has been pointed out that intelligence activities unrelated to CFE could be undertaken by the Soviet inspection teams who are allowed access to sites under U.S. and allied control in Europe. Do we have sufficient counterintelligence capabilities to cope with this?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The Department of Defense is both concerned about and alert to the potential for intelligence exploitation posed by granting Soviet inspection teams access to U.S. declared sites in Europe. This same concern was also prevalent during similar in inspections conducted under the INF Treaty.
- Using INF as a model, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and the counter-intelligence agencies of the military services have developed a plan for protecting sensitive weapons systems while still complying with the requirements of the treaty. Protection against loss of technical information on U.S. weapons systems has been considered, Counterintelligence-trained personnel will conduct a variety of defensive measures to protect escort and site personnel from any attempts to cultivate or recruit them.
- To perform the additive counterintelligence missions which this and all other, treaties require, additional resources will-be required. Alternatives to providing these resources will be among the topics addressed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures) in her November 14, 1991 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Senator WARNER. Secretary Bartholomew, what will happen to Soviet aircraft other equipment) held within a republic should the state leave the union?
In a situation where aircraft levels are relatively low for a breakaway republics will cascading still be a consideration after the republic has become independents.
In sum, what assurances do we have on the control of TLE in the breakaway republics?
Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. [Deleted.]
DEFINITION OF A "BATTLE TANK"
Senator WARNER. Ambassador Woolsey, you may remember that during our hearings on the INF Treaty, this committee identified a problem with the overall definition of the weapons covered by the treaty, specifically with respect to future weapons platforms. I have examined the definition for the various systems covered by this treaty, and have one question with respect to the definition of a tank.
In Article II, paragraph (C) it states that: "The term 'battle tank' means a self-propelled armored righting vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun, necessary to engage armored and other targets. . . ." In the Article-by-Article analysis for the CFE Treaty, it stated that: "The 'battle tank' definition was drafted in this way in order to provide a procedural mechanism for addressing, in the Joint Consultative Group (in accordance with Article XVI of the treaty) or in conferences (in accordance with Article XXI of the treaty) the deployment of new wea no technologies."
For clarification, Ambassador Woolsey, how would the parties resolve a weapons system that meets all the criteria for a "battle tank," but instead "high muzzle velocity direct fire gun," it employs a high-power labor or some other non-muzzle weapon system? I this already covered by the treaty, or would all Parties have to agree to include this under the limits set forth for "battle tanks?" If the latter, would this require a consensus of all the parties to the treaty, and if so, could I the state party that developed the system veto such an attempt to cover this new weapons technology under the terms of the treaty?
I also ask this question because the treaty definition for "combat aircraft" cover weapon systems that use "other weapons destruction" technology to cover technologies not known today. Why didn't we use a similar phrase for "battle tanks?"
Ambassador WOOLSEY. If a State Party were to field a new armored fighting vehicle designed to accomplish the mission described in the general criteria set forth in the first paragraph of the definition of "battle tank," but did not meet the specific criteria for current battle tanks set forth in the second paragraph of the definition (e.g., an armored combat vehicle meeting all of the specific criteria except that it possessed a smaller-less than 75 millimeters in caliber-but more capable main armament employing a high-powered laser), such a vehicle might very well be deemed a battle tank for purposes of compliance with the treaty.
In such a case, any State Party would have the right, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XVI of the treaty, to raise the issue before the Joint Consultative Group (JCG). Pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article, the States Parties would be required to address the issue. If consensus were reached to do so, the States Parties could change the specific criteria to capture such armored vehicles and then add such vehicles to the list of existing types of battle tanks in the Protocol on Existing Types.
While it is true that the State Party fielding the new armored righting vehicle could break consensus and thus prevent the changes from being approved, such an action would almost certainly lead to that State Party being isolated. Experience with the Article III counting rule controversy demonstrates that under such circumstances States Parties have compromised in order to resolve even the most contentious Issues. In any event, if the problem were not resolved, the other States Parties would have the right to take whatever action is allowed under the treaty or international law that they believed was appropriate in response.
The phrase "other weapons of destruction" was not used in the battle tank definition for two reasons. First, the drafters wanted to make the battle tank definition as precise as possible. It was for this reason that the second paragraph of the definition, with specific criteria, was added. Second, it was believed that the general criteria in the first paragraph, along with the dispute resolution mechanisms of the JCG would be adequate to handle all potential compliance issues in the future.
ELIMINATING THE DISPARITY OF FORCES IN EUROPE
Senator WAREN. Ambassador Woolsey and Secretary Bartholomew, in the Secretary of State's letter to the President recommending that he submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, he stated that the treaty ". . . will eliminate the enormous conventional forces disparity that has existed between the East and West since World War II." If the West does not exercise its right to maintain forces at the levels allowed for under the treaty, does this statement still hold true? I ask this question because it is becoming apparent that many Western countries, including the United States, will maintain forces at the levels agreed to by the Group of 16. Assuming that the future direction of a new Soviet Union will be settled one way or another in the next few years, isn't it important that the Group of 16 maintain a relatively equal level of forces in Europe?
Ambassador WOOLSEY. Yes, the treaty still meets the objective of eliminating the enormous conventional forces disparity. However, it can do this only if it is ratified by all 22 signatories and enters into force making reductions a legal requirement. The treaty is actually more effective in this area than previously envisioned because of the disappearance of East Germany as a nation and the demise of the Warsaw Pact. The alignments that existed when we started CFE negotiations in March 1985 have been completely altered, and an implemented CFE Treaty will place legal prohibitions against any reversal of this transition.
The realignment of Central and Eastern European nations and the collapse of Communist domination in the Soviet Union have reduced the risk of conflict in Central Europe. NATO is reacting to the new realities and is in the process of developing a new strategy which acknowledges the change of the past 2 years. SHAPE is conducting a command review of requirements and we expect NATO's integrated military structure to match these requirements. The alliance remains cohesive and is proving flexible enough to adjust in these rapidly changing times. As long as NATO is collectively able to meet adjusted threats we should not become overly concerned with individual national holdings of TLE. Projections of national contributions to NATO Indicate all our allies are reducing their forces by percentages roughly equal to our own reduction.
Senator WARNER. Ambassador Woolsey, I understand that access to the intelligence we obtain through our overhead Capabilities may become a problem as we decide what to share with our allies. Wouldn't inspection by surveillance aircraft be advantageous? What is the possibility of getting an "Open Skies" agreement to help in this area?
Ambassador WOOLSEY. [Deleted.]
U.S. AND NATO REDUCTION OBLIGATION
Senator WARNER. Ambassador Woolsey, how much equipment will the NATO countries as a whole be required to reduce under the treaty? How much U.S. equipment and of what type will we be required to destroy under the terms of this agreement?
Ambassador WOOLSEY. NATO collective reductions based on initial data exchange:
Tanks ............................................................ 5,523 ACVs .............................................................7,678 Artillery ........................................................2,668 Attack Helicopter ..............................................114 Combat Aircraft ................................................118 Total Reductions ............................................16,001
- If the U.S. obtains required enabling legislation to participate in the NATO Transfer of TLE Plan, we will, within provisions of the treaty, transfer TLE and reduction liabilities to other NATO allies who will destroy higher levels of TLE.
The United States will actually destroy 640 old M47 tanks and 5 old howitzers which are in the treaty area and which are excess to our requirements. The United States received these pieces of TLE back from allies under requirements of the Military Assistance Program (MAP). This equipment is of no military use and will be destroyed under provisions of the treaty.
AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION
Senator WARNER. Ambassador Woolsey, with regard to destruction of above-ceiling TLE, each state party may now eliminate up to 200 aircraft by using them as aerial targets (drones). Why was this limit established?
Ambassador WOOLSEY. The initial suggestion of using aerial targets as a method of destroying treaty-limited combat aircraft came from the United States based on our own military experience. When proposed to the Soviets, they agreed this was a good idea and suggested there be no limit on the number of reductions taken in this manner provided they were reported. NATO's delegations would not accept the Soviet proposal. A historical check of NATO's use of target drones indicated that within a 40-month period (treaty implementation) 100 would be the maximum requirement for any state party. Therefore, NATO suggested a limit of 200 on target drone conversion for combat aircraft reductions. The Soviets accepted this limit and it became a part of the treaty.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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